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2ABSTRACT
Differently from orthodox stabilization programmes, 
exchange rate based stabilization programmes (ERBS) show a 
peculiar cycle. Output, growth and consumption rise from 
the onset and there is a huge current account deficit. 
Since several programmes have been accompanied by huge 
capital inflows, the economic cycle is known as the capital 
inflows problem.
The economic literature has identified the capital inflows 
problem with a situation where there is not fiscal 
adjustment or people do not believe in the programme (see 
chapter two) . However, chapter one of this thesis shows 
that the cycle has been observed in successful and 
consistent programmes (Argentina 1991- , Bolivia 1985- ,
Israel 1985- and Mexico 1987-1994). It has been also 
observed in absence of capital inflows (Mexico 1988) . 
Furthermore, some of its negatives consequences (eg balance 
of payments crises) have occurred in programmes under 
fiscal adjustment. These observations deserve an 
explanation.
Chapter two makes a review of the literature about the 
economic effects of ERBS.
Chapter three questions why successful ERBS have observed, 
increases in long run growth and/or output from the onset 
and also the symptoms of the capital inflows problem 
(higher consumption, current account deficits). To answer 
the question, the chapter sets a growth model in a cash in 
advance economy. The main results are that sluggish 
disinflation can increase the long run growth and 
definitely increases the long run output of the economy. 
However, it cannot explain the symptoms of the capital 
inflows problem by itself. When the model is extended to
capture some externalities, then it suggests that the 
structural policies accompanying successful ERBS are 
responsible of higher consumption and current account 
deficits. In those cases, that situation is not a problem.
Chapter four questions why the symptoms of the capital 
inflows problem may appear in absence of capital inflows. 
The answer is that these symptoms emerge when there is lack 
of credibility and the monetary policy is accommodative. In 
this context, actual fiscal policy is irrelevant to combat 
the problem if it cannot change expectations of future 
inflation. Monetary policy is effective but often produces 
huge fiscal costs since real interest rates have to rise 
considerably. When the actual fiscal deficit increases the 
future expected inflation, tight monetary policy may 
generate a perverse effect fuelling the symptoms of the 
problem.
Chapter five questions why ERBS that apparently are 
consistent may be subject to the capital inflows problem 
and eventually to balance of payments crises. Political 
factors are responsible of this situation. The chapter sets 
a model that resembles the Mexican political system. Actual 
government chooses its successor. The former has incentives 
to choose a future candidate with preferences for high 
inflation. People, forecasting this possibility, consumes 
more in periods of low inflation. That generates the 
capital inflows problem.
Chapter six concludes.
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UNIT ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
In its first part, this introduction explains the origins 
of exchange rate based stabilization programmes (ERBS) and 
the emergence of the so-called capital inflows problem. The 
second section addresses the objectives, methodology and 
organisation of the thesis.
ORIGINS OF EXCHANGE RATE BASED STABILIZATION PROGRAMMES AND 
THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM
Academic and popular voices consider inflation as one of 
the most harmful economic problems. The consequences of 
increasing prices are the disruption of information on 
markets1 and reductions on the capital stock and growth2. It 
is also important to consider changes in the distribution 
of income (Taylor (1991)) and the emergence of an 
inefficient tax (Friedman (1968)), only to mention some of 
the most known arguments.
But if inflation has huge associated costs, its reduction 
also generates problems. Combatting inflation has been 
related to the emergence of unemployment. The reasons for 
this phenomenon are inertial factors and price 
inflexibility downwards3.
Several empirical studies4 find traditional Phillips curves 
in the short run. This relation is clear when inflation is 
moderate (around 20-30%. See Dornbusch and Fischer (1991)) 
and economic policy reduces it to low levels. For very
Fischer (1986), Fischer and Modigliani (1978)
2Stockman (1981), Hung (1993)
3See for example Taylor (1979) (1980) or Chadha, Masson 
and Meredith (1991) for the inertial factors and Dornbusch 
(1976), Buiter and Miller (1985) for price inflexibility 
downwards.
4Gordon (1982), Kiguel and Liviatan (1988)
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high inflation the costs of stabilization are smaller.5 
Phillips curves in open economies are related to the 
exchange rate regime. In many Latin American countries 
there have been chronic inflation episodes. The rate of 
growth of prices is high but stable6. Disinflation policies 
using the public deficit or money as main instruments have 
produced unemployment (Kiguel and Liviatan (1988) ) . A clear 
example is Mexico in 1983 and 1995. After balance of 
payments crises, traditional stabilization programmes 
generated big recessions.
Because of the costs of disinflation, several countries 
decided to carry out different stabilization programmes. In 
the late seventies, Argentina, Uruguay and Chile adopted 
the exchange rate as the main instrument to reduce 
inflation. Before, other countries had maintained fixed 
exchange rates to preserve price stability.7
Among all, Latin American countries are perhaps the most 
viable economies to manage the exchange rate. They are very 
open economies and their volumes of trade with The United 
States are enormous.
In the late seventies, policy makers thought that the law 
of one price (purchasing power parity proposition PPP) 
would always prevail. Fixing or managing the exchange rate
5Sargent (1982) shows negligible costs of disinflation 
in the hyperinflation episodes of the 1920#s. Sachs (1986) 
(1987) reports similar results for the Bolivian 
stabilization programme in 1985.
According to Bruno (1993) and Buiter and Miller (1985), the 
absence of high costs of stabilization under high inflation 
is related to the short period of contracts. All inertial 
factors disappear and the dichotomy between the real and 
monetary sectors reappears (see Bruno (1991)) .
6Between 100% and 200% see Bruno (1993), Dornbusch and 
Fischer (1991) and Pazos (1972)
7 During 1954-1976 the Mexican peso was pegged to the 
US dollar at the fixed rate of 12.5 pesos/dollar. Central 
American countries also had fixed parities to the US dollar 
(see Edwards (1995a)).
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would be analogous to manage the rate of inflation itself. 
The new stabilization strategy through the exchange rate in 
Latin America produced different results to traditional 
programmes8. Argentina, Uruguay and Chile did not show an 
initial recession but an expansion. The current account 
became a deficit.9 The real exchange rate appreciated 
considerably, showing to the PPP advocates they were wrong 
(see Dornbusch (1982)).
The most surprising result of the new programmes was the 
inflow of considerable amounts of foreign capital. They 
could finance not only the growing current account deficit, 
but also an accumulation of international reserves.10 
Though the initial effects of the exchange rate based 
stabilization programmes (ERBS) were positive, after two or 
three years the economies under consideration started 
showing negative signs. The real appreciation reduced 
competitiveness. Growth fell and banks, who initially had 
lend huge amounts of money, were unable to recover their 
loans. Several authors talked about a new problem. Carlos 
Diaz Alejandro (1981) gave it a name: the peso problem. 
Later, Guillermo Calvo (1983) renamed it as the capital 
inflows problem.
It is not possible to find a clear definition of this 
problem. Its main characteristics are loss of 
competitiveness and a current account deficit that weakens 
the external position of the country. The symptoms are 
similar to the so-called dutch disease.11 Nonetheless, this 
time the apparent cause of the problem is not the rise in
8see Kiguel and Liviatan (1992)
9Very huge in Chile: 14% of GDP in 1982.
10 Between the end of 1976 and the end of 1980, central 
bank reserves rose from 1.8 to 7.7 billion dollars in 
Argentina (Calvo (1983), Obstfeld (1985)). A similar 
process occurred in Chile and Uruguay.
lxSee Buiter and Purvis (1990) and van Wijnbergen
(1984).
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some important export product, but the financial inflows of 
foreign capital associated to an ERBS.
The described phenomenon in Latin America was not 
completely new. McKinnon and Pill (1996) report several 
examples across the world with similar features. By the 
time Argentina, Chile and Uruguay started their programmes 
(1978-1979), Mexico was also under an ERBS. This country 
faced also similar problems: a current account deficit, a 
real appreciation of the exchange rate and expansions of
the GDP. However, in Mexico private capital inflows were
not very important at that time.
The final result of the first ERBS, including Mexico 1976- 
1982, was a balance of payments crisis. Afterwards, the 
rate of inflation increased even above the levels preceding 
the programmes.
In the late eighties and early nineties, other ERBS
started. In 1985 Argentina, Brazil and Israel carried out 
stabilization policies through the exchange rate. Bolivia 
also set up a strategy to combat the hyperinflation.12 At 
the end of 1987 Mexico adopted an ERBS. Since 1991
Argentina again fights inflation through the exchange rate.
These new programmes showed again the symptoms of the 
capital inflows problem: current account deficits, real
exchange rate appreciations and GDP expansions. Capital 
inflows have been important in some cases but not in all of 
them, or at least not always.
There have been important differences in the outcomes of 
the latest programmes. At least Bolivia, Israel and 
Argentina (since 1991) have been successful ERBS. Mexico 
faced a balance of payments crisis in 1994 but apparently 
the stabilization programme broke a flat profile of GDP in
12Chapter 1 shows that the Bolivian stabilization 
programme can be considered an ERBS in many respects.
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the eighties. Argentina in 1985- and other intents 
afterwards- and Brazil failed and had similar results to 
the first ERBS.
An interesting observation of the outcomes in ERBS is the 
diversity in the results and the common factors of all the 
programmes. The capital inflows problem has appeared often. 
However, not always has been a severe problem. Fiscal 
adjustment has been absent in many failed programmes, but 
not in all of them. During the stabilization programme, 
Chile and Mexico adjusted their public finances. The 
experiments collapsed anyway. Real interest rates fell in 
the initial programmes (see Dornbusch (1982), Rodriguez 
(1982)). In the following programmes real interest rates 
increased (see Agdnor (1994b)).
The experiences of successful programmes suggest that the 
capital inflows problem is not necessarily a problem. The 
presence of similar symptoms in episodes where there are 
not private capital inflows, indicates that they are not 
crucial to produce the problem.13
After this brief explanation, we offer an new definition of 
the capital inflow problem:
It is a situation where ERBS produce current account 
deficits, real exchange rate appreciations and GDP 
expansions. Many - not all- of these episodes are 
accompanied by huge private capital inflows. Some of them - 
again not all- finish with balance of payments crises and 
renewed inflation.
13Ades, Kiguel and Liviatan (1993) show that Denmark in 
the eighties was also a successful ERBS. The programme 
showed also the capital inflows problem.
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OBJECTIVES, METHODOLOGY AND ORGANISATION
The main objective of this thesis is to answer some 
questions related to the capital inflows problem. It is 
mainly theoretical work but motivated on empirical 
observations.
We will follow the methodology suggested by Obstfeld
(1985) . Rather than being an accurate description of the 
events in which it is motivated, this thesis sets highly 
stylized models to look for the causes behind the 
occurrence of certain phenomenons.14 The models should have 
two characteristics: a) Be sufficiently general to be
useful for explaining other potential cases 2) Have at 
least some predictive power in the cases in which are 
motivated.
Objectives
The thesis addresses three specific questions:
Question one: Why do successful ERBS show the symptoms of 
the capital inflows problem and better performance on long 
run output or growth or both of them? Is the capital 
inflows problem indeed a problem in these cases?
Question two: Are capital inflows necessary for the
emergence of the capital inflows problem?
14The exact quotation by Obstfeld (1985 pp. 606) is:
"This paper attempts to explain aspects of the Southern 
Cone experience by developing a simple intertemporal 
optimizing framework and using it to study a small open 
economy's response to a preannounced, gradual 
disinflation... The framework developed below is highly 
stylized, and does not pretend to offer a realistic 
description of Southern Cone economies or an accurate 
account of events there... The goal of the present work is 
to elucidate a channel through which capital inflows and 
real appreciation may occur even if agents have rational 
expectations, policy is credible and market clearing 
prevails".
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Question three: Why do some countries under ERBS and with 
public finances in equilibrium or surplus have suffered the 
capital inflows problem?
Question one is based in the empirical observation of four 
episodes: Bolivia (1985- ), Israel (1985- ), Argentina
(1991-) and Mexico (1987-1994). All these countries reduced 
inflation and experienced the capital inflows problem. 
Mexico faced a balance of payments crisis. However, in all 
of them the reduction of inflation seems to be associated 
with a better performance of output and growth relatively 
to trend.
The empirical motivation of question two is based in the 
fact that in the 1987-1994 Mexican ERBS all the symptoms of 
the capital inflows problem started in 1988. However, in 
that year there were not capital inflows but huge capital 
outflows.
Finally, the last question is motivated by facts observed 
in Mexico in the period 1990-1994. During most of the time 
of the stabilization programme, the government pursued a 
fiscal adjustment consistent with disinflation. 
Nevertheless, the capital inflow problem appeared. At the 
end of 1994 the programme collapsed. Fiscal adjustment has 
been considered as a key element for the success of ERBS. 
It is important to answer what other elements produce these 
cycles and crises and how to avoid them.
Methodology and Organisation
The thesis is divided in three units:
Unit one includes the introduction and background of the 
thesis. It is composed of this general introduction and
chapters one and two
Chapter one shows the stylized facts already described in 
general terms in the questions addressed in previous 
paragraphs.
Chapter two analyses the literature concerning the 
questions addressed in this introduction. It also discusses 
what has not been answered about these problems.
Unit two constitutes the extensions and main theoretical 
and empirical contributions of this thesis. It is composed 
of chapters three, four and five. These chapters answer 
questions one, two and three respectively.
Unit three contains the general conclusions of the thesis 
in chapter six and several appendixes. These may be very 
important but are left until the end because of their 
technical difficulty. The theoretical chapters will mention 
the appendixes emphasizing the importance of their results 
to answer the questions already addressed.
Once some common elements are considered, the theoretical 
chapters are self-contained. Therefore, it is possible to 
read them in an independent way.
The theoretical part of the thesis assumes rational 
individuals and rational expectations. The analysis starts 
from the dynamic optimisation approach in continuous time. 
Consumers and producers have maximising behaviour. All the 
theoretical chapters assume a cash in advance constraint 
for consumption goods.
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CHAPTER 1: MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN SOME EXCHANGE RATE 
BASED STABILIZATION PROGRAMMES.
INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents the facts that motivate the questions 
already explained in the general introduction. It is 
descriptive. The intention is to analyse and discuss the 
facts rather than offering an explanation for them.
The first section of the chapter presents facts showing 
that in four successful stabilization programmes the 
reduction of the rate of inflation was correlated with 
higher growth and output. However, the countries under 
consideration also showed the symptoms attributed to failed 
programmes and known as the capital inflows problem.
Second section shows that in the first year of the Mexican 
stabilization programme 1987-1994 the symptoms of the 
capital inflows problem appeared. Nonetheless, instead of 
capital inflows there were capital outflows.
Finally, the third section shows that during 1990-1994, the 
current account deficit showed an unsustainable trajectory 
in Mexico. At the end of 1994, the stabilization programme 
collapsed and then the deepest recession since 1932 took 
place in 1995. The interesting point is that the process 
preceding the crisis was accompanied by high international 
reserves, huge capital inflows and a surplus in the public 
balance.
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1.1.- SOME STYLIZED FACTS OF FOUR SUCCESSFUL ERBS
This section analyses the stylized facts of four countries 
whose stabilization programmes were successful.
The definition of success obeys two criteria:
1) Permanence of low or falling inflation.
2) Increasing in the long run output or growth due to the 
stabilization programme.
1.1.1.- The Chosen Countries
We have chosen four ERBS to analyse their stylized facts: 
Israel from 1985, Bolivia after the stabilization programme 
of 1985, Argentina from the last ERBS in 1991 and Mexico 
after 1987.
Israel is possibly the most representative case. The 
stabilization programme has lasted for more than ten years. 
It was conceived and announced as an ERBS. The reduction of 
inflation has been gradual but now the rate of growth of 
prices is barely above 10%.
Argentina is a country with a pegged exchange rate since 
1991. The success of the programme is considered for the 
following reasons:
a) There has been a spectacular increase in output after 
the stabilization programme started.
b) The economy faced a recession in 1995. Output growth 
fell from approximately 7.5% in the four previous years to 
-4.4% in 1995. Nonetheless this adjustment was enough to 
reduce the current account deficit almost to zero.
The other two cases: Bolivia and Mexico require further 
discussion.
The stabilization programme in Bolivia has also lasted for 
more than ten years. Among the analysed cases, it is the
26
only one in which there was hyperinflation. The average 
rate of inflation of the last five years has been below 
10%. The reduction in inflation was dramatic and definite. 
The Bolivian programme has been regarded not as an ERBS, 
but as an orthodox strategy or MBS (money based 
stabilization programme). Nevertheless, certain facts 
suggest that it was much nearer to an ERBS than to an 
orthodox programme:
a) There were very important movements in the level of 
international reserves. For that reason it is difficult to 
think in this programme as a flexible exchange-rate.
b) The Bolivian economy showed similar stylized facts to 
those of Argentina, Israel and Mexico.
c) The most important fact implying the classification of 
the Bolivian programme as an ERBS comes out from the 
analyses of Sachs (1986), Sachs (1987), Morales (1988) and 
Morales (1991) . Not only there was a lot of intervention in 
the foreign exchange market, but also a mechanism to 
increase the real money supply almost identical to that of 
crawling peg regimes (see Obstfeld (1985), Drazen and 
Helpman (1987) and van Wijnbergen (1988)).15 Furthermore,
15In his 1986 paper pp. 30-31 Sachs asserts:
" One of the central policy issues at the end of 
hyperinflation is how the increase in real money demand 
should be accommodated. Through domestic credit expansion 
to the public sector, or the private sector (e.g via 
rediscounting of private paper), or through foreign reserve 
inflows through the balance of payments (i.e central bank 
purchases of foreign exchange at a pegged rate or in a 
dirty float). The Bolivian government chose the third, and 
clearly most conservative strategy, of relying on the 
balance of payments. It was felt that with large Bolivian 
hoards of U.S. dollars, both in Bolivia and abroad, there 
was sufficient availability of foreign exchange holdings in 
private sector hands to provide the basis for the needed 
expansion of the domestic money supply."
In his 1991 paper pp 22, Morales says:
M The above description shows that the central bank has 
several ways of intervening in the bolsin, while preserving 
its image as a market mechanism. A few weeks ago after the 
system was implemented, the difference between the official
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Sachs (1986) presents a model for the Bolivian case in 
which there is PPP and the government fixes the exchange 
rate to reduce inflation!
Among the four programmes, the ERBS of Mexico in the period 
1987-1994 is the one that can be considered successful only 
with great difficulty. The programme lasted seven years and 
had very positive results during the first four. In the 
following two years, output growth fell and at the end of 
1994 there was a balance of payments crisis. 1995 was the 
year of the deepest recession since 1932 (7% of reduction 
in GDP).
However, there is an argument that probably contains what 
is needed to classify the Mexican programme as successful. 
The ERBS of 1988-1994 broke the negative trend of growth of 
the eighties.16
exchange rate and the floor price narrowed to almost 
nothing, except occasionally. In the rare cases of 
speculative attacks against the boliviano, the central bank 
discretely increased the amount supply in the auction in 
order to align the bid prices with the floor price. 
Symmetrically, in even more rare cases , the central bank 
reduced the amount supplied to the auction, to devalue in 
discrete steps."
The bolsin was an auction of U.S dollars, the boliviano was 
the new currency introduced in Bolivia just after the 
programme started.
16During the period 1982-1987 total GDP growth was near 
to zero (actually negative) . With a rate of growth of 
population around 2%, per capita output fell by more than 
12%. Between 1988-1995 total GDP growth was around 12%, 
even considering the severe recession of 1995. In 1996, 
inflation fell again and the rate of growth of the whole 
year was 5.2%. The recovery has been quite fast. On 
average, the impact of the ERBS in output was positive.
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1.1.2.-The Origins of Inflation in the Analysed ERBS.
The economies under consideration are very different (see 
table 1.1). Israel is a rich country. Bolivia, with per 
capita income of 800 US dollars per year, is a poor 
country. They have also experienced different rates of 
inflation. Table 1.1 shows the maximum and the minimum 
rates of inflation of the last 20 years. Mexico did not 
experience a high inflation episode, relatively speaking. 
Nonetheless, and except the case of Argentina, all of them 
are very open economies. Table 1.1 shows their share of 
trade as a percentage of GDP.
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TABLE 1.1 General Indicators of Selected Countries
Argentina Israel Mexico Bolivia
GDP per 
capita 
(US dlls)
8174 12365 3968 795
Average
Trade
(%GDP)
11 50 23 26
Average 
rate of 
growth 
high
inflation
period
0.2 2.7 0 -3.1
Average 
rate of 
growth 
after the 
programme
7.7 4.7 2.7 1.9
Maximum 
inflation 
in twenty 
years
2313 372 130 11750
Minimum 
inflation 
after the 
programme
4.3 11 6.9 8.5
Sources: International Financial Statistics (IMF)
Country Reports: Economic Intelligence Unit
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The emergence of high inflation and hyperinflation in these 
countries had different reasons in each case:
Israel was exposed to external shocks in the late seventies 
because of the increase in the prices of oil and other raw 
materials. Backward indexation of wages and accommodative 
policies transformed a negative shock in the aggregate 
supply in an inflation spiral (see Bruno (1993), Bruno and 
Fischer (1986) and Liviatan and Pitterman (1986)).
In Argentina, high public deficits financed with external 
debt in the seventies, a weak position of the government to 
strengthen the public finances, and a relatively strong 
position of some unions to maintain high real wages, 
produced very high inflation episodes since 197517. Fiscal 
accounts were never balanced (see for example Kiguel and 
Liviatan (1994)), implying several failed stabilization 
plans in the late seventies and in the eighties.18
The reason for the Bolivian hyperinflation may be found in 
two types of problems: first, as in Argentina, there was a 
fiscal imbalance covered by external debt. Second, the 
country is very sensitive to movements of the prices of its 
main exports: tin, natural gas and cocaine (illegal). In 
the middle eighties the price of these three products fell. 
Also, financial restrictions stopped the possibility of 
further indebtedness. Strong devaluations and a high 
inflation tax were necessary to cover the imbalances and 
debt overhang.19
17see Canavese and Di Telia (1988), De Gregorio (1991), 
Fernandez (1991) and Machinea and Fanelli (1988)
18See Canavese and Di Telia (1988), De Gregorio (1991) 
Dornbusch (1982), Fernandez (1991), Heymann (1987) (1991), 
Rodriguez (1988).
19See Maiken (1988), Morales (1988) (1991), Ramos
(1988), Sachs (1986), Sachs (1987)
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Mexico is also a country in which the origins of inflation 
are found in high external indebtedness in the seventies. 
The policy of those years was to expand the aggregate 
demand through government expenditure financed with 
external debt. The government believed in a future 
permanent rise in the oil prices (the main export of the 
country) and a permanent reduction of the international 
interest rate. However, these variables changed in the 
opposite direction since 1981.20
In 1982 the Mexican economy faced sharp devaluations. The 
government suspended the payment of its international 
obligations for a while. There was a significant reduction 
in the public deficit. Nonetheless, it was insufficient to 
pay huge amounts of principal of the foreign debt, as well 
as to finance a rise in international reserves necessary to 
avoid speculative attacks. The government then resorted in 
the inflation tax to cover the fiscal imbalance.
1.1.3 • -Common and Different Factors of the Analysed ERBS
Except the case of Bolivia, the stabilization plans of the 
analysed economies were announced as ERBS. In all of them 
there were several common economic consequences and 
characteristics:
a) Immediately after the implementation of the ERBS in 
Argentina, there was a significant change in the output 
growth relatively to trend. A similar phenomenon happened 
in the other countries with a small lag (no more than one 
year and a half. See chart 1.1 in which the vertical line 
shows the beginning of the ERBS) .
The cases of Bolivia, Mexico and Argentina are the most 
significant:
In the period 1980-1984 the average rate of growth of
20See Aspe (1992) (1993) , Aspe and Cordoba (1984), 
Bazdresh and Levy (1991) , Gil Diaz (1984) , Gil Diaz and 
Ramos Tercero (1988), Ortiz (1985), Ortiz (1991)
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Bolivia was -3.12%. GDP continued falling in 1985, date in 
which the stabilization plan started, and 1986. Afterwards 
there was a sharp increase in this variable. The average 
growth rate of the economy during the period 1985-1991 was 
1.93%. It is significant that growth accelerated quite 
rapidly, in such a way that in 1991 it reached 4.5%. 
During 1982-1987 Mexico faced a relatively high rate of 
inflation and no growth. The average rate of growth of the 
economy in such period was -0.073%. During the 
stabilization programme (1988-1994) the country grew at an 
average level of 2.73%.
The most amazing case is Argentina. This country faced a 
very long period of stagnation and high inflation. During 
1976-1990, the average rate of growth of the economy was 
0.22%. Since the ERBS started, such measure has changed 
dramatically to a very high 7.67 (1991-1994). Even
considering that in 1995 the estimated growth of the 
economy was negative in 4.4%, the total growth of GDP since 
the implementation of the ERBS has been near to 30%. 
Measured in US dollars, the per capita income of this 
country has passed from $4342 in 1990 to $8174.4 dlls in
1994. This figure is similar to the one of some European 
countries, like Ireland or Portugal.
Israel has also achieved a good performance. During 1975- 
1984 its average rate of growth was 3.73%. Nevertheless, 
during the years of high inflation this measure fell to 
2.74%. Since the stabilization programme started, growth 
has increased to 4.67% on average. Several cycles have 
taken place: The first, with high rates of growth, started 
just after the ERBS began (1985-1988) . In a second cycle 
(1988-1991) growth fell below average. Finally, starting in 
1991 there has been accelerated growth.
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CHART 1.1:
REAL GDP IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
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Several econometric specifications show that disinflation 
has a significant and positive effect over growth in 
Bolivia and Mexico. According to other estimations, in 
Argentina and Israel disinflation affects positively the 
long run level of output but not the rate of growth (see 
econometric appendix at the end of the thesis).
b) All the economies faced increasing current account 
deficits (see chart 1.2). In Israel and Bolivia the 
deterioration of this figure did not last for more than two 
years. The current account balance in Argentina passed from 
a surplus of 3% of GDP to a deficit of a similar magnitude 
in less than two years. Then, it stabilized, remaining as 
deficit, for around one year. By the end of 1995 it is 
expected to be near to equilibrium.
In Mexico there was also a high increase in the current 
account deficit. Differently from the other countries, it 
continued deteriorating. In 1994 it reached 8% of GDP. The 
situation proved to be unsustainable and a balance of 
payments crisis occurred at the end of 1994. The government 
abandoned the crawling peg exchange rate regime and now 
there is a dirty float. However, the consequences have been 
painful. GDP fell 7% in 1995, but the current account 
balance was restored to near equilibrium.
c) For all the countries analysed private consumption has 
been procyclical (see chart 1.3). Consumption has been one 
of the most dynamics elements of the aggregate demand at 
least in the first stages of the stabilization programme. 
As we will show afterwards, that is the reason why the 
total savings of the countries under consideration have 
felt for a while.
d) At some point, some of these economies faced recessions 
or rates of growth below trend. After a period of high 
growth, the Argentinean economy suffered a recession in
1995. The Israeli economy has shown some cycles in its
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activity. Bolivia is still growing quite fast; and Mexico 
observed also some cycles during 1988-1994 which, given the 
very negative trend of the previous years, were not 
necessarily below trend.
CHART 1.2s
CURRENT ACCOUNT IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
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Current Account in Mexico
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CHART 1.3:
PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Private Consumption in Argentina
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Private Consumption in Mexico
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e) A Possible indicator of the pressure on the stability of 
the exchange rate regime is a measure of the total savings 
of the economy. The chapter defines this measure as the sum 
of the current account surplus and of total (gross) 
investment. The current account balance represents the 
increase in the total financial claims of people from the 
country (inside and outside). Investment is the total 
change in the physical assets of the economy. The sum 
measures the gross increase in the total assets of the 
country. To account for the net change, it is necessary to 
consider the rate of depreciation of physical capital and 
the capital earnings of the financial instruments held by 
nationals.21
In all cases, after the programme started, there was an 
immediate reduction of savings. However, Argentina has 
stopped the continuous fall of this variable. Israel 
reversed the negative trend very soon as well as Bolivia 
did. Mexico was the only country in which savings fell 
during all the time the stabilization programme lasted. It 
has been also the only one facing a balance of payments 
crisis.
21Traditionally what we consider total savings has been 
called domestic savings and the negative of the current 
account is known as external savings. The sum of them is 
equal to total investment in the country. Nevertheless, 
such definition implies that an economy where physical 
capital remains constant does not save. If the current 
account is in surplus, the financial assets of the economy 
are growing and in fact total savings are positive.
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CHART 1.4:
TOTAL SAVINGS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
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f) All the countries under consideration accompanied the 
stabilization programme with a structural adjustment policy 
that included trade and financial liberalisation, foreign 
debt rescheduling, privatisation and deregulation. However, 
the structural policies did not follow the same steps in 
every country and show particularities in each case.
By 1991 Argentina had already free financial markets. 
Nonetheless, in the trade sector there were many non tariff 
barriers and a discriminatory treatment to foreign
investment. The structural adjustment programme eliminated 
virtually all taxes in exports and reduced import duties 
and non tariff barriers. It also eliminated the
discriminatory practices against foreign investment.
With respect to the external debt, the government carried 
on an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
in two stages. There was a stand by loan in 1991 and an 
extended facility in 1992. The government also rescheduled 
the debt services with creditors members of the Paris club 
in 1991.
The Argentinean government launched a very ambitious 
privatization programme that has lasted until these days 
(see Cavallo (1992)).
Bolivia initiated its stabilization programme with a 
unilateral suspension of the debt service with commercial 
banks. The strategy was successful in the sense that it 
helped to reduce the public deficit dramatically,
strengthening the disinflation programme. Once the
international community realized that the stabilization 
plan was serious and committed to low inflation targets, 
there was a debt rescheduling. Since 1986 the country 
received loans and eliminated debt with the commercial 
banks, the IMF, the Andean Reserve Fund and the World Bank. 
Apart from the debt rescheduling, Bolivia launched an 
ambitious trade liberalisation policy since the
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stabilization programme started. The intention was to 
increase competition and set price ceilings for many 
products. The policy was so aggressive that some measures 
were reversed in order to avoid social unrest (see Sachs 
(1986) and Morales (1991)).
The main structural adjustment in Israel occurred in the 
financial markets, though it was a gradualist policy. At 
the beginning of the stabilization programme there were 
foreign exchange decontrols and a reduction of segmentation 
and quantitative restrictions in credit markets. These 
policies helped to reduce interest rate differentials. 
Other measures included more independence to the central 
bank and the development of new financial instruments. 
Trade liberalisation was also an important instrument of 
the structural adjustment. Although Israel had been a very 
open economy, in the years of the inflation crisis there 
was a set back. Import licensing was reintroduced and non 
tariff barriers proliferated. To overcome these problems, 
the government negotiated a free trade agreement with 
United States in 1985. However, still the country remain 
with considerable protection against countries in South 
East Asia, South America and Eastern Europe (see Bruno 
(1993)) .
In the case of Mexico, four were the main instruments of 
the structural policy accompanying the stabilization 
programme: a) The renegotiation of the external debt, b) 
Trade liberalisation, c) Financial liberalisation and d) 
Divestiture of state owned enterprises.
Among these instruments, trade liberalisation was deepened 
by the government at the very initial stage of the 
programme22. Between December 1987 and December 1988 the
22A very aggressive policy of trade liberalisation had 
started in 1985, with a huge elimination of quotas. 83% of 
the value of imports was subject to quotas. At the end of 
1985 less than 28% of that value were subject to quotas. 
The weighted tariff level was brought down from 16.4% to
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maximum tariff was brought down from 100% to 20% and the 
number of items subject to quantitative restrictions from 
1200 to 325. The policy continued. By 1991 less than 10% of 
the total value of imports was subject to import licensing. 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), signed by 
the Presidents of Canada, United States and Mexico in 1993, 
has increased trade between its members. It is, according 
to the public, a crucial factor explaining why the Mexican 
economy recovered quite fast from the 1995 recession. 
Mexico rescheduled its external debt in 1989. There were 
agreements with the IMF, the World Bank, the Paris Club and 
the commercial banks that reduced the level of transfers 
abroad. The debt service fell from 8.3% of the GDP in 1987 
to 6.4% and 5.2% in 1989 and 1990, respectively.
For the immediate and medium terms of the ERBS, probably 
the most important instrument of the structural adjustment 
was the financial liberalisation. It started in 1988 with 
the elimination of credit quotas and continued with a 
reduction of compulsory reserve requirements in the central 
bank by the commercial banks. In 1989, there was an 
abolition of the reserve requirement of the total savings 
of the banks (around 30% of the total savings) . It was 
substituted by an ad-hoc variable rate oscillating around 
10%. Financial liberalisation channelled quite a lot of the 
capital inflows coming to the country to the private sector 
(see Aspe (1993)).
13.1% and the dispersion was reduced from 16 to 11 
different tariffs (see Aspe (1993)).
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1.1.4 Success and Failure: Some Explanations
The chapter claims that the four programmes described in 
the previous section were successful. There are two main 
elements in this definition of success:
The first is a sustained reduction in the rate of 
inflation. The second is a long run increase in economic 
activity.
A sustained reduction in the rate of inflation has been 
achieved by Bolivia and Israel. In these countries there 
are no pressures for higher inflation and the exchange rate 
regime has become more flexible. The programme in Argentina 
is still in a relatively early stage. The real exchange 
rate has appreciated considerably and some popular voices 
say that the programme may be abandoned soon.
Nonetheless, for this last case there are some indicators 
showing a possible long duration of the programme. Instead 
of a balance of payments crisis, the 1995 recession was 
enough to adjust the external accounts. Also, the size of 
the monetary base is equal to the level of international 
reserves (the convertibility plan or the so-called currency 
board). A speculative attack can be theoretically supported 
because there will be always a positive demand for money.23 
Furthermore, the legislative power is the only one 
authorized to modify the exchange rate between the 
Argentinean peso and the US dollar. This measure has the 
intention of creating credibility in the convertibility 
plan.24
The case of Mexico is more difficult. The balance of 
payments crisis and the abandonment of the ERBS increased
23Nobody can carry out a speculative attack that 
reduces international reserves to zero. That would produce 
money going also to zero. As long as there is a positive 
demand for money, that cannot happen.
24See Cavallo (1992) for a good description of the 
intention of the Argentinean programme.
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inflation for a while. In 1994, inflation had fallen to 
7.8%, in 1995 it was 51%. In 1996 the peso stabilized 
considerably relatively to the US dollar, and there was a 
small real appreciation. Capital inflows returned to the 
country. The rate of inflation for the last year was 27% 
and at the end of 1997 is expected to be 15%. That could 
imply better economic prospects.
With respect to the second definition of success, all the 
economies seem to be better than the trend before the 
programme. In Argentina the cumulative increase in GDP of 
1991-1995 is around 30%. Compared with the very poor 
performance of the previous fifteen years, it is almost 
sure that the Argentinean economy has improved permanently.
Bolivia and Mexico show a similar performance. The 
cumulative growth in Bolivia in the period 1985-1991 was 
14%, the trend before the programme was actually negative. 
The same figure for the case of Mexico in 1988-1995 is 12% 
(considering the recession of 7% in 1995), against a flat 
profile of the GDP in 1982-1987.
Chapter three intends to explain why successful 
stabilization programmes observed a similar economic cycle 
that the unsuccessful experiments of the early and mid 
eighties.
1.2.- MEXICO 1988: THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM WITHOUT
CAPITAL INFLOWS
This section shows that during the first year of the 
Mexican stabilization programme 1987-1994, Mexico observed 
the symptoms of the capital inflows problem already 
explained. However, this phenomenon occurred in the 
presence of high real interest rates and capital outflows, 
which is a strange situation whose causes will be explained 
in chapter four.
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1.2.1.- The Symptoms o£ the Capital Inflows Problem in the 
first year of the Mexican Stabilization Programme.
After the debt crisis in 1982, the Mexican economy entered 
a difficult economic situation for several years. In 1987, 
inflation reached 160%, the highest rate in the history of 
the country. On 15th of December of that year, President 
Miguel de la Madrid announced a comprehensive package to 
stabilize the economy. Among its main instruments the most 
important was the control of the exchange rate.
During 1988, inflation fell from 140% on average to 100% 
(from 160% to 50% comparing the consumer price index from 
December to December). The economy started to recover from 
six years of stagnation. However, it showed some of the 
facts already observed in previous ERBS:
a) Private consumption increased in real terms and as a 
percentage of the GDP, which can be seen in figure 1.5. In 
the previous years to the stabilization programme 
consumption had shown a very bad performance. Starting in 
1988, the figure initiates an ascending trajectory (see the 
de trended figure) . It is remarkable that the recovery took 
place also as a percentage of the GDP.25
25The de trended figure was obtained running the 
regression
C= 3014.7 - 31.4t+ 4 .41t2-0 . 082t3 
(28.0) (-1.12) (-2.11)
Where t is time, t statistic in parentheses.
R2: 0.868 D.W.: 2.36 F(3,28): 61.9
Quarterly data from 1986 to 1993. t statistics in
parentheses.
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CHART 1.5: PRIVATE CONSUMPTION IN MEXICO
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B)There was a significant exchange rate appreciation.
During 1988 the real exchange rate26 fell by 29.5% (see 
figure 1.6). The reduction was gradual but sustained 
through the year and it continued in the following years.
CHART 1.6: REAL EXCHANGE RATE IN MEXICO
Real Exchange Rate
Real Exchange Rate (Index)
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C) A current account deficit emerged.
As we already discussed in the previous section of this 
chapter, during several years before the stabilization 
programme Mexico experienced current account surpluses. In 
1988 a modest current account deficit developed.
26The measure is the typical EP*/P where E is the 
nominal exchange rate, P* is the consumer price index in 
United States and P is the consumer price index in Mexico.
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CHART 1.7 s CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE IN MEXICO
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These are some of the main symptoms of the capital inflows 
problem. The strange fact is that they occurred in absence 
of capital inflows as we will see now.
1.2.2.- High Real Interest Rates and Capital Outflows
Together with the symptoms of the capital inflows problem, 
there were high real interest rates and a complete absence 
of capital inflows.
A measure of the real interest rate shows that before the 
stabilization programme, ex-post real interest rates were 
negative. The reason for this fact is that in the first 
three months of the stabilization programme (December, 
January and February), inflation rose with respect to the 
same figure in the previous quarter. The inflation outburst 
can be explained because to increase public incomes the 
government raised the price of several public goods (mainly
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gasoline and electricity). Stabilization was not expected. 
Ex-post real rates fell below ex-ante rates.27 
However, since 1986 real interest rates were around zero, 
which anyhow means an important effect upwards of the 
stabilization programme on real interest rates.
CHART 1.8: REAL INTEREST RATE IN MEXICO
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Perhaps the most surprising fact observed in the first year 
of the ERBS in Mexico was the presence of capital outflows. 
Usually, after an ERBS, the symptoms already explained are 
accompanied by capital inflows. Nonetheless, in 1988 they 
were absent. The composition of the balance of payments 
makes us to suspect that an important proportion of the 
outflows were capital flight.
27The measure of the real interest rate takes the 
nominal rate of interest of three months Mexican CETES 
(Certificados de la Tesoreria de la Federacion) which are 
Mexican T-Bills and compares it with the inflation of the 
following quarter.
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TABLE 1.2: Balance of Payments in Mexico (billions of
dollars)
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
C.A 5.9 4.2 0.8 -1.4 4.2 -2.4
F.A -2.1 0.08 -0.6 1.6 -3.1 -4.5
E.O -3.1 -2.1 -2.9 -0.7 2.9 -3.2
C.R 0.7 2.1 -2.7 -0.5 4.1 -10.0
C.A: Current Account
F.A: Financial Account
E.O: Errors and Omissions
C.R: Change in International Reserves
Source: International Financial Statistics. IMF
The current account passed from a surplus of 4.2 billion 
dollars (bd) in 1987 to a deficit of 2.4 bd in 1988. In 
this year, the financial account, which is the official 
measure of the capital account, was a 4.4 bd deficit. 
However, errors and omissions were also negative in more 
than 3 bd. It is known that this category concentrates an 
important part of the capital flight.
The presented scenario is challenging. As we have already 
explained, it is our objective to explain why the symptoms 
of the capital inflows problem may appear without capital 
inflows. It is also important to answer what the role of 
economic policy is to overcome this problem.
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1.3.- THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM IN A "CONSISTENT" 
STABILIZATION PROGRAMME (MEXICO 1989-1994): A CREDIBILITY 
ISSUE?
This section analyses some stylized facts of the Mexican 
stabilization programme after 1988. The most important 
financial variables indicate, apparently, a consistent 
stabilization programme. This observation is reinforced by 
the fact that the ERBS was accompanied by a structural 
adjustment in different areas (see section 1.1 in this 
chapter). However, the experiment collapsed at the end of 
1994, raising a doubt: Was this programme consistent and 
credible?
1.3.1.- Financial Indicators of the Mexican Stabilization 
Programme
Starting in 1989, the macroeconomic performance of Mexico 
changed in several respects. Consumption continued growing 
(see chart 1.5) and the real exchange rate deteriorated 
even more (see chart 1.6). However, in the financial side 
there were some significant changes. Capital flight stopped 
in 1989 and was substituted by huge capital inflows (see 
chart 1.9). The public operational balance was a deficit 
mainly because of high real interest rates. From 1990, it 
became a surplus, reaching levels of 2.5% of the GDP in 
1992 (see chart 1.10). Finally, international reserves 
started accumulating in a considerable way (see chart 
1.11). The domestic credit of the central bank to the 
government fell in a dramatic way. By 1993 it had almost 
disappeared.
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CHART 1.9: CAPITAL ACCOUNT IN MEXICO
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CHART 1.10: OPERATIONAL BALANCE IN MEXICO
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CHART 1.11: INTERNATIONAL RESERVES IN MEXICO
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(billions of dollars)
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These indicators show an apparent consistency of the 
programme. At least until 1993 there were not pressures in 
the financial side of the economy to trigger a speculative 
attack on the local currency (peso). Nonetheless, the size 
of the current account, the exchange rate appreciation and 
the behaviour of the total savings of the economy were 
inconsistent with long run stability (see sections 1.1 and 
1.2 in this chapter).
1.3.2.- Lawson Law, the Crisis and the Long Run in the 
Mexican Stabilization Programme.
The British Ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson 
used to say that current account deficits are not a problem 
when public finances are in equilibrium (see Cline (1995) 
and Edwards, Lozada and Steiner (1995)). That assertion is
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known commonly as Lawson law or Lawson proposition.
Some historical evidence contradicts the Lawson 
proposition: First, the collapse of the European Monetary 
System in 1992, then the Mexican crisis in 1994 and 1995 
and very recently, in 1997, the collapse of the currency in 
Thailand. In all these episodes the actual public balance 
has not been a problem. In some cases it was a surplus 
(Mexico) , in others it did not show negative values higher 
in absolute value to the historical trend. However, the 
levels of the current account deficit proved to be 
unsustainable at the end. The result in all cases was a 
balance of payments crisis.
In the particular case of Mexico, the balance of payments 
crisis occurred when the public operational balance showed 
a surplus of around 1% of the GDP. The current account had 
deteriorated since 1988 and at the end of 1994 reached a 
deficit of more than 8% of the GDP. The private sector was 
spending too much money and there is not still a good 
explanation of why this phenomenon happened.
Nonetheless, as section 1.1 of this chapter explains, the 
stabilization programme in Mexico produced good results at 
the very end. Even considering the painful effects of the 
crisis, growth and production have been greater after the 
programme than before.
For all these reasons, it is our intention to explain in 
chapter five what was behind the capital inflows problem in 
Mexico. It was not a problem of disequilibrium in public 
finances. It could be a problem of credibility, but then it 
is relevant to ask why credibility was absent in an 
apparently very consistent programme. We also intend to 
answer why the production capacity of Mexico apparently 
increased after the programme.
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CHAPTER 2. - RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF EXCHANGE 
RATE BASED STABILIZATION PROGRAMMES
INTRODUCTION
This chapter divides the exposition about recent
developments on ERBS into three topics. The organisation is
related as much as possible with the questions already 
explained.
The first topic is ERBS and real activity. Activity 
considers not only output and growth, but also consumption, 
investment and other real variables.
Second section makes a review of the literature on the
importance of capital inflows in the capital inflows
problem.
Third section describes recent developments in the topic of 
the capital inflows problem in the presence of fiscal 
adjustment. It also makes a review of the literature on 
balance of payments crises (bpc) when the public balance is 
in equilibrium.
Finally, the last section makes a critical assessment of 
the literature, emphasizing what questions have not been 
answered.
2.1.- ERBS AND REAL ACTIVITY
The basic theory about ERBS shows that under perfect 
capital mobility, perfect competition and full employment 
these programmes should be neutral and equivalent to money 
based stabilization programmes (MBS).28
Changes in the real system due to ERBS require some kind of 
imperfection, or at least to break traditional assumptions.
This section identifies five possible sources of changes in 
the real system due to ERBS (analysed in the literature):
28see Obstfeld (1985) and Drazen and Helpman (1987)
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a) The Nature of the Utility Function and Disinflation.
This argument is mainly due to Obstfeld (1981) (1985) .
Obstfeld (1985) starts from the traditional Sidrausky 
dynamic optimisation model. The peculiarity of the utility 
function is that it may be non separable. The rate of 
devaluation does not fall in a sudden way, but sluggishly 
(as in the so-called tablita experiments of the southern 
cone in the late seventies)29. When consumption and money 
are substitutes, a reduction of the rate of inflation in 
steps produces a gradual increase in money and a similar 
reduction of consumption (substitution effect). The only 
way in which consumption can fall without violating the 
intertemporal budget constraint, is increasing discretely 
and in one jump at the beginning of the experiment. This 
behaviour explains the current account deficits observed in 
ERBS.
Though interesting, the Obstfeld result is not supported by 
the facts. In the tablita experiments consumption increased 
at the beginning and continued increasing for a while.
b) Inertial Inflation:
This was probably the first explanation for the stylized 
facts of ERBS (Rodriguez (1982), Dornbusch (19 8 2)).30 The 
argument is relatively simple. Suppose a perfect capital 
mobility economy where inflation responds sluggishly to 
changes in the rate of devaluation (there is not PPP) . The 
covered interest premium is zero. A reduction in the rate 
of devaluation implies an appreciation of the currency and, 
given the interest rate parity, an immediate reduction in 
the real interest rate. Aggregate demand and output
29Specially the programmes of Argentina (1978-1981), 
Uruguay (1978-1982) and Chile (1979-1982).
30See also Dornbusch (1993), Dornbusch and Werner
(1994) and Kiguel and Liviatan (1992).
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increase but reinforce the real appreciation of the 
currency. Eventually this effect dominates and the initial 
expansion is followed by a recession.
This appealing explanation has a fundamental problem, only 
in the first ERBS (Argentina, Chile and Uruguay) there was 
a reduction in the real interest rate. In all the others 
this variable increased.
c) Lack of Fiscal Adjustment
The intuitive explanation of this argument to account for 
more dynamic economic activity is the following: a
reduction in the inflation tax generates disposable 
additional resources, increasing demand and output. 
However, if the expansion of demand is large compared with 
that of output, there will be a tax adjustment in the 
future. The rise in production is not enough to increase 
the tax base, or to compensate the reduction of the 
inflation tax through higher demand for money. It is not 
possible to close the public deficit. Rational people would 
consider this fact not raising demand on the first 
instance. Ricardian equivalence prevails (see Barro 
(1974)).
To increase demand when a tax falls there must be 
exceptions to the Ricardian equivalence proposition. The 
model by Blanchard (1985) assumes finite horizons. Helpman 
and Razin (1987) use a modified version of this model to 
generate some stylized facts of ERBS. People that are going 
to die before the future taxes are levied, raise 
consumption at the beginning of the programme. As time 
passes, the burden of new generations increases. There is 
a point in which the future burden of taxes is greater than 
the original release of resources. Then consumption starts 
falling.
The assumption that people die and do not care about their 
heirs is not necessary to produce bpc preceded by
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unsustainable current account deficits.31 Calvo (1987) works 
a cash in advance model where people have infinite 
horizons. Ricardian equivalence prevails. The reason why a 
reduction in inflation not backed with fiscal adjustment 
produces a rise in consumption is the following:
The rate of depreciation of the exchange rate falls. 
Inflation falls by the same magnitude (because of PPP). The 
public sector maintains the same taxation and expenditure. 
An overall public deficit emerges when the inflation tax 
falls. This situation can only last while international 
reserves are positive. When they vanish there will be a 
balance of payments crisis and the system will enter a 
floating regime32. People anticipate higher inflation in the 
future relative to the present.
Comparing the period of low inflation with a future under 
higher inflation, people decide to increase the demand for 
money in the first period. Consumption also increases 
(because of the cash in advance constraint). A current 
account deficit appears. If the utility function is 
logarithmic, the only force driving the balance of payments 
crisis is the higher current account deficit. The capital 
account remains constant (see Rodriguez-Arana (1995)). The 
model behaves as if Ricardian equivalence were absent. The
31van Wijnbergen (1988) advocates a similar argument. 
In his model two factors imply that a stabilization 
programme without fiscal adjustment produces an 
unsustainable current account deficit. The first is that 
people can die. The second is that the utility function is 
non separable.
32This problem was originally addressed by Krugman 
(1979) and later by Connolly and Taylor (1984), Flood and 
Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1984) and Sachs (1986) (see Flood 
and Garber (1994) for a good summary of the problem). In 
the original Krugman model the imbalance of the public 
sector does not translate into higher private consumption 
but in an increase in foreign private bonds with a 
counterpart in a decline of international reserves. In a 
dynamic optimisation approach (see Obstfeld (1984) and 
Sachs (1986)) a separable utility function imply no 
movements of private consumption whatsoever and the balance 
of payments crisis comes from the capital account.
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reduction of the inflation tax produces a rise in 
consumption of the same amount.33
d) Lack of Credibility
This factor is related to the previous one. When fiscal 
adjustment is absent there is lack of credibility. 
Nonetheless, lack of credibility may exist though there is 
fiscal adjustment. Calvo (1986) shows that a perceived 
increase of inflation in the future produces a rise in 
consumption today. The mechanic of the problem is similar 
to the already quoted 1987 paper. Calvo and Vegh (1993) 
conclude that the same argument generates a temporal 
increase in output when there are overlapped price 
contracts. Reinhart and Vegh (1995) perform an empirical 
assessment of this hypothesis for several countries under 
ERBS. They found that the argument may be considered for 
some cases but not for many others.
e) Supply Side Effects
In the explanations already analysed there are not 
permanent changes in output. The possible increase in 
economic activity is driven by demand factors and takes 
place because of sticky prices. In the long run, when all 
prices are flexible, output and employment return to 
natural levels.
Nonetheless, when disinflation affects factors of 
production, output may change permanently.
33It is interesting to notice that the same would 
happen with a reduction of lump sum taxes. People would 
anticipate higher inflation in the future and then they 
would consume more today. The increase of consumption would 
be of exactly the same magnitude than the reduction of 
taxes.
To show that Ricardian equivalence exists in this model it 
is easy to see that if taxes fall today and people 
anticipate not a balance of payments crises, but a future 
rise in the present value of taxes, then nothing will 
happen to consumption today.
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There are two types of supply side effects identified in 
the 1i terature:
The first is a substitution effect between consumption and 
leisure in a cash in advance model (Roldos (1993)). When 
inflation falls, the price of consumption also falls 
(because of the cash in advance constraint) and people 
substitutes leisure by consumption. The supply of labour 
rises as well as consumption, which increases the aggregate 
supply of the economy.
The second effect considers the relation between inflation 
and transaction costs (see Rebelo and Vegh (1995), Roldos
(1995) and Uribe (1995)). If investment is subject to 
transaction costs with money, the reduction of inflation 
increases the desired capital-output ratio. The same 
happens under a cash in advance constraint. There is an 
investment boom accompanied by a current account deficit. 
According to this approach the situation is optimal from 
the social point of view (Roldds (1995)) and the government 
should not intervene to stop it.
In their empirical investigation, Rebelo and Vegh (1995) 
find support for this effect in Argentina (1991-) (see also 
Baxter (1995)).
2.2.- THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM WITHOUT CAPITAL INFLOWS
The symptoms of the so-called capital inflows problem have 
been studied always in economies open to trade and capital 
markets. However, as we have shown before, this problem is 
not exclusive of economies under high capital mobility. 
Some studies analyse the behaviour of consumption in ERBS 
and in absence of capital mobility. Calvo (1981) presents 
a model where increases of the rate of growth of the 
nominal exchange rate raise consumption in the short run. 
A straightforward exercise would show that reductions of 
such rate reduce also consumption. That is to say, 
disinflation generates the opposite solution to the capital 
inflows problem.
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Calvo (1986) asserts that in his cash in advance model 
capital inflows are necessary to produce the symptoms of 
the capital inflows problem. He describes disinflation 
exercises in models with money in the utility function, in 
absence of capital mobility and under lack of credibility. 
The result is that even in these cases the initial effect
of an ERBS is to reduce consumption.
Auernheimer (1987) extends the Calvo (1981) model to 
analyse the effects of ERBS not supported by fiscal 
adjustment. In the examples provided by him, consumption 
falls at the beginning and then rises to levels greater
than the original. Without fiscal adjustment the system
collapses in a different way than models under perfect 
capital mobility. Since people cannot attack the foreign 
exchange market, the bpc is accompanied by a sharp 
devaluation.
More recently, Velasco (1993) has studied disinflation 
under zero capital mobility again. In his paper, lower 
inflation induces a raise in the demand for money that 
increases the real interest rate in the short run. This 
effect worsens the public deficit and jeopardizes the 
stabilization programme. However, in this study the effect 
of disinflation over consumption is not studied at all and 
not even mentioned by the author.34
34Agenor (1994b) also studies the effect of 
disinflation over real interest rates in a partial capital 
mobility model. The effect is ambiguous. When capital 
mobility is low, the increase in the demand for money 
raises the real interest rate. When capital mobility is 
high the Dornbush-Rodriguez effect dominates and the real 
interest rate falls.
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2.3.- THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
CRISES UNDER FISCAL ADJUSTMENT
In the late seventies and early eighties, several countries 
experienced the symptoms of the capital inflows problem and 
eventually faced bpc. Most of these experiments did not 
care about the public deficit. With the inflation tax 
falling, the fiscal authorities were unable to sustain the 
same pattern of public expenditure. Inevitably their public 
deficits became financed by the domestic credit of the 
central bank. The ensuing reduction of the international 
reserves produced a speculative attack and inflation 
increased again in a floating regime.
The observation of these episodes produced a huge 
literature on the topic of balance of payments crises. In 
1979, Paul Krugman wrote a seminal paper that in the 
following years was the starting point of many extensions 
and adaptations.35
However, as some other historical episodes show, bpc are 
not produced by lack of fiscal adjustment exclusively. In 
several countries the public balance was in equilibrium, or 
at least was not higher than the historical trend, and the 
crawling peg regime collapsed anyway.36
Balance of payments crises in countries that pursued fiscal 
adjustment were preceded by the symptoms of the capital
35See for example Connolly and Taylor (1984) , Flood and 
Garber (1984), Obstfeld (1984), Sachs (1986), Calvo (1987), 
Drazen and Helpman (1987) (1988) , van Wijnbergen (1988),
Flood and Garber (1994).
In the topic of the capital inflows problem, the literature 
of bpc in absence of fiscal adjustment has been studied by 
Calvo (1987) and van Wijnbergen (1988), as we have already 
analysed.
36Chile 1976-1982, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the 
United Kingdom before 1992, Mexico at the end of 1994 and 
Thailand in 1997
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inflows problem. Calvo (1987), Helpman and Razin (1987) and 
van Wijnbergen (1988) explain that current account deficits 
are linked in almost one to one basis to the public 
deficit. However, when the public balance is in 
equilibrium, the current account deficit is produced by a 
disequilibrium in the private sector. The ensuing exchange 
rate collapse corrects a problem in the private sector, 
which is challenging.
The economic literature has not been ignorant to these 
episodes and has been providing hypotheses for their 
occurrence. There are basically four explanations: a) The 
excess confidence hypothesis b) The lack of credibility 
explanation c) The self-fulfilling prophecies and 
vulnerability of capital markets story d) The external 
shock's argument.
The first two hypotheses are useful to explain the 
emergence of the capital inflows problem in the presence of 
fiscal adjustment. The last two explain the mechanics of 
the crisis itself.
a) Excess Confidence
Before the European Monetary System (EMS) collapsed in 
1992, several authors pointed out the risks of current 
account deficits and the overvaluation of the currencies in 
some countries.37 The explanation for this phenomenon was 
that people had very positive expectations on the future 
performance of the economies under consideration.38
According to this approach, the media and even serious 
economists overestimated the positive effects of more 
integrated and global markets (the so-called Washington
37See for example Muellbauer and Murphy (1990) and the 
comments of King (1990) and Pagano (1990).
38 See especially the comments by Mervyn King to the 
Muellbauer and Murphy (1990) article.
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consensus). People became convinced that because of these 
structural changes the macroeconomic performance of many 
economies was going to be much better in the future. 
However, according to Krugman (1995), while structural 
policies have produced a better allocation of resources, 
they have not been so good increasing growth and output. 
The result has been the emergence of a new type of crisis 
in modern capitalism.
The excess confidence hypothesis, first used to explain the 
collapse of the EMS, has been also advocated to explain the 
capital inflows problem and the bpc in Mexico. McKinnon and 
Pill (1996) assert that once credit and capital markets are 
more open, better technologies with increasing returns are 
available. However, banks find profitable to exaggerate the 
positive aspects of the projects to increase the loans, 
knowing that they will be bailed out in the future.
These results are interesting for Mexico. After the 
exchange rate collapse, there was a financial crisis in the 
banking system. Many people were unable to repay their 
debts and the government entered to rescue banks with huge 
amounts of money.39
b) Lack of Credibility
Lack of credibility in the spirit of the Calvo (1986) model 
has been also considered a cause of the capital inflows 
problem under fiscal adjustment. For the specific case of 
Mexico, Reinhart and Vegh (1995) assert that the increase 
in consumption during the period 1988-1994 is consistent 
with the lack of credibility hypothesis. Leiderman and 
Thome (1995) point out indicators of fiscal relaxation in 
1994 that contributed to generate a credibility problem in 
the Mexican stabilization programme. Mendoza and Uribe
390ther studies about the Mexican crisis based in the 
excess confidence hypothesis are due to Agenor and Masson 
(1996) and Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995).
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(1996) extend the basic Calvo model to explain cases under 
uncertainty. In a calibration exercise, these authors 
assert that the capital inflows problem in Mexico is well 
explained under the assumption of lack of credibility.
c) Self-Fulfilling Prophecies and Vulnerability of Capital 
Markets.
According to this approach, bpc under fiscal adjustment 
happen because of self-fulfilling prophecies.40 Krugman 
(1996) summarizes the main arguments of this hypothesis: 
The government will devalue the currency if it is costly to 
maintain the exchange rate peg. A devaluation reduces the 
burden of the domestic debt and increases the level of 
employment in the presence of sticky wages. The maintenance 
of the exchange rate peg under expectations of future 
devaluation raises interest rates and worsens public 
finances. These factors induce the government to devalue. 
However, there may be a huge political cost for the 
devaluation.41
When the cost of devaluation is smaller than the cost of 
maintaining the peg, the government devalues. The 
interesting point is that expectations may be self- 
fulfilling. When people expect a devaluation, the costs of 
maintaining the peg may go above the costs of devaluation. 
Then there is a balance of payments crisis.
Though Krugman explains this hypothesis, he does not agree 
with it. The fact that the government has public finances 
in equilibrium does not guarantee that is doing things 
right. According to him, the collapses observed in Europe 
1992 and Mexico 1994 and 1995 were not produced by self-
40Among the academics that defend this position are 
Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1995), Obstfeld (1996), 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) and for the Mexican case Cole 
and Kehoe (1996).
41Agenor (1994a), Cukiermann, Kiguel and Liviatan
(1992) and Edwards (1992) discuss the costs of 
precommitment to an exchange rate target.
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fulfilling prophecies. They were produced more by the 
perception that the governments were going to relax the 
fiscal or the monetary policy or both in the future. For 
the case of Europe, Krugman presents some evidence that the 
monetary policy became more relaxed in several countries.42
An approach very related to the self-fulfilling prophecies 
hypothesis is the one of vulnerability of capital markets. 
According to it, the new type of crises occurs not because 
there is excess confidence or lack of credibility but 
because very open capital markets are vulnerable. When 
there are imbalances between some stocks, there may be 
self-fulfilling financial crises (Calvo and Mendoza 
(1996)).
To clarify this last point, we take again the case of
Mexico at the end of 1994. By that time the level of
international reserves was huge. However, the size of 
domestic debt denominated in US dollars (the so-called 
TESOBONOS) was even larger. Not even with a devaluation was 
possible to reduce this debt, because it had to be paid in 
foreign currency. If someone expects future debt 
repudiation and takes the money out of the country, others 
will follow him/her in herding behaviour. Then a crisis 
will emerge (see Calvo and Mendoza (1996) (1996b)).
d) External Shocks
This argument asserts that consistent stabilization 
programmes collapse because of external shocks. When the 
nominal exchange rate is an instrument, terms of trade 
deterioration or increases in the international rate of 
interest raise the vulnerability of the country.
Expectations of future devaluation develop and there are
42In this respect, there seems to be a contradiction 
between the articles by Krugman in 1995 and in 1996 already 
quoted. In the first excess confidence produces the capital 
inflows problem. In the second there is lack of 
credibility.
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two possible outcomes: either the government devalue or
people attack the foreign exchange market producing the 
crisis. The approach is not necessarily mutually exclusive 
with the previous one and has been in the literature for 
about five years.43
For the Mexican case, the argument has been slightly
modified. Instead of terms of trade deterioration it has 
been said that there were several political shocks that 
generated lack of confidence in capital markets, producing 
the crisis. The described shocks were basically two: the
uprising revolution in the Southern state of Chiapas and
the assassination of two political figures44 (see Gil Diaz 
and Carstens (1996), Leiderman and Thorne (1995) and
Savastano, Roldos and Santaella (1995)).
2.4.- CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE
This section will make a critical assessment of the review 
of the literature about the three topics of our interest. 
The objective is to explain what is not yet explained about 
these problems.
2.4.1.- The Capital Inflows Problem in Successful ERBS
Most of the literature on the real effects of ERBS explains 
short run movements in output. Recently there have been 
explanations of why ERBS produce permanent increases in the 
level of activity.
According to the literature, there are two main channels 
why ERBS affect output permanently: a) The effect of
inflation on the supply of labour b) The effect of
43 See for example Agenor (1994a), Cukiermann, Kiguel 
and Liviatan (1992), Edwards (1992) (1995a) and Kiguel and 
Liviatan (1994).
44Mr Luis Donaldo Colosio, the candidate of the ruling 
party to the Presidency (Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional) and Mr Jose Francisco Ruiz Massieu, the 
General Secretary of the same party
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inflation on investment through the cash in advance 
constraint or transaction costs where money is needed to 
invest.
In our opinion both explanations may be criticized. The 
first because it ignores non linearities in the labour 
market; the second because in the modern world it is 
implausible to think that cash is necessary to invest.
Let us start with the fist criticism:
To assume that leisure is in the utility function is 
sensible. What is not a very plausible assumption is that 
the labour market is as flexible as other markets. In 
reality there are many restrictions and at least in formal 
markets people do not choose the number of hours to work. 
Considering that many people are subject to a fixed 
schedule reduces the effect that changes in the desired 
supply of labour may have on output.
With respect to the second hypothesis, the assumption that 
cash is necessary to invest is unrealistic. The cash in 
advance constraint is more related to consumption goods and 
especially to those obtained in casual or informal markets. 
The same criticism applies to the transaction costs 
approach. Eliminating this assumption breaks the relation 
between disinflation and permanent changes in economic 
activity described by an important string of the 
literature.
There are other two factors that may generate permanent 
changes in output and/or growth and consumption booms from 
the onset: a) The dynamics of inflation; b) The role of the 
structural change accompanying ERBS. The first factor was 
analysed by Obstfeld (1985) but not in a context of 
changing output and growth. The second factor has been 
mentioned by several authors45. However, they do not explain 
in what way the structural change interacts with the 
stabilization programme to derive the stylized facts of
45 For the Israeli programme by Bruno (1993), for the 
Mexican programme by Aspe (1993) .
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successful ERBS.
2.4.2.- The Capital Inflows Problem Without Capital Inflows
Out of the three described topics, this is the one where 
there has been less research. However, it is an important 
topic for at least two reasons: First to explain why the 
symptoms of the problem may occur in absence of capital 
inflows or even in the presence of capital outflows (the 
case of Mexico in 1988) ; second, because there are some 
voices promoting the control or even bans on capital 
inflows to avoid current account deficits and real exchange 
rate appreciations.46
The described controls could be useless if the factors 
behind the symptoms of the capital inflows problem are 
independent of capital inflows. That seems to be the case 
of Mexico in 1988. Instead of controlling capital inflows, 
it is much better to attack the fundamental causes of the 
problem.
Another problem related to this topic is the use of 
interest rate policies to stabilize. Can they stop the 
symptoms of the capital inflows problem? In a context of 
imperfect capital mobility Calvo and Vegh (1990) conclude 
that increasing interest rates may generate a perverse 
effect, increasing consumption. If that result were true 
also in complete absence of capital mobility, tight 
monetary policy would fuel the symptoms of the capital 
inflows problem. That situation needs more research.
46See Calvo (1986), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz
(1995), Edwards (1995b), Krugman (1996), McKinnon and Pill
(1996) .
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2.4.3.- The Capital Inflows Problem and Balance of Payments 
Crises under Fiscal Adjustment
According to the review of the literature, there has been 
much research in this topic. Several hypotheses explain the 
reasons for this phenomenon and it is difficult to 
aggregate more to the causes of the problem.
Our interest here will concentrate more on the Mexican 
case. We will investigate the reasons producing the capital 
inflows problem of 1990-1994 rather than the mechanics of 
the balance of payments crisis. Since the hypotheses of 
self-fulfilling prophecies and vulnerability of capital 
markets are designed to explain the crisis, we will 
concentrate in the other two explanations. The Mexican 
capital inflows problem was produced either by excess 
confidence in the stabilization programme or by lack of 
credibility.
Among the two explanations, excess confidence is appealing 
because of the structural change pursued in Mexico. 
However, the natural question is why the positive 
expectations did not take place. The lack of credibility 
hypothesis seems to have fulfilled possible expectations of 
renewed inflation in the future (inflation in Mexico was 8% 
in 1994 and 51% in 1995). The question here is what factors 
produced a credibility problem when the government pursued 
a consistent fiscal policy.
UNIT TWO: EXTENSIONS
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CHAPTER 3:
DISINFLATION AND REAL ACTIVITY: THE EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE 
BASED STABILIZATION PROGRAMMES (ERBS) IN THE BEHAVIOUR OF 
OUTPUT AND GROWTH.
INTRODUCTION
Chapter one shows that in some successful ERBS47 the 
reduction of inflation has been followed by higher growth, 
higher current account deficits and consumption booms from 
the onset (or the so called capital inflows problem) .
The observation is apparently contradictory. If growth 
rises, there should be an initial reduction of the total 
expenditure of the economy, because savings are 
increasing.48 To observe both, consumption increases and 
sustained or long run growth, there must be something that 
triggers the actual or perceived production capacity of the 
economy.
The economic literature says that one of the factors 
explaining the initial expenditure boom of the economy and 
higher growth is the behaviour of employment. Disinflation 
affects negatively leisure in a cash in advance economy 
(see for example De Gregorio (1993) or Roldos (1993)). 
Other approaches consider the role of inflation over 
investment. When a cash in advance constraint affects 
investment, the reduction of inflation increases the size 
of physical capital in the economy at once (Rebelo and Vegh
(1995), Roldds (1995), Uribe (1995)).
Both approaches may be criticized. The first because it is 
difficult to think that people have really the option of
47Israel (1985-), Bolivia (1985-), Mexico (1987-1994) 
and Argentina (1991-)
48The behaviour of consumption in Israel could be 
compatible with this hypothesis. At the very beginning of 
the programme private consumption fell and then rose in a 
very fast way. However, the time in which consumption was 
below average was very short in order to produce a boom in 
the rate of growth (see Bruno (1993) or Drazen (1990)).
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choosing the number of hours to work (see chapter two). The 
second argument rests too much on the argument that money 
is necessary for investment. As time passes, in the modern 
world that is less plausible. Credit markets are very 
developed especially for certain goods. The cash in advance 
constraint or the transaction costs approach seem to be 
more relevant for consumption.
From the previous analysis two questions emerge. The first 
asks what is behind the fact that disinflation increases 
growth. This question is important because traditional 
approaches link disinflation with higher growth also 
through the relation between money and investment.49 
Abstracting for this relation, are there other channels 
linking directly disinflation and growth?
The second question tries to look for the factors behind 
the initial increase in consumption in successful ERBS. The 
question is worthwhile because a branch of the literature 
considers lack of credibility as the main responsible 
factor for the initial consumption boom (see Calvo (1986) 
and Kiguel and Liviatan (1992)). However, it is not clear 
why successful and consistent ERBS should be non credible.
The chapter is divided in three sections:
First section analyses an ERBS in an endogenous growth 
model that considers a small economy inserted in a global 
environment (see the Rebelo model for open economies: 
Rebelo (1991b)). The main result is that the sluggish 
reduction of inflation has a positive impact on the growth 
of the small economy. When inflation is falling forever, 
there is a permanent impact on growth. When inflation is 
falling only for a short period, there is a transitory 
impact on growth and a permanent effect on output. However, 
in every case the sluggish reduction of inflation reduces
49See for example Orphanides and Solow (1990), Hung
(1993), De Gregorio (1992) (1993).
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consumption at the initial stage and cannot explain the so- 
called capital inflows problem.
Second section introduces the role of externalities and 
structural policies in ERBS. In the presence of some 
externalities and constant returns to scale in the capital 
stock, structural changes generate capital inflows that 
may trigger an initial expansion on consumption. Growth is 
reinforced if, furthermore, disinflation is sluggish.
Finally, the last section compares the results of the 
chapter under ERBS with other possible results under MBS. 
The exchange rate regime seems to have an important role in 
the final outcomes of the chapter.
3.1.- EXCHANGE RATE STABILIZATION IN AN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH 
MODEL.
To explain why disinflation affects growth, this section 
sets up a growth model.
The model is constructed mainly of two different sources:
a) The Rebelo model for open economies (Rebelo (1991b)).50 
We take this model to characterize the production of the 
economies under consideration. The Rebelo version assumes 
that all economies of the world have constant returns to 
scale in an aggregate measure of capital that may include 
human resources. The possibility of different 
productivities in open economies implies that all the 
production of the world can take place in only one location 
(Rebelo (1991b) pp 1, 24) . When productivities are the
same, the GDP of the economies of the world is 
indeterminate. However, the GNP of the particular economies 
of the world is always determinate.
50This model is based in the very well known endogenous 
growth model also by Rebelo (Rebelo (1991a)).
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b) The cash in advance constraint for consumption goods: 
This assumption has been widely used by several authors. In 
models dealing with ERBS has been used by Calvo (1986) 
(1987). In his analysis of inflation and growth, Stockman 
(1981) shows that when the cash in advance involves only 
consumption goods, the capital stock of the economy is 
unrelated to the rate of inflation. Orphanides and Solow 
(1990) and Hung (1993) rescue this argument to say that 
long term endogenous growth is unrelated to inflation when 
investment goods are not included in the cash in advance 
constraint. According to the results of this section, when 
only consumption goods are included in the cash in advance 
constraint, the acceleration of inflation has real effects 
on output and growth.51
The model analyses the particular behaviour of a small 
economy that interacts with other economies in the world. 
There are three main actors in this economy: consumers,
producers and the government.
+ Consumers:
A representative individual maximises the following utility 
function:
51Growth models introduce money in different ways: 
Sidrausky (1967) and Brock (1974) assume money in the 
utility function. Stockman (1981) and Hung (1993) set a 
cash in advance constraint for consumption and investment 
goods. Stockman (1981) and Orphanides and Solow (1990) 
consider the possibility of the cash in advance being 
relevant only for consumption goods (see also Lucas and 
Stockey (1987) . They set up a model where some goods are 
subject to the cash in advance constraint while others can 
be acquired in credit markets). Alogoskoufis and van der 
Ploeg (1994) work with an overlapping generations model. De 
Gregorio (1992) (1993) uses a transaction technology:
introducing more money reduces an implicit tax caused by 
shopping costs.
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Max f U (Ct) exp(-0t) dt (3.1)
Jo
The utility function has the traditional characteristics: 
it is strictly concave and twice continuous differentiable. 
The maximisation is subject to the private budget 
constraint 
Where:
Tt + rt Kt + x* t bt - Ct - mt - Dmt + Dbt + DKt (3.2)
C : private consumption
T: net government transfers
K: capital stock
K: rate of inflation
m: real quantity of money
b: foreign bonds.
r: domestic real rate of interest
r*: foreign real rate of interest
D: operator differential: Dx=dx/dt
The private sector can save in money, foreign bonds or 
shares of new capital stock.
It is clear that if
r* > r K = 0
r > i* b - 0
The model assumes r=r*
V = m + b + K 
V is total wealth for the individual.
There is also a cash in advance constraint for consumption 
goods:
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m k <\> C (3.3)
People carry on money in order to purchase consumption 
goods.
If r+7t>0 (3.3) will hold as an equality (Calvo (1986)). 
The Hamiltonian of the problem is:
U (C) + X ( T + rV - C{ 1 + <J) (r + 7i))) (3.4)
First order conditions are:
Uc - X (1 + (r + ic) <|>) = 0 (3.5)
DX = (0 - r) X (3.6)
lim^. X t V t exp (-0t) =0 (3.7)
Assuming a fixed real rate of interest r but a possible
variable inflation, (3.5) and (3.6) give as a result:
DC = (0 - r) — _ _  (3.8)
Ucc (1 + (r + Ucc
Which is the dynamical optimal trajectory for consumption. 
If the utility function is isoelastic (see for example 
Blanchard and Fischer p. 44 (1989)).
i - l  
c p U =    (3.9)
1 -  —
P
Where p is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
present for future consumption.
Then:
^  = P (r - 6 - —  f-ff1-  ) (3.10)C (1 + (r + tc ) <J))
Observe that if inflation is falling (D7C<0) there is a 
positive impact over the rate of growth of consumption with
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respect to the case in which inflation is constant.52 
+ Production Sector
The model assumes the following production function for the 
economy as a whole:
Y = AiKi A = A± = Aj V j * i (3 .11)
Assuming perfect competition
r = H  = A (3-12)
The production function of the particular economy under 
analysis is identical to the production function of all 
other economies of the world. The rate of interest, which 
is equal to the marginal productivity of capital, is the 
same everywhere. It is independent of size of capital. In 
a world in which capital can move from one country to 
another, this fact means that the GDP of any particular 
economy is indeterminate. However, we will see that the GNP 
is perfectly determined, as in the Rebelo model for open 
economies (Rebelo (1991b)).
+ Government
The consolidated government-central bank spends in 
consumption, net transfers and interest payments of public 
external debt. It derives incomes from interest payments on 
its international reserves and the inflation tax. Any 
disequilibrium is financed printing money, increasing the 
level of foreign debt or through the reduction of net 
international reserves.
The consolidated government-central bank budget deficit 
(COBD) is then defined as
520bstfeld (1985) derives this result when money and 
consumption are complementary goods.
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g + T +zD- rR - urn = Dm + DD - DR (3 .13)
Where g is government consumption, D foreign public debt 
and R net international reserves.
3.1.1.- Long Run Sluggish Disinflation
This subsection investigates how the real variables of the 
small economy react when the government decides to reduce 
inflation sluggishly and in a permanent way. Obstfeld 
(1985) addressed this argument originally to show that 
reducing inflation in steps produce real effects in some 
cases.
Combining (3.13) and (3.2):
IS - C - g = DS (3.14)
S = R + K + b ~ D
S is the total net number of assets of the economy and rS 
is the GNP. Though the GDP is indeterminate, the GNP is 
determined by (3.14).53
A convenient additional assumption is that the government 
of this economy carries out a policy where m=R. The 
monetary base is equal to international reserves.
If the rate of inflation is constant, a balanced growth 
equilibrium means:
53It is interesting to observe that money is not an 
asset for the economy as a whole because it is a liability 
for the government.
Any discrete unexpected change in the rate of inflation 
will not affect the balanced growth path. It will not 
change any real variable, either (superneutrality). Since 
the cash in advance constraint does not include investment 
goods, there is not relation between the level of inflation 
and growth.54
However, a gradual reduction (increase) in the rate of 
inflation will have real effects.
Let us assume that the described small open economy sets up 
an exchange rate based stabilization programme (ERBS). The 
rate of devaluation of the currency falls sluggishly. In 
the presence of perfect competition, absence of transport 
costs and prices abroad constant and equal to one, there 
will be purchasing power parity (PPP) . Setting a trajectory 
for the rate of devaluation is the same than setting the 
trajectory for the rate of inflation itself.
Assume that the rule for the reduction of inflation is:
 ----  = -y y h 0 (3.16)
(1 + (r + 7i) <J))
The policy lasts forever. Given this differential equation, 
the solution for the rate of inflation is:
it (t) = (it (0) + (-i + r)) exp (-Yt) - (A + r) (3.17)
4> <P
When t approaches <»
lim^ 7i {t) = ~ (-^  + r) <0 (3.18)
<P
Given this rule, at some moment a revaluation of the 
currency starts.
Under these assumptions a balanced growth path emerges.
54Stockman (1981) and Orphanides and Solow (1990) 
derive also this result.
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*§ = p u  - 0 ♦ Y) = f  = SSL - DULljL - ^(3.19)
The faster inflation falls., the more the economy grows. 
There is a negative association between the acceleration of 
inflation Die and growth.
To analyse what happen to consumption in this case, it is 
necessary to divide (3.14) by S assuming g=0 without loss 
of generality.
Doing that:
r - Cs = Gs (3.20)
Where Gs is the growth of GNP and Cs is the level of 
consumption in terms of total assets. When inflation falls 
in the way already explained, Gs rises forever. Since r is 
constant, Cs has to fall. S is a predetermined variable. 
Therefore, consumption falls initially and then grows at a 
higher rate. The model can explain higher growth but can 
not explain the initial increase in consumption (see 
appendix 3.3 to see the effect over the current account)
3.1.2.- Short Run Solutions for Sluggish Disinflation
The assumption that inflation is falling forever is 
unrealistic. More unrealistic is the possibility of 
deflations in the long run. The balanced growth result of 
the last subsection is subject to another criticism:
If originally the world economy was growing at the rate 
p (A-0) and now the analysed small economy is growing at the 
rate p(A-0+y), an infinite horizon cannot sustain the 
assumption of small economy.
To rescue the balanced growth exercise in the small open 
economy we should assume that the size of 0 in the analysed 
country is greater than the world average 0. The small 
economy is becoming even smaller before its government
introduces the disinflation policy.
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Something observed in many countries is that over some 
period inflation pass from one stable plateau to another, 
where the level is smaller. In other cases (Mexico 1987- 
1994) once inflation reached the lower plateau, it jumped 
to higher levels.
In this subsection, the chapter investigates what kind of
short run solution can emerge when inflation is falling
sluggishly but only for a short period. Credibility is 
assumed. People believe that the reduction of inflation is 
permanent.
The experiment is the following. In period (t0,tx) inflation 
is falling according to the rule
4> Dn = -y (1 + (r + 7t)<|>) (3.160
Between (tx,<») :
n = it (tx) = (it (0) + (-i + r))exp(-ytx) - (-i + r) (3.21)
Starting in tx inflation becomes a constant.
The analysis is subject to cases where
71 (tx ) * 0
Rewriting (3.20) for convenience
r - Cs = Gs (3.20')
It is possible to analyse the case in figure 3.1
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Figure 3.1
Gc 1G s O
The economy starts in point A in figure 3.1, where:
Gs0 = p(A -  0) (3.22)
In the interval (t0,tx) the rule for inflation reduction 
implies that consumption is growing at the rate:
Gci = 9 (A + Y " 6) > Gs0 (3.23)
That growth is represented by the vertical line in figure
3.1.
From tx to infinity D7i=0. Balanced growth implies that the 
economy has to return to point A in tx. The questions are
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what the initial condition for consumption is and what 
trajectory the rate of growth of GNP follows.
Along the frontier and to the right of the line Gcl, GS>GC 
and Cs is falling. To the left of Gcl ,GC>GS and Cs is 
growing. If the initial condition for consumption were such 
that Csi>Cs0 the economy would be in the northwest of point 
A. Since consumption cannot jump twice55, the economy could 
never reach equilibrium again.
On the other hand, if the initial condition for consumption 
were to the right of Gcl, the ratio C8 would be falling 
forever. The economy never would return to the balanced 
growth path in tx. Therefore, the initial condition for 
consumption must be between A and B. The exact position 
being determined by the length tx. At that precise moment 
consumption growth is again the original and all the 
economy is in equilibrium in point A.
The trajectories of the main variables can be observed in 
figure 3.2.
55This is because in this case inflation is 
predetermined. If inflation changed in discrete ways, 
consumption could jump again (see Calvo (1986)).
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Figure 3.2
INF
G s
G c
C s
Growth increases temporarily. However, the sluggish 
reduction of the rate of inflation has permanent effects. 
Consumption falls at the beginning. The results show again 
that there is not a capital inflows problem.
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3.2.- GROWTH, DISINFLATION AND INTERNATIONAL PORTFOLIO 
MOVEMENTS
So far, the obtained results seem to explain only part of 
the story of successful stabilization programmes. The 
observed permanent changes in GNP of the analysed countries 
are related to disinflation. Nonetheless, the model cannot 
account for the capital inflows problem.
Soon after disinflation started, the countries analysed in 
chapter 1 showed high increases in the current account 
deficit. They quite possibly increased its debt-GDP ratio.56 
These facts seem to be correlated with higher consumption 
from the onset.
Several reasons can account for the increase in the total 
debt-GDP ratio:
a) A reduction in inflation and its variability often 
reduces the country risk, inducing higher supply of foreign 
investment.
b) Successful ERBS have been accompanied by structural 
adjustments57. These policies include deregulation in 
several areas, financial liberalisation, privatization of 
state enterprises and a better fiscal performance 
(reduction of tax rates and increase in tax bases). It is 
quite intuitive to think that these changes have opened 
opportunities to foreign investment, increasing financial 
flows to these countries (see chapter one).
c) All the analysed ERBS received foreign aid from 
international organisations or the United States government 
(see chapter one). In general these resources were given as 
debt. As we will see, sometimes that can have real effects.
56The measure of total debt of the country is difficult 
to obtain because usually there are not good statistics for 
private debt.
57see Bruno (1993) for several cases and especially for 
Israel. Aspe (1993) for Mexico, Morales (1991) for Bolivia, 
and Cavallo (1992) and Kiguel and Liviatan (1994) for the 
last ERBS in Argentina
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In other cases there was a net transfer of resources. 
Mexico, for example, negotiated its foreign debt in 1989, 
obtaining a considerable reduction in the principal and 
interest payments.
The question addressed is whether the structural policies, 
the lower perceived risk and foreign aid may be responsible 
of the observed initial consumption boom.
To answer this last question we will modify the model of 
the previous section slightly:
First of all the chapter will work again with a small 
economy but where production takes place geographically. It 
will be important to know what happen to both the GDP and 
the GNP.
Second, the analysis will concentrate on the small economy 
and its constraints and will not ask how the production 
function of other economies is. That is to say, it will be 
a general equilibrium analysis for the particular economy 
but will be a partial analysis with respect to the world.58 
Third, the chapter will consider the role of the Romer
58There are two reasons to do that: a) The Rebelo model 
for open economies can be highly counter factual. If 
productivities are different, production does not take 
place in countries with low productivity, something that
has not been observed in any part of the world; if
productivities are the same, production is indeterminate 
and can take place everywhere or in only one place, or in 
several countries but not in others, b) The Rebelo model is 
very strict setting the AK model for all countries in the 
world. There may be countries with increasing returns and 
others with diminishing returns. The general equilibrium of 
a world where some countries have some returns and some 
other have different returns can be very difficult. 
Instead, setting one country under the AK model and making
sensible assumptions about the flows of capital or the
behaviour of its own investment, may give light some 
issues. Furthermore, this methodology permits to open the 
discussion of the interaction of economies under increasing 
returns with economies with diminishing returns (see 
appendix 3.2)
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externality (Romer (1986)) and its influence in growth and 
consumption.
Fourth, the section will consider an initial financial 
repression for the small economy. Foreign assets are 
limited, which can occur for at least three reasons: a) 
Perceived risk b) Because the government of the small 
economy limits these flows on purpose (see appendix 3.2),
c) Because the governments have followed policies not 
favoured by international organisations.
The first exercise of this section will show that in the 
original AK model increasing capital inflows from abroad do 
not change the GNP of the economy, only increase the GDP. 
Since there is not a wealth effect, consumption is not 
affected for these flows.
The previous assertion can be proved setting a modified 
version of equation (3.14)
r(K + f) - C = D(K + f) (3.24) 
f = R + b - D
Equation (3.24) determines the behaviour of f+K=S 
endogenously. If f falls (there are more resources from 
abroad) and the economy is in the steady state, the only 
change is an immediate rise in K of the same magnitude than 
the reduction of f. The GDP of the economy rises but the 
GNP remains constant. For the same reason, consumption and 
wealth also remain constant.
To obtain that greater resources from abroad change welfare 
and output without changing conditions for endogenous 
growth, it is necessary to change slightly the model seen 
previously.
This section will change basically the production sector. 
The production function will be defined now as:
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Y = AKa L1_a a < 1 (3.25)
Where L is labour.
It is assumed that in this small economy people work a 
fixed number of hours and do not derive utility from 
leisure. The utility function of the representative agent 
remains as previously.
For each firm in the economy there are constant returns to 
scale in labour and capital. However, for the economy as a 
whole:
A = Ax K1'* (3.26)
Where Ax is a parameter.
None individual firm recognizes (3.26). It is only when 
capital increases in all the economy when productivity also 
increases. This is the Romer externality (Romer (1986), see 
also De Gregorio (1992a)).
In the presence of perfect competition
r = -^ = a A K*'1 L1_a (3.27) 
OK
W = = (1 - a) A K* L~a (3.28)
oL
Where W is the real wage.
Taking into account (3.26), equations (3.25), (3.27) and
(3.28) become
Y = A1 K L1'* (3.29) 
r = a A1 L1_a (3.30)
W = (1 - a) Ax K L~* (3.31)
(3.29) implies that in the economy as a whole there are 
increasing returns. (3.30) shows again that the perceived 
marginal productivity of capital is, at the end,
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independent of the quantity of capital in the economy59.
(3.31) asserts that the higher the level of capital in the 
economy the higher are wages. This relation is interesting 
when all economies of the world have this technology and 
are similar in productivities. No matter that they are 
open, those economies with greater levels of capital will
pay higher wages. Since labour can not move there is not
factor price equalization.
Setting L=1 for convenience and adding up W+rK we obtain Y. 
Again there are not extraordinary profits. That is 
consistent with the fact that the representative individual 
derives incomes from wages and his/her capital stock.60
Now suppose that r is the same everywhere in the world. The 
combination of the private and the government budget 
constraint produces
A± K + rf - C - g = DK + Df (3.32)
Where AXK is the GDP and AxK+rf is the GNP. Observe that
this equation has not solution for K+f, as previously, 
because Ax is different from r=otA1.61
To solve the system the chapter assumes that the small 
economy is limited in its foreign financial flows or 
credit, f is given exogenously and we will analyse what
59The true marginal productivity of the economy is AiL1'"
60The new private budget constraint is
W + rK + r* b + T - C - Tim = Dm + Db + DK
Provided leisure is not in the utility function, nothing
happens to first order conditions for introducing labour.
61We are assuming that r=cxAx but that is not the
important point. What is necessary is that the externality 
is such that the productivity of this economy is higher 
than the interest rate paid to foreign capital. See 
appendix 3.2 for an example where r is determined
endogenously.
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happen when this limit changes.62
It is convenient to make an additional assumption: (XA1=0. 
Therefore, in the steady state growth is zero.
Now the question is whether higher financial flows from 
outside accompanying an ERBS can account for an initial 
expansion in consumption.
For simplicity and following the previous section, the 
chapter assumes that inflation falls sluggishly.
The current account of this economy is given by Df. Setting
(3.32) in another way (the chapter assumes g=0 without any 
loss of generality).
DK = Y + rf - C - Df (3.33)
It is also true that
Y = AXK (3.34)
The experiment is the same already explained in last 
section. Between (t0,tx) inflation falls in the way (3.16') 
indicates.
Given the new assumptions, during (t0,tx)
C - Ct exp (p yt) (3 .35)
and
f - f (0) exp (-Qt) (3.36)
Where 0  is a factor of growth of foreign assets. If f<0 and
62Since long time ago many economists have considered 
the role of financial repression in the economy (see for 
example McKinnon (1973)).
Appendix 3.2 sets a more formal model of financial 
repression in which the flow of foreign resources is 
derived endogenously.
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£2<0 there is a rise in the total foreign debt of the 
country.
Before t0 and after tx
DK = DY = Df = 0 (3.37)
In (tx/°o)
C = C± exp(p ytx) (3.38)
Substituting these assumptions in (3.37) for the period 
(t0/tx)
DK=A1K + rf(O)exp(-Qt) -C± exp(p yt) + Qf (0)exp(-Qt) (3.39)
The solution for this differential equation is (see Chiang 
(1984) pp 480-482):
K{ t) =H0exp t) f (o)exp(-Ot) - Cj exp(PYc) (3.40)
0 1 (£ 1 + ^ )  (pY -  A j )
H(0)=K{0) + f{0) + , Cj, . (3.41)(Q+Ai) (py-Ai)
After tx the balanced growth equilibrium is zero and:
Cj exp(pYtx) = Ax K( tx) + rf(0) exp(-Qtx) (3.42)
Equation (3.40) valued in tx/ (3.41) and (3.42) solve for 
H0, K(tx) and Ci (the initial condition for consumption) . 
The system has analytical solution but the interpretation 
is not easy. A simple simulation exercise shows the desired 
results: growth increases as well as the initial condition 
for consumption when the debt-output ratio rises. A second 
column shows that growth may increase though total debt 
remains constant (or falling respect to GDP). In that case,
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however, consumption falls at the beginning.63 
Table 3.1: Assumptions of simulation 1
(i) (2)
K (0) n 11
a 0.1 0.1
Ax 1 1
Y 0.07 0.075
♦ 0.04 0.04
tx 1 1
7C(0) 2 2
f (0) -10 -10
n -0.1 9.535
p 1.0 1.0
63This simulation was performed using the previous 
model in a lotus 1-2-3 programme, setting a simple 
algorithm which gives an arbitrary C* to equation (3.40) 
calculates K(tx) and H(0) and then check if (3.42) holds. If 
it does not hold, it gives another Ci and repeats this 
operation until convergence.
Table 3.2: Results of simulation 1
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(1) (2)
Y(0) 1 1 1 1
r 0 . 1 0 . 1
C(0) 1 0 1 0
C (i) 10.132 9.535
7t(tx) 0.168 0.042
K(tx) 11.97 11.27
Y (tx) 11.97 11.27
(f/y) (0) i o VO o i o VO o
(f/y) (tx) 1 o VO to
0000o1
Exercise 1 shows an expansion of consumption and positive 
growth in the period (t0/tx) . The debt/GDP ratio passes from 
0.9 to 0.92. Inflation passes from 200% to 17%. After tx=l 
the economy returns to its zero balanced growth path. There 
are always positive assets.
Exercise 2 shows that the size of the absolute debt remains 
constant. However, considerable disinflation increases also 
growth. In this case the initial condition for consumption 
is smaller than the original equilibrium.
The intuitive reason why growth and consumption increase 
when the debt-output ratio rises, is the following: 
Increasing K and the debt by one unit, increases output by 
Ax and interest payments by otAi. The remaining (1-cOA! 
additional units increase welfare and are ready for 
consumption or new investment (see appendix 3.2) . The debt- 
output ratio will increase for sure if AX<1.
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According to the exercises, growth is positively influenced 
by two factors: the steady reduction of inflation and the 
rise in the debt-output ratio. Instead, the capital inflows 
problem is negatively related to the sluggish reduction of 
inflation (as we have seen in the previous section) but 
positively influenced by higher debt-output ratio. In some 
circumstances the net effect of a negative association 
between higher debt-output ratio and inflation produces 
both higher growth and the capital inflows problem.
To avoid an excess of technical matters in the main story, 
the chapter leaves an interesting exercise for appendix
3.2. In it a small developing economy (or group of 
economies) subject to constant returns in the capital 
stock, interact with a more developed world. The most 
developed countries operate under decreasing marginal 
returns of capital and initially have a huge amount of 
capital. The governments of the emerging economies find 
profitable to limit the access of capital from abroad. They 
pay a very low rate of interest to the developed world and 
take the difference between the real productivity of the 
emerging economy and the rate of interest paid to the 
developed world (in the same way that a tax) . Financial 
liberalisation increases both the flows of capital from 
abroad and the rate of interest paid to foreign people. In 
the presence of the Romer externality, the increase of 
capital from abroad raises wealth. However, the effect of 
raising also the net interest rate paid abroad may affect 
the emerging economy. The model shows that in absence of 
externalities it is not convenient to open financial 
markets completely. When the Romer externality is present, 
it may be convenient to reduce all barriers to foreign 
capital. If that is the case, the structural change 
accompanying the disinflation strategy may produce a 
capital inflows problem.
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3.3.- ERBS versus MBS
The chapter has assumed solutions under ERBS. If there is 
PPP, the gradual reduction in the rate of growth of the 
exchange rate is also a reduction on inflation. However, it 
is possible to think that in a world of flexible regimes 
the monetary authorities manage the rate of growth of money 
downwards. An equivalent solution for the rate of inflation 
should appear. The question addressed in this section is 
whether that policy produces different real results. 
Flexible regimes are always related to constant 
international reserves. Nonetheless, in growth models that 
assumption is not plausible. An economy growing at high 
rates is reducing the real size of these assets. It is more 
sensible to assume predetermined international reserves.
Let us analyse first disinflation in the Rebelo model of 
section 3.1: as the chapter explains, the gradual reduction 
of inflation produces an initial condition for consumption 
smaller than the original. In ERBS the financial solution 
to this result is to reduce at once the quantity of money 
(cash in advance constraint). The private sector increases 
the size of foreign bonds, which produces a reduction in 
international reserves (Obstfeld (1985)). In MBS the 
financial solution that produces an equivalent real 
solution is different. Predetermined international reserves 
imply a sudden increase in the price level with constant 
reserves and bonds. Therefore, the reduction of inflation 
is originally accompanied by an increase in the price 
level, something that contrasts with other results of the 
literature (Buiter and Miller (1985), Sargent and Wallace 
(1973) ) .
In the case with externalities (section 3.2), initial 
consumption may rise. ERBS imply a reduction of foreign 
bonds, a capital inflow and a rise in international 
reserves (Drazen and Helpman (1987), Obstfeld (1985)). To 
be equivalent in real terms to ERBS, MBS with predetermined
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reserves would imply an appreciation of the currency and a 
reduction of the price level.
Downward inflexibility of prices would change the result 
(see Buiter and Miller (1985)). To maintain predetermined 
prices, consumption must be also predetermined. This can 
only occur if there is some transitory or permanent 
unemployment of labour or capital. If capital is 
unemployed, it is not true that the risk of this economy is 
lower under the disinflation policy. Neither it is true 
that the possible financial liberalisation or deregulation 
open real opportunities to foreign capital.
The last analysis suggests that under downward rigidity of 
prices and flexible regimes the perception of risk or new 
opportunities because of disinflation and the structural 
change is not the same than under ERBS.
CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions of this chapter are two. The first is 
that sluggish disinflation promotes higher savings and 
growth. Consequently, it reduces consumption in a first 
instance and it is not responsible of the so-called capital 
inflow problem in credible successful ERBS. The second 
conclusion is that the structural changes accompanying ERBS 
constitute the most plausible candidate factor to explain 
the initial consumption boom in this kind of programmes. 
Both effects have probably coexisted in successful ERBS. 
Structural changes reduced the country risk or increased 
the potential rate of return of the economy (see appendix 
3.2), generating actual and perceived capital inflows. In 
the presence of externalities, they produced higher 
perceived productivity, promoting higher initial 
consumption. As capital inflows entered to the economies, 
stopped a possible reduction of total investment. The 
contribution of sluggish disinflation was to avoid a 
greater increase in the initial consumption, which 
marginally increased the rate of growth of the economy (see
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section 3.2) .64
Several authors would support this view65. They assert that 
the structural change has been a determinant factor of the 
transformation of the analysed economies. Nonetheless, they 
do not explain formally and systematically how these 
effects can take place. It is the role of capital inflows 
the one that affects positively consumption. We show either 
in section 3.2 or in appendix 3.2 that this assertion is 
not obvious. In some plausible cases more capital inflows 
do not affect consumption or actually deprive it.
With respect to the channel between growth and inflation, 
the chapter reports that in absence of the traditional 
relation between money and investment, still there is a 
negative relation between the acceleration of inflation and 
growth. However, the reason why disinflation promotes 
growth is very different to other approaches.
When money is needed to invest, a reduction in the rate of 
inflation is a reduction in an indirect tax to investment. 
Therefore, higher investment promotes growth. In our 
approach, when inflation falls sluggishly, the shadow price 
of consumption is falling in time (because of the cash in 
advance constraint). Comparing the present with the future, 
people decide to consume more in the future, when the price 
is smaller. Consumption falls initially and that promotes 
higher savings and growth. It is interesting to notice that 
a sluggish reduction of the rate of some consumption taxes,
64In absence of sluggish disinflation consumption 
maintains a flat performance (when r=0). The initial 
condition is higher that when inflation is falling in 
steps. That effect reduces the marginal investment and 
growth.
65Aspe (1993) for Mexico, Bruno (1993) and Bruno and 
Meridor (1991) for Israel, Cavallo (1992) for Argentina and 
Morales (1991) for Bolivia. In Britain, the ex-chancellor 
of the exchequer Nigel Lawson used to say that capital 
inflows promote higher current account deficits (the so- 
called Lawson law) . That is very related to the analysis of 
this chapter, (see Cline (1995) for an explanation of the 
Lawson law).
for example the VAT, would also promote growth.
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The chapter also concludes that ERBS could produce 
different real solutions to MBS especially when capital 
inflows come from abroad and induce consumption booms. The 
reason is that under ERBS prices are, by definition, 
predetermined, whereas in MBS the sudden increase in 
consumption should be accompanied by a sudden fall of 
prices, which can not be obtained without some
unemployment.
As a corollary of these conclusions there are some policy 
recommendations: the first is that the way in which
governments design stabilization policies affects the 
patterns of growth. A same inflation target can produce 
very different solutions for the real system and growth 
when it is achieved at once or little by little. If the 
intention of the policy maker is to increase growth, the 
chapter recommends to reduce inflation sluggishly.
The second policy recommendation is that though the 
structural change (namely financial liberalisation or 
better opportunities for foreign investment) seems to have 
promoted welfare in some ERBS, it is not necessarily true 
that it will always do that (see for example appendix 3.2) .
Policy makers have to evaluate and balance the costs and
benefits of particular structural policies.
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CHAPTER 4:
DISINFLATION, CONSUMPTION CYCLES AND THE CAPITAL INFLOWS 
PROBLEM: THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC POLICY
INTRODUCTION:
In several countries, stabilization programmes based in the 
exchange rate (ERBS) have produced the capital inflows 
problem: a situation characterized by huge private capital 
inflows, current account deficits and a real appreciation 
of the exchange rate.
Popular analyses of that problem stress the role of capital 
mobility. Capital inflows have been advocated as the 
responsible evil of the final consequences of some ERBS 
(collapsing exchange rate regimes, reductions in 
consumption, big recessions). Informal analyses recommend 
reducing or stopping capital movements to overcome the 
undesirable results of some stabilization programmes. 
Formal studies also question the role of capital mobility 
in stabilization programmes. Dornbusch (1982) considers 
that Argentina made a mistake maintaining an open capital 
account during the 1981 crisis.66 Calvo (1986) asserts that 
in his cash in advance model zero capital mobility would 
not produce the symptoms of the capital inflows problem. He 
calls for further research.
In a very strict sense, the capital inflows problem cannot 
appear without the presence of capital inflows because they 
are part of the definition. However, some empirical 
observations create doubts about the nature of the problem:
a) During 1988, there were capital outflows in Mexico. The
€6This position has been criticized by Dellas and 
Stockman (1993) who assert that capital controls only make 
the situation worse.
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ERBS started at the end of 1987. The symptoms of the 
analysed problem appeared the year of the capital outflows 
(see chapter one).
b) In 1994, the final year of the ERBS in Mexico, the 
current account continued deteriorating. Private capital 
inflows were small with respect to the size of the 
current account deficit (14 billion dollars and 28 billion 
dollars respectively) . The final result was a substantial 
decline in international reserves and a collapse.67
These facts suggest that the symptoms of the capital 
inflows problem may appear for different reasons to those 
of capital inflows.
Given this introduction, the aim of this chapter is to find 
alternative explanations for the capital inflows problem. 
The motivation is based on the Mexican episode of 1988 
explained in chapter one. However, the objectives are 
mainly theoretical. The chapter looks for the causes behind 
the problem rather than to be an accurate description of 
what happened in some specific cases. Anyhow, the 
explanation seems also compatible with the Mexican episode, 
as one section of the chapter explains. At the end the main 
objective is to have a better knowledge of what the role of 
capital mobility is in the emergence of the problem.
The chapter is divided in five sections. The first develops 
an optimising model under zero capital mobility. Since the 
main interest is to find factors other than capital inflows 
producing the described problem, the chapter develops a 
model under zero capital mobility. This is the best way to
67Here it is very important to stress that the 
reduction in capital inflows and the collapse took place 
even though the public balance was in surplus. Other 
studies, like the one of Krugman (1979) , Drazen and Helpman 
(1987), Calvo (1987) and van Wijnbergen (1988) derive 
capital outflows as a consequence of deficits in public 
finances.
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isolate other possible explanations.
Second section analyses the emergence of the symptoms of 
the capital inflows problem in absence of capital mobility. 
Third section analyses the instruments of policy to cope 
with the problem.
Section four describes a simulation of different policies 
to combat the capital inflows problem using parameters and 
data of the Mexican economy.
Finally, the last section reflects on the effectiveness of 
tight monetary policy to cope with the problem.
There are two main results in the chapter:
First, capital mobility is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to produce the symptoms of the capital inflows problem. 
They may appear when there is lack of credibility and 
monetary policy is accommodative.
Second, in the presence of government bonds monetary 
policies aimed to avoid the capital inflows problem may 
produce unsustainable financial costs for the government. 
For that reason there is an incentive to abandon these 
policies partially, which produces a peculiar consumption 
cycle observed in cases like Mexico in 1988.
The chapter concludes that it is better to generate 
credibility through stronger institutions than to fight the 
problem with a costly monetary policy.
4.1.- A DYNAMIC OPTIMISATION MODEL UNDER ZERO CAPITAL 
MOBILITY
This section presents a cash in advance model very similar 
to the model of the previous chapter. The main difference 
is in the production sector. A small economy produces one 
perishable and tradeable good in constant amounts. The 
economy under consideration is open to trade but closed to 
capital mobility. In principle, people can save in money
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and government bonds. There are two main actors in the 
economy, the government and the private sector.
+ The problem of the private sector
A representative individual maximises an intertemporal 
utility function that depends upon consumption.
Max j U{Ct) exp(-Gt) dfc (4.1)
Uc >  0 Ucc < 0
Where
U(.): Instantaneous utility function 
Ct: Consumption in period t
0: Subjective discount factor of the utility
The problem is subject by two constraints: the private
intertemporal budget constraint and the cash in advance 
constraint.
Yt + Tt + rt Bc - Ct - nc mt = Dmt * DBC (4.2)
BltfC (4.3)
Where:
Yt: Given output
Tt: Net government transfers
Bt: Government bonds
rt: real interest rate
Kt: Rate of inflation
11^ .: Real money in terms of tradeable goods 
D: Operator difference: Dx = dx/dt; x being any 
variable
(4.2) is the intertemporal budget constraint and (4.3) the
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cash in advance constraint.
Standard procedures yield to the first order conditions 
(see chapter 3)
Uc - X (1 + (r + 7C)<(>) = 0 (4.4)
D X = (0 - r) X (4.5)
lim X t Vt exp(-Gt) =0 (4.6)
Where
Vt = mt + Bt (4.7)
From (4.4) and (4.5)
DC = (0 - r) _5l + ,,(£>r,+ m ) U c  (4.8) 
Ucc (1 + (r + n)<\>) U
(4.8) defines an optimal trajectory for consumption. Since 
the utility function is strictly concave, consumption 
increases in time when the rate of interest is greater than 
the subjective discount factor of the utility. It falls 
gradually when the nominal interest rate is increasing on 
time.
+ The Government
The behaviour of the consolidated government-central bank 
budget deficit (COBD) is characterized by the equation:
gt + rt Bt + Tt - r* Rt - 7lt mt = Dmt + DBt - DRt (4.9)
Where g is government consumption, r* is the foreign 
interest rate and Rt the level of international reserves. As 
in the previous chapter, the interest payments of 
international reserves are incomes for the consolidated 
government-central bank. Differently from chapter three, 
this time the government may finance its deficit with 
bonds.
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We are going to assume that the foreign rate of interest is 
equal to the subjective discount factor of the utility 
always (r*=0) .
+ General Equilibrium
The chapter assumes again PPP and a crawling peg regime. It 
also assumes that inflation abroad is zero. Therefore:
Inflation (tc) is equal to the rate of growth of the nominal 
exchange rate E.
Combining equations (4.9) and (4.2)
Yt + r* Rt - Ct - gt = DR (4.11)
Since foreign bonds are assumed to be zero, the equation of 
the current account is the same than the equation of motion 
of international reserves. Differently from the previous 
chapter, now R is predetermined.
Equations (4.3), (4.8), (4.9), (4.10) and (4.11) solve for 
five variables of the set m, C, r, n, B and R. To determine 
what variables are unknowns, it is necessary to specify the 
monetary policy. The government can follow a policy in 
which changes in the real quantity of money are always 
equal to changes on international reserves. That kind of 
policy has been studied by Calvo (1981) and Velasco (1993) 
in models under zero capital mobility. However, the 
government can follow other policies. It can fix the rate 
of interest r, or the quantity of government bonds, B, for 
example.68
68 Velasco (1993 pp. 264) says about his zero capital 
mobility model
" Now the possibilities of running down reserves enlarge 
the government's financial options. We must therefore 
specify how the authorities choose among the various 
alternatives."
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Different instruments of monetary policy can survive at 
least in the short run. In the long run, any policy that 
does not reach the system to a steady state can survive 
only if the transversality condition (4.6) holds.69
4.2.- THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM WITHOUT CAPITAL INFLOWS
In his excellent 1986 paper, Guillermo Calvo suggests that 
capital inflows are necessary to generate the symptoms of 
the capital inflows problem in a cash in advance model.70 In 
our opinion there are two crucial elements behind this 
result: a) absence of alternative assets to money and b) an 
adequate fiscal adjustment.
This section will prove now that the Calvo assertion is 
true only in absence of alternative domestic assets to 
money and in the presence of fiscal adjustment. We will 
show first that absence of alternative domestic assets to 
money and absence of present fiscal adjustment produce one 
variety of the capital inflows problem. In a second stage,
69McCallum (1984) and Obstfeld (1985) show examples 
where the transversality condition holds even though the 
used models do not have steady state.
70The exact quotation by Calvo (1986 pp. 1328) is:
■ A matter of considerable interest is the role of 
international mobility. It is quite clear that, in terms of 
the model of section II, results would be drastically 
different in no capital mobility were allowed. For example, 
if initially neither the government nor the private sector 
hold international bonds..., the only possible solution 
would be C=Y for all t, independently of the exchange rate 
policy. The prohibition of capital mobility would therefore 
succeed in eliminating the distortionary effect of 
temporary policy!"
In page 1329, Calvo says:
■ In sum, then, there seems to be a possible case for 
imposing capital controls on capital mobility in situations 
where, for some reason, the stabilization is, or is 
expected to be, temporary. More research is, however, 
needed before we are able to reach a useful conclusion in 
this respect."
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we will show that the presence of alternative domestic 
assets may produce the symptoms of the problem even though 
there is fiscal adjustment.
4.2.1.- The Capital Inflows Problem in Absence of 
Alternative Assets to Money
To prove what the previous paragraph says, we take equation
(4.2). In absence of government bonds, this equation is 
transformed in:
Yt + Tt - Ct - Kt mt = Dmt (4.12)
Together with the cash in advance constraint, (4.12) 
determines both consumption and money, which can be seen in 
figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1
Y + T O
Y + T 1
C O
(Y+T0)/INF0 (Y+T0)/INF1m0
Ill
Figure 4.1 shows equation (4.12), with negative slope and 
well defined limits ((Y+T0) , (Y+T0) /n0) , and the cash in
advance constraint (4.3). The original equilibrium is in A 
with C0 units of consumption and units of money. Let us 
assume that the economy is in equilibrium originally, in 
such a way that
Y + r* R - C0 - g0 = 0 (4.13)
Suppose an ERBS reducing inflation from K0 to n1. The 
private budget constraint (4.12) shifts to the right but 
nothing happens to the cash in advance constraint. A new 
potential equilibrium is in B. The private sector is 
accumulating money and, by the cash in advance constraint, 
is consuming more. That produces a current account deficit. 
All of these are symptoms of the capital inflows problem. 
The counterpart of the real solution is a continuous 
reduction of international reserves. If the government does 
not reduce transfers at some moment, there will be a 
collapse of the exchange rate regime. It will occur before 
the private sector reaches the point B. As Auernheimer 
(1987) explains, collapses in a zero capital mobility 
economy show very different patterns to those under perfect 
capital mobility. When the exhaustion of international 
reserves takes place, there is a sharp devaluation that 
produces a drastic reduction of consumption and money.71
However, an adequate fiscal adjustment would maintain the 
economy in equilibrium. If at the moment in which 
inflation falls, transfers fall from T0 to T1# the 
equilibrium remains always in A.
An interesting observation of this solution without 
alternative assets to money is that the utility function
71This solution contrasts sharply with models under 
perfect capital mobility since here there is not way of 
attacking the foreign exchange market (see Auernheimer 
(1987)) .
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does not play any role. Here there are many constraints, 
relatively speaking. The cash in advance constraint and the 
private budget constraint determine the endogenous 
variables of the system. For such reason, credibility is 
irrelevant. The absence of capital markets precludes any 
possible substitution between assets.72
Nonetheless, absence of capital mobility is not the same 
that absence of capital markets. The presence of 
alternative assets to money opens possibilities for 
different varieties of the capital inflows problem. Among 
them one analogous in real terms to the Calvo (1986) model.
4.2.2.- Non Credible ERBS and Full Monetary Accommodation
Now the chapter recovers the assumption of government bonds 
in the economy. Under these circumstances the government 
sets a temporary stabilization programme where:
In the interval of time (0,tx) 7C=n1<n0 (4.14)
Between (tx,oo) 7C=7C0 (4.15)
A full monetary accommodation implies that the government 
fixes the nominal rate of interest and carries on open 
market operations to maintain that rate.
In the context of crawling peg regimes and zero capital 
mobility, fixing the nominal rate of interest is the same 
than fixing the real interest rate. At least for a while, 
the government can do that since it prints the bonds and 
there is not any additional competition in capital markets.
This subsection will work under the assumption that the 
government sets r=0 always. It will be quite
72A situation where the government sets R=m+K, K being 
a constant, would produce the Calvo solution, without any 
change in real variables. However, in his model Calvo 
(1986) does not specify any policy and seems to refer to 
all situations under zero capital mobility.
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straightforward to show that the real solution of this 
problem is strictly analogous to the Calvo (1986) model. 
Therefore, capital inflows are not necessary to produce the 
capital inflows problem. Furthermore, it can occur 
independently of the present state of public finances.
Given these assumptions, (4.8) shows that DC=0 both in 
(0,tx) and (tx,<») . However, consumption in both periods is 
not at the same level since by (4.4) and (4.5).
U , U
c l  =  C(*  l  A  1 £  t
(1 + (r +X)T (1 + (r + K0) )
Where Cx is the level of consumption in period (0,tx) and Cq 
is the level of consumption in period (tx,©o) . Since 
C^Cq. At the same time, C1>C0>Cq because the present value 
of consumption is given. Therefore, between (0,tx) there is 
a current account deficit and international reserves are 
falling.
Y + r* R - Cx - g = DR < 0 (4.17)
As long as expectations of inflation do not change, this 
result is independent of the behaviour of the actual COBD. 
If the public sector is always in equilibrium:
g + T + rB - r*R - K1m1 - DB - DR = 0 (4.18)
International reserves are falling and the government is 
reducing its domestic debt. Any change in the actual fiscal 
policy, without changes in the future perceived inflation, 
will change the behaviour of government bonds only. That 
situation contrasts with the case where there are not 
alternative assets to money, in which actual fiscal policy 
had a very important effect in the dynamics of consumption.
Once the government reduces inflation in a temporary basis, 
money jumps. Full monetary accommodation maintains the real 
interest rate given an equal to 0. There is an open market 
operation. The government reduces the quantity of bonds at
114
once and injects money to the system. Afterwards, 
consumption and money remain constant but international 
reserves are falling continuously. In tx, the government 
increases again the rate of depreciation of the exchange 
rate. Consumption falls to Cq and there is a reversion of 
the original open market operation. Money falls and 
government bonds increase at once.
The symptoms of the capital inflows problem appear in the 
same way than in the perfect capital mobility case. The 
real solution is the same (see Calvo (1986)), being the 
difference in the financial markets. Money does not come 
from abroad but from open market operations under a 
monetary rule. There is not way in which the government can 
influence the behaviour of international reserves, which 
is an opposite result to the perfect capital mobility case 
(see chapter 5) . Instead, the behaviour of the public 
deficit determines the path of government bonds.73
4.3 POLICIES TO COMBAT THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM
In the presence of alternative domestic assets to money, 
actual fiscal policy is irrelevant to combat the capital 
inflows problem.74 However, monetary policy may be 
effective.
This section investigates the use of two different 
monetary policies to overcome the consequences of the 
credibility problem. The first one is a policy of zero 
monetary accommodation and the second is a policy of 
partial monetary accommodation. The main conclusion is that
73In this solution balance of payments crises are 
independent of the behaviour of the government budget 
constraint in the short run. We have assumed implicitly 
that the level of international reserves is sufficiently 
large. If it were small, the exchange rate regime would 
collapse before.
74Provided it does not change expectations of future 
inflation.
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both policies may overcome the symptoms of the capital 
inflows problem. However, if credibility is very low, the 
financial costs of the policies may be so large that the 
government has strong incentives to abandon them.
4.3 • 1. - Lack o£ Credibility and Zero Monetary Accommodation
As we have already comment, in a zero capital mobility 
economy there is scope for monetary policy. In the previous 
example, the government set r=0 and with the credibility 
problem that fact produced the symptoms of the capital 
inflows problem. Now this subsection will investigate the 
consequences of setting the policy m=R+K, where K is a 
constant. In that policy, the government prints nominal 
money according to the behaviour of international reserves 
and the rate of inflation. For such reason, changes in real 
money are associated to changes on international reserves 
in a one to one basis.
If the government follows the described policy, equation 
(4.11) becomes
yt + i'mt + i'Ke - Ce - gt = Dmt (4.11')
This equation together with the cash in advance constraint
(4.3) determine m and C (see appendix 4.1 to check the 
stability conditions.)
It is easy to observe that these two equations do not 
include the rate of inflation and then this one is neutral 
to the system.75 For the same reason credibility is also 
neutral to the real solution. The policy is then equivalent 
to a zero monetary accommodation policy.
Nonetheless, the credibility problem continues when people 
perceive the stabilization programme as temporary. If now 
the problem can not be reflected in higher consumption, it 
will be reflected on the behaviour of the real interest
75Appendix 4.1 shows that even though inflation is 
neutral under this policy, devaluation is never neutral.
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rate.
To prove this assertion, we take equation (4.8). Knowing 
that during (0,tx) K=Klt setting C=C0 and assuming an 
isoelastic utility function (see chapter 3), we obtain:
(r - 0) = -j- fz ♦ . (4.19)
(1 + (r + 7^ )4))
Where p is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption.
Solving for Dr:
Dr = r2 + (-i + 7C. - 0) r - 0 (-1 + *_) (4.20)
q) V
Which is a non linear differential equation in the real 
interest rate.
In the steady state Dr=0 because 0=r. If the term (!/<{>) + 
TEi-0 is greater than zero and r>0, r shows an unstable path 
growing without bound. Instead, if (1/<|>) + 7Cj-0 < 0, there 
could be some cycles of the rate of interest followed maybe 
by an explosive path towards very high positive values.
The analytical solution of (4.20) is not easy. Because of 
the existence of a constant term, the Bernoulli solution is 
not applicable to this case (Chiang (1984) pp.491-492). 
However, an heuristic argument will show us the qualitative 
path of interest rates under the credibility problem.
Suppose that (1 /<(>) + 7C1-0>O, condition that will hold
always when <j> and 0 are both smaller than one.76 Assume also 
that the beliefs of people are:
During (0,tx) 7t=7t1<7t0 (4.21)
76These are plausible assumptions. In Mexico, for 
example, the ratio of money to consumption is around 10%. 
On the other hand, the rate of discount of the utility must 
be around the real rate of interest, which is difficult to 
think is greater than 100%.
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During (tx,<») 7l=n0 (4.22)
and
from (tx/°<>) r=0 (4.23)
Instead of an initial condition for the real rate of 
interest, there is a terminal condition. This one assert 
that starting from tx the real rate of interest will be 
equal to the subjective factor 0 again. That is a plausible 
assumption. People expect normality conditions in the long 
run.
Using the fact that the lagrange multiplier X is 
predetermined (see equation (4.8)) and that consumption 
remains in C0 always:
^ c0 =  ^ c0 I A  0 A \
(1 + (r(tx) + icJ+J (1 + (0 + 7t0) <j>) 14 ^
Equation (4.24) shows that the nominal rate of interest is 
predetermined. 
and then
r( tx) = 0 + 7C0 - n± (4.25)
The real rate of interest just before the government 
reverses the stabilization programme, has a direct and 
unitary relation with the difference between inflations nQ 
and nx. If the reduction of inflation is temporary and huge, 
so will be the real rate of interest before the end of the 
programme.
Given this information, it is possible to check what must 
be the initial condition for r and its trajectory. 
Equation (4.20) shows that if r=0, Dr=0. When r>0, Dr>0 and 
if r<0, Dr<0. Therefore, the initial value of r (r±) must be 
greater than 0=ro. r is growing continuously until it 
reaches the value 0+7CQ-7C! in tx.
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Figure 4.2
rO+infO - infl
The described trajectory of the real interest rate may 
represent a severe financial cost for the government when 
the stabilization programme is very ambitious. The COBD is:
g + T + rB - r'R0 - K^  = DB (4.26)
Since C=C0, m=m0 and R=R0. The COBD determines the trajectory 
of the domestic debt.
When the problem of credibility is such that r is growing 
too much, either domestic debt is growing enormously or the
119
fiscal effort to stabilize through higher taxation becomes 
unsustainable. Lack of credibility may generate dramatic 
increases in the real interest rate.77
4.3.2.- The Capital Inflows Problem and Partial Monetary 
Accommodation
The financial costs of reverting the capital inflows 
problem completely may be very high. However, between the 
policies of full monetary accommodation and zero monetary 
accommodation there is an option. That is to set a higher 
but unique interest rate and follow a full monetary 
accommodation at that new real interest rate.
Though the described policy seems attractive, there are 
several problems for the government when it follows the 
prescription:
First, from the beginning the government is assuming a 
higher financial cost over the public debt.
Second, it is not clear for how long the government must 
set this higher rate.
Third, it is necessary to analyse the effectiveness of the 
policy.
With respect to the second problem, the government could 
theoretically set a higher interest rate forever. However, 
that would produce a secular increase in consumption78. The 
absence of a steady state may be consistent if the 
transversality condition holds. However, it may be 
inconsistent with artificial limits to the size of the
77Agenor (1994b) and Velasco (1993) assert that 
increases in real interest rates in ERBS occur even though 
there is perfect credibility. Nonetheless, this chapter 
shows that lack of credibility does affect real interest 
rates.
78See for example Drazen and Helpman (1987) and 
Obstfeld (1985) for situations where consumption can 
increase forever with a given output.
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public debt.79 Therefore, another possibility is to set a 
temporal policy of higher interest rates.
Nonetheless, and related with the third problem, the use of 
temporal higher interest rates has to be carefully studied. 
Calvo and Vegh (1990a) show that this policy may actually 
generate current account deficits and consumption booms. 
Instead of combat the capital inflows problem, higher real 
interest rates would fuel it.80
For the purposes of this chapter, we will assume that given 
the credibility problem the government sets a higher real 
interest rate for the duration of the stabilization 
programme. The chapter proves that this policy deprives 
always consumption initially with respect to the case of 
full monetary accommodation (see appendix 4.2). However, 
since r becomes greater than 0, consumption starts growing 
and again it is very difficult to combat the capital 
inflows problem.
The policy is described as:
During (0,tx) r=rx>0 and 7C=7C1<7C0 (4.27)
During (tx,«>) r=0 and 7t=7C0 (4.28)
79Sargent and Wallace (1982) fix a limit for the size 
of government bonds (see also Drazen (1985) and Liviatan 
(1984) for related topics). McCallum (1984) proves that a 
situation where debt tends to infinity may be compatible 
with transversality conditions, so the limits imposed by 
Sargent and Wallace are not necessary. Obstfeld (1985) 
shows examples where there are secular current account 
surpluses or deficits. The first case implies a raise of 
the financial total assets of the economy to infinity in 
the long run. However, that is consistent with 
transversality conditions.
80Calvo and Vegh (1990) use also a cash in advance 
model. However, they assume that the government bonds 
provide liquidity services. That assumption is crucial for 
getting their results.
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Since during (tx,<») Dr=D7i=0 and r=0, C is constant in an 
endogenous value Cq.
During (0,tx) and assuming the isoelastic utility function:
•^ = P (^ 1 - 0) >0 (4.29)
and then
C {tx) = C(i) exp(p - 0) tx) (4.30)
Where C(i) is an initial endogenous value for consumption 
that takes place at the moment where r rises to rx.
Since the lagrange multiplier X is predetermined, it must 
be true that
Uc<C(tx)) = Uc{C(g))
(1 + (lx + 7tx) (J>) (1 + (0 + 7C0) 4>)
Which means that X just before the end of the programme is 
equal to X just after the programme.
Finally, integrating the overall budget constraint of the 
economy
C(i)exp(p(r1-Q)-Q) t + J “ C, exp(-01) = ~ ° ^ +S(0) (4.32)
Which implies
(6 - p(r) - 8)) (1-exp( (P(ri'0) _0> ) +-^ exp(-0tx) =
r° ~ g° + J?0 (4.33)
Equations (4.30), (4.31) and (4.33) solve for C(i), C(tx)
and Cq. Appendix 4.2 shows that if p=l the system is linear 
and has analytical solution. It also shows that in such 
case higher rx reduces the initial level of consumption.
The way in which the model works is the following:
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If there is a credibility problem, full monetary 
accommodation with r=0 will generate the Calvo (1986) 
solution. In t=0 consumption will grow at once but will 
remain constant during (0,tx). In tx it will fall to a 
smaller value. On the other hand, when rx>0 during (0,tx), 
initial consumption will fall below the level of the Calvo 
model81 but will grow during the transition. The questions 
that we address are:
1) What is the necessary increase in the real interest rate 
to avoid the initial consumption boom? that is to say to 
set Ci=C0.
2) What is the necessary increase in r to avoid the long 
run consequences of the capital inflows problem? That is 
Cq=C0.
The answers of these questions will show the financial 
costs of reverting the capital inflows problem. For both 
cases, the graphical solution for consumption will be:
81But not necessary below C0.
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Figure 4.3: Case C(i)=C0
C(tx)
C O
to=o
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Figure 4.4: Case Cq=C0
C(tx)
C O
to=o
In figure 4.3 C(i)=C0 but since consumption grows in the 
period (0, tx) , there must be a reduction of the long run 
consumption Cq (Cq<C0) . A new modality of the capital inflows 
problem appear. With C growing and C0 being its initial 
value, there is again a current account deficit and a loss 
of international reserves. This time, however, under higher 
real interest rates.
In figure 4.4 the government avoids the long run reduction 
of consumption with an even higher real interest rate. 
Nonetheless, it cannot avoid the emergence of a current 
account deficit at sometime. If Cq=C0, it means that 
starting from tx international reserves must be the same
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than the original. There is first a current account surplus 
and then a current account deficit. At the end, there is an 
unavoidable reduction of consumption with respect to the 
highest peak.
4.4.- SOME SIMULATIONS FOR THE CASE OF MEXICO
Chapter one shows that in at least one occasion Mexico 
experienced the symptoms of the capital inflows problem 
without having capital inflows. For that reason, it is 
useful to analyse the costs of reducing or eliminating that 
problem for that specific country.
To analyse the described costs, this section carries on two 
simulation exercises that consider some parameters and data 
of the Mexican economy.
In a first instance, these exercises simulate a reduction 
of inflation similar to the observed in the period 1987- 
1988 (from 140% on average to 100%) . A second stage 
compares different monetary policies and derives the 
necessary increase in the real interest rate to get some 
goals.
The section is divided in two subsections. Both of them 
consider that people believed that the stabilization 
policy would be aborted at the end of 1988.82 
First subsection asks three specific questions:
a) What was the necessary increase in the real interest 
rate to avoid an initial consumption boom (namely Ci=C0) ?
b) What should be the increase in r to avoid the long run 
consequences of the credibility problem, namely Cq=C0?
C) What are the results of the model under full monetary 
accommodation and r=0?
Second subsection asks what the trajectory of the real 
interest rate should have been to maintain a constant level
82In 1988 there was a rumour that the stabilization 
policy would be abandoned at the end of the year, when the 
new administration took office. Chapter five explains why 
stabilization programmes in Mexico are affected by 
political changes.
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of consumption during 1988.
Both exercises assume that the changes in the rate of 
interest to combat the capital inflows problem last for one 
year.
4.4.1.- Simulation under Partial Monetary Accommodation
The first simulation uses the extension of the model 
already shown in subsection 4.3.2. It assumes an 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution p of 2.5, which is 
a value calculated by Arrau (1990) in a model of 
transaction costs.83 To calculate <|>, we simply took the 
historical relation of the monetary aggregate ml over 
private consumption, which is around 0.1.
The data used for the simulation corresponds with the 
national accounts identity of 1987. We assume a 
hypothetical steady state taking the observed values of 
output, consumption (private and public) and investment 
(I) . A shadow foreign interest rate of 10% is also assumed. 
The following equation derives the total foreign assets of 
the economy.
f{0) = C° *■ + g° ^  (4.34)
r *
The consistent foreign assets f have a negative value of 
90% of the GDP (Y).
In order to be able to generate a steady state, 0 is 
calculated in 10% also.
The exercise considers that between the components of f, 
only international reserves show dynamics. Other private 
foreign bonds remain constant always.
The fictitious steady state is the following:
83The model used by Arrau (1990) corresponds 
qualitatively to this model, in the sense that different 
rates of inflation between periods affect consumption 
today.
Table 4.1.Simulation 2: Fictitious Steady State
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Y (0) 4883.7
I (0)+g(0) 1377.5
f (0) -4500
C(0) 3044.95
e 0.10
r (0) 0.10
* 0.1
t (x) 1.0
n(0) 1.4
n(l) 1.0
Y0, I0, g0, C0 and f0 are valued in millions of pesos of
1980.
Since the data is in annual basis, the subjective duration 
of the programme (tx) is supposed to be 1.
The solutions for the questions already described are:
Table 4.2: Simulation 2: Behaviour of Consumption and
Interest Rate
(a) (b) (c)
C(0) 3044.95 3044.95 3044.95
r (1) 0.1334 0.155 0.10
C (i) 3044.95 2887.7 3296.9
C(tx) 3289.7 3284.5 3296.9
C (q) 3032.9 3044.5 3017.7
(a) Policy of avoiding the initial consumption boom (Ci=C0)
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(b) Policy of avoiding the long run consequences of the 
capital inflows problem (Cq=C0)
(c) Full monetary accommodation (r=0).
In order to avoid the initial consumption boom, the real 
interest rate has to be around 13%. With respect to the 
fictitious steady state, r has to increase 3.3 percentage 
points. However, in Mexico, previously to the ERBS, real 
interest rates were negative (see chapter 1). The increase 
in the real interest rate under the credibility problem had 
to be huge according to this exercise, as it was in 
reality. Even in these circumstances, the described policy 
does not avoid the symptoms of the capital inflows problem.
To avoid the long run consequences of the credibility 
problem, the rate of interest should have increased to more 
than 15%. A current account deficit would have emerged also 
at some point.
Finally, a full monetary accommodation policy has a long 
run cost for society of 0.4% lower long run consumption 
than in the case where C^Cq. The same measure with respect 
to the case that avoids the long run costs is 0.9%.
The exercise also calculates the financial cost of the 
domestic debt in each case. For this concept we understand 
the interest payments of such debt divided by the GDP. 
Considering an initial public domestic debt of 30% of GDP84, 
the estimated cost of the debt under the three policies is:
84That was the size of the public domestic debt at the 
end of 1987
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Table 4.3. Simulation 2:Estimated Cost of the Domestic 
Debt
(in % of GDP)
Policy C(i)=C(0) 4.02
Policy C(q)=C(0) 5.01
Full Monetary 
Accommodation
3.01
There are almost two percentage points of difference 
between the cases of full monetary accommodation and the 
one that eliminates the long run effects on consumption. 
Though it might not sound too much, the additional fiscal 
effort to overcome the credibility problem has to be added 
to the initial effort to reduce inflation.
Still there are some additional short run costs for a 
government that tries to overcome the credibility problem. 
In the presence of non tradeable goods, an initial 
reduction of consumption would probably produce a recession 
(see appendix 4.3). Given this fact, the taxes linked to 
these activities would fall. For that reason, the 
government would not have incentives to follow a very tight 
monetary policy in the short run. Instead, the model 
suggests the intermediate policy (Ci=C0) as one that reduces 
the problem but does not eliminate it at all. That 
prescription seems to be consistent with the Mexican facts 
in 1988 and 1994.85
85Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995) assert that the 
monetary policy followed by the Mexican authorities was not 
sufficiently tight.
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4.4.2.- Behaviour of Interest Rates under Zero Monetary 
Accommodation.
The second exercise simulates the hypothetical behaviour of 
interest rates under zero monetary accommodation (C=C0 
always).
In subsection 4.3.1, the real interest rate was 
characterized by the differential equation:
Dr = r2 + (-^  + 7t, - 0)r - 0 ( +  rc.) (4.35)<p <p
We have already explained why if 0=r, Dr=0.
Since the analytical solution of this equation is very 
complex, we used an approximation in discrete time. The 
assumption is that in monthly terms the real interest rate 
behaves as (4.35). Then, the monthly interest rate is:
rt = rt.x + rt-i + (-^  + 7ti - Q)rt.x - 0(-i + n±) (4.36)
Changing the calculation from annual to monthly terms also 
changes some parameters. <|> is now 1.286. Since the 
calculation is now in monthly terms, 0=0.1/12= 0.008333 and 
the rate of inflation falls from an average monthly rate of 
0.11666 (1.4/12) to 0.08333 (1.0/12).
The exercise assumes that 7t falls from n0 to n1. Inflation 
is the same every month of the year. People believe that 
the duration of the stabilization programme is only for one 
year and after that inflation will rise to an annual rate 
of 1.4 again.
As we have already explained in subsection 4.3.1, it has to 
be true that in the last month of the year:
86This is because money is an stock but consumption is 
a flow. Since monthly consumption must be on average twelve 
times smaller than annual consumption, the relation between 
the stock of money and monthly consumption is now 0.1(12) .
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ri2 = 0 + *0 “ = 0.05842 (4.37)
In december, the monthly real interest rate must be 5.84%, 
that is 70.04% in annual terms. That unsustainable value 
has never been observed in Mexico.
Given all this information, a simple programme87 for 
equation (4.36) consists of finding r1 such in the last 
month r12=0.0584. The programme solves for the trajectory of 
the real interest rate.
Table 4.4.- Simulation 3: Trajectory of Real Interest Rates 
(% annual terms)
January 10.3
February 10.33
March 10.41
April 10.56
May 10.84
June 11.39
July 12.45
August 14.50
September 18.43
October 26.09
November 40.09
December 70.04
The trajectory is exponential. During more than six months 
of the year, real interest rates remain relatively stable.
87The programme is to simulate (4.36) and was made in 
Lotus 123.
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Afterwards, they increase to very high levels. The average 
real rate of interest for the year is 20.5%. It would 
generate a financial cost for the public debt of 6% of the 
GDP, the double of case of full monetary accommodation. 
However, the fact that interest rates are growing in an 
exponential way, implies that the situation is 
unsustainable.
4 . 5 . -  SOME R E F LE C T IO N S  ON TH E U SE O F IN T E R E S T  R ATES TO 
S T A B IL IZ E
Throughout the exposition we have assumed that expectations 
of inflation are exogenous. For that reason, in the 
presence of alternative assets to money actual fiscal 
policy does not have any effect. However, in a more 
realistic environment it is plausible to think that future 
inflation is expected to rise if there are fiscal 
imbalances today. Several authors88 have analysed the case 
where an unsustainable fiscal deficit produces a balance of 
payments crisis in the future. In the cash in advance 
model, Calvo (1987) asserts that when there are 
unsustainable fiscal deficits, future expected inflation 
rises and the symptoms of the capital inflows problem 
appear.
In the particular problem analysed in this chapter, the use 
of the rate of interest to combat the symptoms of the 
capital inflows problem presents an interesting challenge. 
Suppose that for given expected higher inflation, the 
government decides to increase the rate of interest. The 
objective could be, for example, to avoid the long-run 
effects of the credibility problem (namely Cq=C0) . The 
increase in the rate of interest represents an additional
88See for example Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber 
(1984), Obstfeld (1984), Sachs (1986), Calvo (1987) and van 
Wijnbergen (1988). For a good summary see Flood and Garber
(1994) .
133
fiscal cost to the government. In plausible scenarios, it 
would increase even more the future expected inflation. But 
if that is the case, then for the same increase in the rate 
of interest actual consumption rises and the government is 
unable to fulfil its desires. A further increase in 
interest rates is needed. This one would produce even 
higher future inflation and can undermine the intentions of 
the government again.
The fact that expected inflation may have a huge elasticity 
with respect to the actual fiscal deficit, can generate an 
unstable situation. There the government is unable to use 
the rate of interest to cope with the symptoms of the 
capital inflows problem.
A similar situation to the one just explained happens under 
a policy of zero monetary accommodation. Lack of 
credibility produces a temporal increase on real interest 
rates. The fiscal deficit deteriorates and it is likely 
that future expected inflation increases more. That implies 
a pattern of even higher interest rates and so on. If the 
situation is unstable, the rate of interest should go to 
infinity. The government would be unable to follow this 
policy, having to accept the presence of some modality of 
the capital inflows problem.89
89The nature of the cash in advance constraint is 
responsible of the potential unstable situation already 
explained. Money and consumption are linked in a one to one 
basis. Expectations of higher inflation in the future 
increase the demand for money and consumption today. Higher 
interest rates tend to reduce consumption in the presence 
of given expectations of inflation (see appendix 4.2). 
However, their indirect effect over the public deficit may 
generate the opposite result.
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C O N C LU D IN G  REMARKS
In 1988 and 1994 Mexico experienced the symptoms of the 
capital inflows problem without capital inflows. The 
episodes were accompanied with huge real interest rates. 
From these observations, several questions have emerged: 
First, why is it possible that these symptoms appear 
without capital inflows?
Second, what is the effectiveness of interest rates 
policies to control these situations?
Third, what is the role of economic policy about this 
problem?
This chapter have tried to answer these questions in a cash 
in advance model. The main conclusion is that when it is a 
problem, the so-called capital inflows problem is not a 
matter of capital inflows but a credibility issue. 
Therefore, the ingredients for the symptoms to emerge will 
be there as long as stabilization programmes have low 
credibility.
The government can use interest rate policies to overcome 
the described symptoms. However, these policies generate at 
least two additional problems:
a) If credibility is very low they generate unsustainable 
financial costs.
b) Huge financial costs may reinforce expectations of 
higher inflation in the future. That situation produces an 
indirect effect that may generate a perverse effect in 
which higher interest rates fuel the symptoms of the 
capital inflows problem.
Because of this explanation, it is much more recommended to 
generate credibility than to try to fight the problem with 
short run monetary policies. Institutions and long run 
rules are the answers. In the particular case of Mexico, 
the political system has been quite responsible of 
consumption cycles, as chapter five will describe more
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accurately. Changes in the political rules will probably 
have a strong effect in expectations. In this sense, the 
fact that democracy is increasing in that country seems to 
be a very good new.
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CHAPTER 5:
STABILIZATION UNDER SHORT TERM GOVERNMENTS:
IS IT CONVENIENT FOR THEM TO CREATE LACK OF CREDIBILITY?
INTRODUCTION
At the end of 1987, the Mexican government set up a 
stabilization programme (ERBS) that lasted for seven years. 
During this time, inflation fell from 160% to 7%, public 
finances were in equilibrium since 1990 and the symptoms of 
the capital inflows problem appeared from the onset. In 
December 1994, the programme collapsed with a sharp 
devaluation. During 1995 the deepest recession since 1932 
developed.
The collapse of the Mexican stabilization programme has 
generated an important discussion in the literature. Mexico 
adopted many market reforms accompanying the stabilization 
programme. Capital markets became more open and there was 
a structural change in many areas. Deregulation, financial 
liberalisation and privatization of state owned enterprises 
are among the main structural reforms. The balance of 
payments crisis of 1994 seems to defy the advantages of 
openness and market oriented changes.90
Following this line, several authors symphatize with the 
idea that very open economies are vulnerable and may be 
subject to self-fulfilling crises.91 However, in a very 
recent article Paul Krugman (Krugman (1996)) challenges 
that hypothesis. He proposes that collapses occur because
90Many analysts discuss now on the convenience of open 
capital markets and market oriented reforms. See for 
example Edwards (1995b), Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz
(1995), McKinnon and Pill (1996), Obstfeld (1996), Krugman
(1996)
91See for example Cole and Kehoe (1996), Eichengreen, 
Rose and Wyplosz (1995) , Obstfeld (1996) and Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995) .
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the government is doing something wrong. The Krugman 
assertion is important for the case of Mexico and for the 
intentions of this chapter.
In the last Mexican stabilization programme public finances 
were in equilibrium or surplus almost all the time. For 
this reason, it seems that the public finance approach to 
the capital inflows problem and balance of payments crises 
cannot be a good explanation of the Mexican collapse. 
Nonetheless, this chapter concludes that behind the Mexican 
capital inflows problem and its eventual crisis there was 
a perceived relaxation in public finances. The chapter then 
rescues the Krugman hypothesis. The government was doing 
something wrong.
In order to prove what the previous paragraph says, the 
chapter analyses the Calvo approach to the capital inflows 
problem and balance of payments crises (Calvo (1986) 
(1987), Calvo and Vegh (1993)). Straightforward 
calculations show that lack of credibility in ERBS reduce 
the necessary fiscal adjustment to stabilize in the short 
run. It also increases international reserves and, as Calvo 
and Vegh (1993) assert, can raise the level of activity for 
a while. Some short term governments could be tempted to 
generate lack of credibility to increase their popularity 
and ease the fiscal adjustment.
The chapter shows that in some historical situations, the 
nature of the Mexican political system could be the main 
factor behind capital inflows problems or balance of 
payments crises. The presence of governments with certain 
characteristics implies that by creating lack of 
credibility they may get some goals.
A way in which the government can create lack of 
credibility is the following:
In Mexico, it is a commonplace to say that the president 
chooses his successor. A government with short term goals 
will be tempted to choose a future government whose 
projected expenditure is huge. The strategy of the first
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government will be to reduce inflation and to set an 
equilibrium target for the overall budget deficit. Expected 
inflation will be higher because of the future high 
expenditure. The demand for money will increase in the 
present period as well as private consumption. The 
inflation tax will fall but not as in the case where 
inflation is always low. At the same time, international 
reserves will increase, reducing the net interest payments 
on the consolidated foreign debt. Employment can also rise.
Still the government follows an apparent consistent fiscal 
policy. There is a current account deficit but is financed 
with speculative private capital inflows in a one to one 
basis.
The problem is that the experiment is unsustainable. At 
some moment there must be an adjustment of the current 
account. This one will produce a drastic reduction of 
consumption and international reserves, but by that time 
the short term government will not be in power anymore.
The chapter shows that the kind of government described 
does not survive in power, unless there are uncertainty and 
mistakes. The combination of governments with short term 
goals and the fact that they can choose their successors 
produce a high rate of inflation in the long run. In the 
last twenty five years the average rate of inflation in 
Mexico has been greater than 30%. Our study suggest that we 
should not ignore political factors in this result.
At the end, we compare this explanation based on lack of 
credibility with the alternative of excess confidence. This 
one proposes that because of the structural adjustment, 
people believe that the future performance of the economy 
will be very good.92 Maybe because the government convinces
92Krugman (1995) assert that there was an excessive 
optimism in the structural reforms of emerging markets. We 
have already said that these reforms did have an impact in
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them, people overestimate the future perspectives, 
consuming and bringing money from abroad. The result is 
observationally equivalent to the model under lack of 
credibility. However, a simple test presented in appendix 
5.1 shows that for the excess confidence hypothesis to 
hold, people in Mexico should have believed unlike rates of 
growth of GDP.
The chapter is divided in four sections:
Section one presents an overview of the 1987-1994 Mexican 
stabilization programme. Section two shows the Calvo (1986) 
model and derives possible advantages for short term 
governments creating lack of credibility. Section three 
presents a political model where the actual government 
chooses its successor. It obtains the complete sequence of 
future governments and investigates when lack of 
credibility may be endogenous. Finally, section four 
compares the explanations of lack of credibility and excess 
confidence for the case of Mexico.
several countries (see chapter three) but still it can be 
true that people expected even more. The case of the last 
ERBS in Argentina may be a good example. The economy is 
much better than before the programme in terms of growth 
and level of GDP. However, consumption grew too much from 
1991 to 1995 and there was an adjustment and a recession in 
1995. After that, the economy has grown again at relatively 
high levels.
140
5 . 1 . -  TH E M E X IC A N  S T A B IL IZ A T IO N  PROGRAMME O F 1 9 8 7 - 1 9 9 4 :  
G E N E S IS  AND C R IS IS
Chapter one shows some stylized facts of the Mexican 
stabilization programme (1987-1994) . These observations are 
sufficient motivation for writing two chapters. However, it 
is in this chapter when we make a broader investigation of 
how the programme started, developed and finally collapsed. 
The stabilization programme lasted for seven years 
(December 1987-December 1994). It was an ERBS considered as 
very successful (see for example Bruno (1993)). During the 
programme, inflation fell from 160% to 7%. Growth 
increased from 0% (average) in the period 1983-1987 to 2.8 
% over the next six years
Since 1988 the reduction of inflation was huge (from 160% 
to 50%). The current account started to deteriorate and 
there were capital outflows. High real interest rates 
prevailed, producing a negative behaviour on the public 
sector operational balance. The economy started to recover 
quite fast from six years of stagnation and private 
consumption grew considerably.
At the beginning of the programme the financial situation 
of the country was fragile. Each year Mexico paid out 
around eight or nine billion dollars in interest payments 
of foreign debt. This burden together with the strict 
amortization schedule of the principal, implied a liquidity 
problem and a need to resort to the inflation tax. With the 
debt overhang, the prospects of long run stability seemed 
dubious (see Aspe (1992) (1993) for a detailed explanation 
of the problem).
When President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (from now on CSG) 
took office in December 1988, there was a fair decision to 
reschedule foreign debt. In August 1989, Mexico adopted the 
Brady Plan, which reduced transfers abroad (see Aspe 
(1993)). From that point on, the stabilization programme 
took a different pattern. Capital flight stopped and was
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replaced by huge private capital inflows. The current 
account deficit deteriorated but the capital account 
surplus was greater in absolute value, producing an 
accumulation of international reserves. Real interest rates 
fell and all the definitions of the public balance went 
into surplus. By 1992, the domestic credit of the central 
bank to the government disappeared. Economic growth 
increased93 and private consumption continued growing 
considerably (see chapter one) .
Since 1987, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank supported the stabilization programme. By 1992, 
the reduction of public external debt had been substantial. 
Mexico then concluded its adjustment programme with the 
IMF.
The government claimed that Mexico had entered a new 
economic era. In 1990 negotiations for a free trade
agreement with United States and Canada started. They
lasted until 1993, when the Presidents of the three
countries signed the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), and it was approved by the respective congresses.
Although inflation fell considerably during these years, 
economic activity started showing negative signs since 
1992. Growth declined. By 1993 it fell to 0.4%. The real 
rate of interest remained high. According to Dornbusch 
(1993) and Dornbusch and Werner (1994) the real exchange 
rate was overvalued.
The government intended to introduce more flexibility to 
the exchange rate mechanism. Before November 1991, there 
was a preannounced crawling peg. At the end of that year, 
a target zone was adopted. The upper band devalued in a 
preannounced way, while the lower band remained fixed. 
Nonetheless, some analysts consider that the mechanism was 
not enough. Dornbusch (1993) recommended a devaluation
93At least during 1989-1991
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consistent with an inflation target of around 20% per year, 
like in Chile or Colombia. In 1993 Paul Krugman expressed 
concern on the overvalued currency.
The response of the government to these criticisms was to 
resort to the argument that an appreciation of the currency 
is a natural consequence of a more open economy.94 With 
respect to the slowdown of growth, the official position 
related it to the structural change in the productive 
sector due to privatisation, trade liberalisation and 
deregulation. The argument was that this process required 
adjustment in employment and huge transaction costs. 95
The reduction of growth in the economy was followed by a 
higher current account deficit and a huge capital account 
surplus. In the seventies and eighties, these inflows were 
considered a problem, the capital inflows problem as we 
have seen before. In Mexico the government claimed that 
capital inflows were produced by restored confidence in the 
future performance of the country. It claimed, also, that 
the current account deficit was a natural consequence of 
capital inflows. Therefore, a sudden reduction in them 
would reduce the current account deficit without any risk 
of an exchange rate collapse.
But the most important argument of the government in favour 
of the programme was the fiscal adjustment. According to 
it, stabilization programmes where the public deficit is
94Dombusch and Werner (1994) agree with the argument 
but consider that the orders of magnitude of the variables 
in Mexico indicate an important overvaluation of the 
currency.
95The general idea is that at the beginning of the 
programme the structural change raises growth. At some 
stage, however, it produces the opposite result as a 
consequence of transactions costs and higher transitional 
unemployment. See Bruno (1993) and Bruno and Meridor (1991) 
for a similar discussion in the case of Israel.
143
under control cannot fail.96 Adjusted public finances 
guarantee permanent disinflation.97
Some historical evidence (Uruguay (1978-82), Chile (1979- 
82) and several European countries in 1992 (Spain, 
Portugal, Italy and Britain)) shows that balance of 
payments crises (bpc) can occur in the presence of fiscal 
adjustment. However, the government resorted in the 
explained argument throughout the "sexenio"98.
The political and economic situation deteriorated in 1994. 
An uprising revolution surged in the southern state of 
Chiapas. The candidate of the official ruling party99 for 
the presidency, Luis Donaldo Colosio, was assassinated in 
March. Capital inflows fell dramatically (from 30 billion 
dollars in 1993 to 14 billion dollars in 1994) . The current 
account deficit remained very high (28 billion dollars- 
more than 8% of GDP) , which discredited the argument that 
it was produced by capital inflows. Surprisingly, growth 
increased.
Fears of devaluation started very soon in the year, which
96The government claimed that a current account in the 
presence of fiscal adjustment is not a problem. For
example, Aspe (1993 page 225) writes:
"For instance, in the late 1970 #s, a sizable current
account deficit was a cause for concern. Usually it was the 
result of an overheated economy pushed by the government 
spending and financed by increasing external borrowing. 
Nowadays a current account deficit of the same size,
relatively to GDP, means a strong expansion of private 
investment financed by capital repatriation or direct flows 
from foreign investment into the country."
Pedro Aspe was Minister of Finance of the CSG government.
97The government was borrowing an argument by Nigel 
Lawson in Britain (see Cline (1995)): current account
deficits produced by the private sector are not a problem 
(see chapter three).
98Sexenio is the six years period of the President in 
Mexico.
"Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
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can be detected in the composition of the public debt. An 
important part of private capital inflows were saved in 
public bonds. Among them, the so-called Certificados de la 
Tesoreria (CETES) were particularly favoured by foreigners. 
However, though the rate of interest of CETES was high, 
they are not indexed to the exchange rate. Other government 
bonds (TESOBONOS) are indexed to the US dollar. Since March 
1994, there was a portfolio movement against CETES and in 
favour of TESOBONOS. By the end of the year, TESOBONOS 
accounted for almost 40 billion dollars. The maturity of 
75% of this debt was not more than six months ahead. 
Several speculative attacks took place during 1994. The 
huge amount of international reserves could cope with them. 
The government did not change the exchange rate policy. Low 
inflation was considered priority.100
The response of the government to the political shocks was 
to consider them as transitory (see Leiderman and Thorne 
(1995)). Monetary policy, instead of being contractionary, 
was relatively expansionary. International reserves were 
falling but the real quantity of money was growing, 
creating an important domestic credit of the central bank 
to the government (Edwards (1995b), Edwards et al (1995), 
Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1995)).
President Ernesto Zedillo (EZ) took office in December 
1994. Fifteen days after, a speculative attack reduced the 
level of international reserves from twelve billion dollars 
(bd) to five bd. A further three bd flew away in the 
following three days. A sharp devaluation of 70%101 occurred 
and the new government adopted a floating regime.
The amount of TESOBONOS owned by foreigners and their short
100In 1994 inflation reached 7% the lowest in 25 years. 
Not for a long time, unfortunately.
101Additional devaluations took place during 1995. The 
cumulative depreciation of the peso against the U.S dollar 
between December 1994- January 1996 was around 130%.
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maturity make people fear debt repudiation.102 The US 
government instrumented a bail out covering the value of 
these bonds (even against some congressmen). Guillermo 
Calvo had suggested a similar scheme in April (see 
Dornbusch and Werner (1994) and the comment by Calvo) . The 
loan was an implicit debt rescheduling and has exacerbated 
nationalistic feelings both in Mexico and US.103 
The costs of bringing down the current account deficit were 
enormous. Private consumption fell by almost 15% in 1995. 
GDP fell by 7%. As in Chile in 1982, there was a crisis in 
the banking system. Fiscal adjustment, the favourite 
argument of the CSG government to defend the ERBS, proved 
not to be a sufficient condition to avoid bpc.
Apart from economic considerations, Mexico now faces many 
political problems. Former President Carlos Salinas blamed 
President Zedillo for mismanagement of the exchange rate 
policy. Before, no former President had blamed new 
governments. The debate has concentrated in who is 
responsible of the crisis. The reality is that the size of 
the current account in the CSG government could not be
102By the end of 1994 the Mexican government was 
illiquid. For several authors that fact has been considered 
the main cause of the crisis. Calvo and Mendoza (1996a) 
(1996b) argue that people followed herding behaviour when 
the capital flight started. Sachs, Tornell and Velasco
(1995) share this view.
Though the observation is valid, the cause of the crisis 
was not a self-fulfilling prophecy but several years of 
current account disequilibrium. At the end, herding 
behaviour and self-fulfilling expectations exacerbated the 
damages of the crisis.
103A very polemic discussion started in Mexico because 
the loan has the incomes of oil exports as a guarantee. The 
Congress in Mexico is dominated by the ruling party PRI but 
the opposition deputies voted against the loan. Several 
people assert that some deputies from PRI were personally 
against the loan.
In United States Senator D'Amato has opposed vigorously to 
the rescue package to Mexico. Groups related with the most 
conservative wing of the Republican Party are also opposed 
to increase the loan.
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compatible with the moderate rate of growth of the economy 
(see section 5.4. and appendix 5.1. See also Edwards 
(1995b) , Edwards et al (1995) and Oks and van Wijnbergen 
(1995) for very related topics). On the other hand, it is 
true that some mistakes of the new government created more 
problems.104
5.2.-EXPLOSIVE CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICITS AND CONSISTENT 
MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
As some chapters and the general introduction of this 
thesis explain, the capital inflows problem has been 
observed also in consistent ERBS. Some countries like 
Argentina, Bolivia and Israel have had current account 
deficits during stabilization programmes. Nonetheless, 
those have fallen in time to levels that can be managed. In 
the experience of Mexico, however, the current account 
deficit reached unsustainable levels, producing a balance 
of payments crisis (bpc) at the end of 1994.
This section analyses public finances in a non-credible 
ERBS, obtaining the result that temporal reductions of 
inflation reduce also the necessary fiscal effort to 
stabilize. They also increase the level of international 
reserves and probably can raise the level of economic 
activity for a while (see for example Calvo and Vegh 
(1993)). For these reasons, it seems that some short term 
governments may be tempted to create lack of credibility in
104One day before the government abandoned definitely 
the foreign exchange market, the Minister of Finance 
announced a 15% devaluation. Nobody believed that it could 
be sufficient to stop the speculative attack and in fact 
this one was more aggressive.
Several authors (Edwards et al (1995), Leiderman and Thorne 
(1995), Savastano, Roldds and Santaella (1995) and Sachs, 
Tornell and Velasco (1995)) consider there was economic 
mismanagement in the last year of CSG government. On the 
contrary, Gil Diaz and Carstens (1996) consider that 
economic policy was in principle right. According to them 
the crisis was produced by political shocks.
their own stabilization programmes.
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To prove what the previous paragraph says, the first two 
subsections show the Calvo (1986) cash in advance model. 
Then, in a third subsection, we analyse what the results 
for public finances are. We prove also that an
observational equivalent result can be obtained when
instead of lack of credibility there is excess confidence 
in the future performance of the economy. Therefore, if the 
actual government wants to reduce the fiscal effort to 
stabilize and to increase consumption, it can try to 
convince people that the actual rate of inflation is 
unsustainable. It can also try to convince people that the 
future performance of the GDP of the economy will be great. 
The results on fiscal and macroeconomic grounds will be 
the same at least in the short run.
5.2.1.- The Cash in Advance Model
The Calvo (1986) model assumes a perfect capital mobility
small economy. People maximise the following intertemporal 
utility function. (See also chapters three and four).
f" U (Ct) exp (-6t) (5.1)
J o
Where
Ct: Private Consumption
0: Subjective discount factor of the utility
The maximisation is subject to the constraints
Yt + re bt * Tt - Ct - nt mc = Dmc + Dbt (5.2)
mt = (J) Ct (5.3)
Where
Yt: Output (given)
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bt: Foreign bonds
rt: foreign real rate of interest
Tt: Government Transfers
Kt: Rate of inflation
mt: Real quantity of money
D: Operator Difference
(5.2) is the private intertemporal budget constraint and
(5.3) the cash in advance constraint. People save in money
and foreign bonds.
The model assumes that output is given.
First order conditions of the problem are
Uc - X (1 + (rt + tct)<t>) = 0 (5.4)
DX = (0 - rt) X (5.5) 
lirnt-m Xt Vt exp(-0t) =0 (5.6)
Where
Vt = mt + bt (5.7)
Uc is the marginal utility of consumption. Since the utility
function is assumed to be strictly concave, Uc>0 and Ucc<0.
If furthermore we assume r=0, DA,=0. Therefore, the term105
105Several authors assume r=0. See for example Calvo 
(1986) (1987), Drazen and Helpman (1987) (1988), Obstfeld
(1985) . If r is different from 0 there is not steady state 
and yet the model is consistent (see Obstfeld (1985) for an 
example). However, to rescue the steady property for any 
value of r and 0, Obstfeld (1981) assumes that 0 has a 
dynamic trajectory and van Wijnbergen (1988) takes the 
Blanchard (1985) approach under finite horizons.
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U C , / x= X = cons tan t (5.8)
(1 + (rt + 7rt) 4>)
The behaviour of the consolidated government-central bank 
budget deficit (COBD) is:
gt + Tt - zt Rt - mt = Dmt - DRt (5.9)
Where:
gt: Government consumption 
Rt: International reserves
The COBD is financed printing money or reducing 
international reserves. Foreign debt is normalized in zero 
and assumed constant.
Combining (5.2) and (5.9)
Yt + xt fe - Ce - ge = Dfe (5.10)
ft = bt * Rc (5.11)
Where f represents total foreign assets in the economy 
(foreign bonds plus international reserves) and Df is equal 
to the current account.
Since the economy is open to goods and capital markets, and 
we assume perfect competition, there is PPP. If inflation 
abroad is zero, the rate of growth of the nominal exchange 
rate is equal to inflation.
5.2.2.- Credible and Non Credible ERBS
A credible ERBS sets k=ka<k0 from (t0,<») . K0 is inflation in 
the original steady state previous to t0.
(5.8) shows that if inflation is constant, C is also 
constant. If the economy starts in a steady state, it has 
to remain in it, otherwise foreign assets would explode 
upwards or downwards without limit (see equation 5.10). 
Therefore:
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C = Y0 + rf0 - gQ = CQ (5.11)
The chapter assumes that Y and g are always constant.
However, a non credible ERBS produces a current account 
deficit in some period. Suppose people believe that during 
(t0/tx) K=izk, and during (tx,«>) k=jcp>ka. By (5.8) CA>CP, where 
CA is consumption in the first interval of time and Cp in 
the second. That implies a current account deficit in 
(t0,©°) , since integrating (5.10)
J Ct exp(-0t) = (1 - exp(-ztx)) + exp{-rtx) -
Y° + fQ (5.12)
r u
The present value of consumption is a constant and it is 
also a weighted average of CA and Cp. Since CA>Cp/ and CA>C0.
Y0 + zf - CA - g0 = Df < 0 (5.13)
and during (t0#tx) there is a current account deficit.
5.2.3.- Current Account Deficits, Public Finances and 
International Reserves
Now we will expose some of the characteristics and patterns 
of public finances and international reserves in non 
credible ERBS.
First: Given a belief (7tA<7Ep), the behaviour of the actual 
public deficit determines only the pattern of international 
reserves and that of private capital inflows
Proof:
The COBD is again:
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go + Tt - rRt - nA mA = -DR (5.14)
9o'T an<^  r are parameters. mA=<|>CA because of the cash in 
advance constraint, m^ nio (mo is money in the previous steady 
state) . Since CA is constant, mA is also constant. Then 
Dm=0.
The COBD solves for international reserves. If it is in 
equilibrium, DR=0 and the current account deficit must be 
equal to the capital account surplus. Since foreign debt is 
zero, the capital account is given by private flows. 
Therefore, under lack of credibility and public finances in 
equilibrium, there are speculative capital inflows 
financing the current account deficit in a one to one 
basis.
When the COBD is in surplus, DR>0 and capital inflows are 
greater than the current account deficit. When the COBD is 
in deficit, DR<0 and private capital inflows are not enough 
to finance the current account deficit.
In this model, when expectations of inflation do not depend 
in actual public finances, the public deficit is 
independent of the current account. In a more realistic 
environment this result still may hold. That happens when 
the actual current account does not depend on present 
public finances but in the present value of public 
finances. Future expected transfers raise future expected 
inflation, generating an actual current account deficit. 
However, actual transfers do not produce any effect in the 
current account if they are compensated by future taxes in 
present value.106
Second: Explosive current account paths are associated with 
higher international reserves when the COBD is in 
equilibrium or surplus.
106Calvo (1987) presents a model where actual public 
finances produce a current account deficit and an eventual 
balance of payments crisis.
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Proof:
When inflation falls to nA and people expect that in the 
future it will be higher, consumption and money increase at 
once. There is a portfolio movement. People reduce foreign 
bonds and increase money. Since the total financial assets 
of the economy are predetermined, the reduction of bonds is 
reflected in a sudden increase of reserves. Afterwards, if 
the COBD is in equilibrium, international reserves remain 
constant. If the COBD is in surplus, international reserves 
are growing, (see equation (5.14)).
Third: If the COBD is in equilibrium, the necessary fiscal 
effort to reduce inflation from K0 to nA is smaller under 
lack of credibility that under perfect credibility
Proof:
Under perfect credibility C and m are constant and equal to 
C0 and m0. If the COBD is in equilibrium, R is also constant 
in R0. The necessary fiscal effort to reduce inflation is
(T0 - Ta) = (ti0 - nA) mQ > 0 (5.15)
Which implies that TA has to fall below T0 (net transfers 
have to fall).
Under lack of credibility:
( Tq — TA) — 7i0 Wq — itjjnA + z {Rq — Ra) (5.16)
The sign is not even defined. n0>nA but mA>m0 and RA>R0- What 
is a fact is that for the same reduction of inflation the 
fiscal effort is smaller under lack of credibility than 
under perfect credibility.
Fourth: An observational equivalent result for the current 
account and public finances appears when instead of lack of 
credibility there is excess confidence in the future 
performance of the economy.
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Proof:
Suppose that inflation falls from %0 to tea and people 
believe that in the future output will increase. For 
example, between (t0,tx) Y=Y0 and between (tx,«>) Y=YX>Y0 (see 
chapter three for a related analysis) . Now C is always 
equal to Ch but the permanent income has increased, since107
(1-exP (-rt*>) +-jexp(-.rtJC) 9°*f0{5.17)
Between (t0,tx) there will be a current account deficit with 
all the characteristics observed when there is lack of 
credibility. Public finances will behave also in the same 
way during the first interval of time. If the confidence is 
based in real facts, then at the moment in which Y 
increases the current account disappears. If there is 
excess confidence, which means that the future increase in 
output does not take place, there will be a drastic 
reduction in consumption, money and reserves. In that case, 
the result for the real system will be the same than under 
lack of credibility.
These characteristics of ERBS imply that lack of 
credibility in the programme or excess confidence in the 
future performance of the economy may benefit short term 
governments. If they want to reduce inflation, they need to 
make a lower fiscal effort and have an apparent consistent 
fiscal policy. They also may benefit from the transitory 
increase on international reserves. Sometimes, 
international organisations set higher reserves as a 
condition for lending money.
A situation where the public balance was in equilibrium or 
surplus, and there was a huge increase in consumption and
107Equation (5.17) is derived integrating equation 
(5.13) for the cases where Y remains always in Y0 and that 
where Y is Y0 in the period (t0,tx) and Yj>Y0 in the period 
(tx,°°) •
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international reserves, happened in Mexico in 1990-1994. 
Then, at the end of 1994 the situation collapsed and there 
was a drastic reduction of consumption and international 
reserves. Since these facts may happen under lack of 
credibility or excess confidence, it is worthwhile to ask 
which one was behind.
Next section shows that given some features of the Mexican 
political system, lack of credibility is a good candidate 
to explain the capital inflows problem of 1990-1994.
5.3.- A POLITICAL MODEL OF CREDIBILITY
The previous section shows that non credible ERBS increase 
international reserves and reduce the necessary fiscal 
adjustment to stabilize. In a more sophisticated model they 
could produce temporal expansions in economic activity (see 
Calvo and Vegh (1993)).
Most economic models assume that credibility is exogenous. 
Our interest is to find a possible explanation for the 
capital inflows problem in Mexico. This country has a 
peculiar political system and for that reason it is 
convenient to investigate whether political elements may be 
behind the 1990-1994 events.
In order to do what the previous paragraph says, it is 
important to discuss the nature of short term governments. 
All of them like low inflation, equilibrium in public 
finances and higher international reserves, consumption and 
economic activity. Traditional analyses assert that a 
reduction of unemployment is obtained at the cost of higher 
inflation, or that stabilization requires a huge adjustment 
in public finances. However, the lack of credibility 
hypothesis may produce other results. When the actual 
government can convince people that future governments will 
increase inflation, the reduction of inflation today will
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be less costly. There will be also higher consumption, 
higher international reserves and possibly increasing 
economic activity.
While these results are interesting, it is useful to ask 
under what conditions they can occur. In a perfect 
democracy they probably will not take place. If the 
electorate likes low inflation, the actual government will 
not be able to convince people that future governments will 
increase inflation. The electorate will choose candidates 
whose priority is low inflation. On the other hand, a 
dictatorship has a long run horizon. To generate short run 
advantages, the dictator has to convince people that in the 
future he will change. However, when that future arrives he 
will not have any incentive to change (time inconsistency 
problem) . Anticipating this behaviour, people will expect 
the status quo and nothing will happen.
A situation in which the already explained results can 
happen is one where the actual government chooses its 
successor. The activities of the successor do not affect 
necessarily the utility of the actual government (the 
actual government may have a finite horizon) . Some elements 
of that peculiar situation have happened in Mexico in the 
last seventy years.
5.3.1.- Some Basic Elements of the Mexican Political 
System.
The Mexican political system has been described as highly 
presidential (Philip (1992)). The political party called 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) has been in 
power for more than seventy years.108 Though the country has 
a very advanced Constitution, many political analysts
i°8PRI started being a party in the centre. However, 
many of his members have a tendency to be either from the 
left wing or from the right wing. The party itself has 
tended to the left sometimes and some others to the right.
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consider that the president in power has almost unlimited 
powers (Cosio Villegas (1975), Philip (1992), Zaid (1987)). 
His very particular limitation is the impossibility of 
extending his six-year period. Nonetheless, he has great 
powers choosing his successor among the members of his 
cabinet (Cosio Villegas (1975), Philip (1992)). Once this 
happens, the successor becomes the candidate of the PRI for 
the next presidency. These candidates have always won the 
election against other parties.109
A peculiar feature of the PRI is that it has members of 
different ideologies and political perspectives. It can be 
considered neither a left wing party nor a right wing 
party. In different stages of history it has tended to the 
left and in others to the right. In general it has been a 
party in the centre, reconciling many different views. That 
has constituted an important part of its success.
5.3.2.- Incentives and Endogenous Lack of Credibility
Considering the previous information, this section sets a 
model where there are short term governments lasting equal 
intervals of time in an infinite sequence. Each of these 
governments chooses its immediate successor among 
candidates with different characteristics and at the end of 
its period of power. The already explained Calvo (1986) 
model is relevant for the economy.
The economy under consideration operates always under a 
crawling peg regime. Governments set the rate of growth of
109The present situation is changing very fast. Still 
eight years ago all the governors of the thirty one states 
that constitute the Federation were, and had always been, 
from the PRI. In 1997 there are four governors from the 
right wing party (Partido Accion Nacional (PAN)). For the 
first time in more than eighty years, in July 1997 there 
were elections for the Governor of the Federal District 
(The Major of Mexico City) . The winner was Mr Cuauhtemoc 
Cardenas, the candidate of the left-wing party (Partido de 
la Revolucion Democratica (PRD)). The right wing party PAN 
won the election for governments in two additional states. 
Democracy seems to be increasing along the country.
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the exchange rate and by PPP and zero inflation abroad, the 
rate of inflation itself. There are not sharp devaluations, 
only possible changes in the rate of depreciation of the 
exchange rate. Any discrete change in the demand for money 
is adjusted selling or buying international reserves.
The questions of this subsection are the following:
1) Starting with governments that have certain 
characteristics, what is the sequence of governments in 
power?
2) Is it possible that because of the peculiar political 
system the capital inflows problem may appear?
The way in which the model works is the following:
Once a government is in power, it sets the rate of growth 
of the exchange rate. For a given rate of inflation, the 
government in power chooses the next government in order to 
get certain goals. It has to take into account that the 
next government will follow the same game and so on.
+Description of the candidates
There are two types of candidates. If they were ruling the 
country, they would operate under certain constraints and 
preferences.
Candidate A would set a low rate of inflation. However, it 
does not care about the welfare of society in an infinite 
horizon. Instead, it tries to maximise consumption, 
transfers and international reserves during its own period 
on power.
Candidate P would set a high rate of inflation. It cares 
about the same goals than government A. That is to say, it 
is also a short term government.
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+ First stage of the game
During the first stage of the game and when these 
candidates are in power, they maximise the function:
UA = -anA + 2imA (5.18)
Up = -aitp + 2b1izp (5.19)
Where nx is the rate of inflation chosen by candidate x x=P, 
A.
As in the Barro-Gordon approach110 (Barro and Gordon (1983)) , 
governments dislike inflation because of the distortions it 
produces in the economy (see for example Fischer and 
Modigliani (1978)). However, inflation has a positive 
impact in the utility of governments. Differently from the 
Barro-Gordon approach, that positive impact is produced by 
the seigniorage generated by higher inflation (Bruno 
(1991)). When Laffer curve is positively sloped, higher 
inflation generates always more fiscal revenues.
Inflation enters the utility function in a different way 
for candidates A and P. Candidate P likes more revenues and 
candidate A is moderate in this respect (bx>b) .
The first step of the game is to maximise (5.18) and (5.19) 
and to obtain the rates of inflation:
110There are many articles explaining high or moderate 
inflation in the Barro-Gordon approach. See for example 
Bruno (1991), Dorabusch and Fischer (1991) and Fischer and 
Summers (1989). Some studies that take into account 
political factors to produce high inflation or inertial 
inflation in stabilization programmes are those of 
Cukiermann and Liviatan (1990), Cukiermann, Kiguel and 
Liviatan (1992) and Kiguel and Liviatan (1990). A good 
summary of these papers is provided by De Gregorio (1992b).
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Jt, = -  (5.20)
A a
to,
Jlc = —  5.21p a
np > nA (5.22)
If he/she were in the government, candidate P would set a 
higher rate of inflation than candidate A . The rules of 
the game indicate that they choose inflation independently 
of the values of other variables and only respecting the 
fact that, at the end, higher inflation increases fiscal 
revenues.
+ Second stage of the game
In the second stage of the game, the government in power 
chooses its immediate successor as to maximise other 
goals.111
It is convenient to explain this stage analysing what 
happen when each of these candidates is in power
- Candidate P
After the first stage of the game, candidate P maximises
Up2 = Y i Cp + Y 2 + Y 3 Rp (5.23)
Where Cp, Tp and Rp are consumption, transfers and 
international reserves in the period of power of government
111 This way of maximising different goals in different 
stages simplifies the problem enormously because in the 
second stage inflation is given. If all the maximisation 
were done at the same time, both inflation and the optimal 
sequence of governments should be solved simultaneously.
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P.
The chapter assumes that all candidates maintains the 
public balance in equilibrium while they are in power, 
therefore:
9 0 + Tp - l R p =  cp (5.24)
Since 7CP is a fixed value, Cp is constant during the period 
of power of P. This is because of equation (5.8), which we 
reproduce for convenience
- X = constant (5.25)
(1 + (rt + 7it) 4>)
X is a constant and 7CP is also a constant value. Then Cp 
remains the same throughout the period of P in the 
government. Given the cash in advance constraint, nip is also 
constant during the same period.
(5.24) implies that the public balance is in equilibrium, 
hence DR=0. There is a direct link between R and m. Due to 
the crawling peg regime, any discrete change in m is also 
a change in R. Given the cash in advance constraint, there 
is a linear relation between C and R.
Considering these facts (5.24) becomes
(g0 - U) + Tp = (r + 7tp) <fr Cp (5.26)
J is a constant and g0 is a parameter. Once candidate P sets 
7Cp, he/she chooses the candidate that maximises Cp. In that 
way he/she also maximises Rp and Tp.
The present value of net income112 at the moment in which P 
takes office is:
112This is the measure of the present value of net 
income multiplied by the constant foreign rate of interest.
161
Ch = y0 + *fi ~ 90 (5.27)
Where f* is the level of foreign assets at beginning of the 
period of power of P.
Inflation can take only two values 7tp or rcA and 7Cp>7tA . For 
the same reason consumption can take also two values. If 
candidate P chooses A as successor, equation (5.25) 
indicates that CP<CA. Whoever this new candidate A chooses, 
Cp<Ch. This is because the present value of income (Ch) must 
be equal to the present value of consumption, and this one 
is a weighted average of the possible values of consumption 
(Cp and CA), which are only two.
On the other hand, suppose that government P evaluates the 
sequence where all future governments are P. Since in that 
case inflation remains constant in 7Cp, consumption also 
remains constant and equal to the present value of net 
income. Therefore Cp=Ch.
An initial government P has the incentive of choosing 
another government P, expecting that this one chooses 
another P and so on. But this actually happens, because the 
next P government makes exactly the same evaluation and 
chooses another P. Hence, if the initial government is P 
there will be an infinite sequence of P governments in 
power.113
Px - P2 - P3 - P4. . .
- Candidate A
If A is the initial government, he will maximise:
113It is important to observe that any sequence 
involving A governments produce a situation where Cp<Ch.
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UA2 = Y xCp + Y 2Tp + y3i?A (5.28)
We maintain the assumption that this government sets the 
public balance in equilibrium. Therefore, for the reasons 
already explained
(ffo ~ rJ) + TA = (x + nA) CA (5.29)
and A has to find the optimal successor to maximise CA.
If A chooses P, then CA>CP. But we have already explained 
that P will choose another P and so on. Then CA>Ch>Cp.
If A chooses other candidate A and the game is repeated 
CA=Ch. A sequence where there is one initial A government, 
then several (one or more) A governments and then an 
infinite sequence of P governments will generate a value 
for CA smaller than the one produced by an initial A 
government and a future sequence of just P governments (see 
appendix 5.3). Therefore, A has strong incentives to choose 
a P candidate.
When A is an initial government, the sequence of future 
governments will be
Ai -* Px -* P2 — P3 -* P4. . .
It is in this case where the capital inflows problem 
appears. During the A government, consumption will 
increase, producing a current account deficit. The increase 
in consumption will induce an initial raise of 
international reserves and will increase the inflation tax, 
financing greater transfers. Since the public balance is in 
equilibrium, international reserves remain constant 
throughout the period. The current account deficit is 
financed with speculative private capital inflows. At the 
moment in which government P takes office, there is a 
drastic reduction of consumption and international
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reserves.
5.3.3.- The Role of Uncertainty
In this analysis, all governments choose successors at the 
end of their period on power. Therefore, it could be the 
case that at that moment they do not have incentives to 
choose the candidates that the previous analysis suggest 
(time inconsistency problem).
Since A and P have only short term goals, at the end they 
have the same incentives to choose any of the candidates 
available114. The cost of precommitment to choose the 
candidate that at the beginning maximise their goals is 
zero. Quite possibly they will precommit to do it. 
Nonetheless, the question of what happen if they do not 
precommit is valid and we should analyse the outcomes under 
that possibility.
Suppose that government A is in power and did not precommit 
to choose successor. At the beginning of his period, he had 
the incentive to choose a P candidate, but at the end he 
has the same incentive to choose any of the candidates. If 
he precommits since the beginning, the future government 
will be P. If he does not precommit, then people expect the 
following rate of inflation for the next period of power 
and in fact for all future periods:
> ** <5 -3°)
Let us assume that the Calvo model operates in a similar 
way when there is uncertainty.115 The presence of government 
A in power implies that expected inflation is greater than 
present inflation. This is because nA is the minimum 
possible rate of inflation in the model. A capital inflows
114We are abstracting here from personal preferences, 
friendship and so on.
115For a lack of credibility model under uncertainty see 
Mendoza and Uribe (1996).
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problem will appear though not as severe as it happens 
under perfect certainty.
Now suppose that a government P is in power and does not 
precommit to choose a future P government. He/She sets 7CP 
but the expected inflation is:
K  = + ("§),ca < np (5.31)
Then there is a new result. When government P is in power 
and does not precommit to choose a future P government, 
there will be a peculiar situation characterized by a 
current account surplus financed entirely with private 
capital flight.
5.3.4.- Some Reflections about the Results of the Model
One of the most important results of the model is that in 
an economy whose political system is like the one described 
here high inflation is an equilibrium value. No matter what 
candidate is in government today, at the end there will be 
high inflation.
The result is interesting when we compare it with the 
outcomes of pure democracies or dictatorships. In the last 
one, the long run value of inflation depends on the desires 
of the dictator. In a democracy it depends on the desires 
of the majority of the electors. If they like low 
inflation, they will vote always for candidates A and the 
long run inflation will be low. Still it is true that the 
long run inflation can be high. This happens when the 
distribution of income is very distorted, the majority is 
poor and the government give transfers to that majority, 
resorting in an inflation tax over the whole population. 
The majority will vote for P governments.
A very important difference between the outcomes of a 
democracy and the outcomes of the presented model, is that 
in the first, inflation is what people like. In the second 
the long run equilibrium inflation is the one that the
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short term government with high inflation wants.
Another interesting point derived from the model is 
concerned with the identities of the candidates. The model 
concludes that A governments are unstable, in the sense 
that they cannot last in power. It suggests that all 
possible candidates will say that they are P to have 
possibilities of election. If that were the case and the 
government in power cannot identify them, the model under 
uncertainty would operate. However, if the government in 
power is very clever and can recognize the candidates, all 
the results of the original model can be rescued.
Finally, it is interesting to ask why an A government can 
be in power if nobody has incentives to choose him. Again, 
some uncertainty is necessary. The previous government 
recognized candidate A as P but in fact he/she was A. If it 
was a unique mistake, all the model can operate as 
described.
5.3.5.- Lack of Credibility and the Mexican Stabilization 
Programme
Is all of this explanation interesting for the case of 
Mexico in 1990-1994? Probably yes. Though President Carlos 
Salinas did not choose a P government, he seems to have 
played with the idea. His possible successor was one of 
four Ministers. Two of them can be considered conservative 
(Mr Ernesto Zedillo, the actual president, at that time 
Minister of Education, and Mr Pedro Aspe the Minister of 
Finance of CGS government). There was a candidate quite in 
the centre, Mr Luis Donaldo Colosio, then Minister of 
Social Development. The last candidate was probably more 
concerned with social projects (Mr Manuel Camacho Solis, 
the Major of Mexico City in the period 1989-1993) . 
President Salinas chose Luis Donaldo Colosio. However, 
several analysts consider that he played with the idea of
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substituting him for Mr Camacho Solis (Proceso (1996) 
several issues). At the end, Mr Colosio was tragically- 
assassinated and Mr Zedillo took his place, winning the 
election for the presidency.
Another point in favour of the presented model is the 
history of inflation. For more than twenty-five years the 
country has experienced relative high rates of inflation. 
In 1993 and 1994, this figure was around 7.5%. It is 
plausible to think that people believed in this situation 
as unsustainable. The average rate of expected inflation 
was above. The differences in the profiles of the 
candidates already explained reinforce this point. In this 
respect, the Dombusch (1993) recommendation of setting a 
rate of inflation around 20% was maybe very good. It was 
necessary to look for a moderate candidate, nor very 
inflationist but not married with the idea that inflation 
had to fall to one digit, either.
5.4.- LACK OF CREDIBILITY VERSUS EXCESS CONFIDENCE IN THE 
MEXICAN STABILIZATION PROGRAMME 1987-1994.
The first section of this chapter shows that the capital 
inflows problem may appear when there is lack of 
credibility or when there is excess confidence. The short 
run results over the fiscal variables and international 
reserves are the same. Both explanations are 
observationally equivalent.
The second section shows a model that derives endogenous 
lack of credibility under certain circumstances. The model 
is appealing for the case of Mexico, since it reproduces 
some political features of that country.
Some studies that reinforce the hypothesis that lack of 
credibility was behind the capital inflows problem in 
Mexico (1990-1994), are those of Arrau (1990) and Reinhart
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and Vegh (1995).
In his empirical investigation, Arrau finds that there is 
a huge intertemporal elasticity of substitution between 
present and future consumption in Mexico (around 2.5). The 
study obtains a result where perceived changes in the 
future inflation produce changes in consumption in the 
present, as in the cash in advance model.116 Reinhart and 
Vegh (1995) use the estimation by Arrau, showing that the 
increase in consumption in Mexico in the early nineties is 
compatible with such estimation.
These two studies suggest not only that the ingredients of 
the lack of credibility hypothesis were present in Mexico, 
but also that, considering them, it was possible to 
forecast what in fact happened. Now, in this chapter we 
find an explanation where lack of credibility could be 
generated by the peculiar Mexican political system. Can we 
then conclude that this is the right explanation for the 
case of Mexico?117
To answer the question, it is necessary to look at the 
alternative explanation of excess confidence. Several 
authors assert that the capital inflows problem in Mexico 
was produced because people overestimated the expected 
performance of the economy (Agenor and Masson (1996) , 
Krugman (1995), McKinnon and Pill (1995), Sachs, Tornell 
and Velasco (1995)). The structural change (deregulation, 
financial liberalisation, reduction of country risk), 
produced capital inflows that increased productivity (see 
chapter three for an explanation of this process). However, 
though they improved the production capacity, were not
116 In the Arrau (1990) paper, there is also a 
substitution effect in which a higher permanent inflation 
reduces the demand for money also permanently.
117The authors that support the lack of credibility 
hypothesis as the main cause producing the capital inflows 
problem, and the eventual balance of payments crisis in 
Mexico, are: Calvo (1994), Mendoza and Uribe (1996) and 
Reinhart and Vegh (1995).
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compatible with the huge rise in consumption. People 
expected even more in the future. The increase in the 
perceived future income explains the huge raise in 
consumption. When people realized that their expectations 
were too optimistic, there was a drastic reduction in 
consumption and money. It produced a fall in international 
reserves and the balance of payments crisis, just in the 
same way of lack of credibility.118
Appendix 5.1 shows that to have excess confidence, people 
in Mexico should have expected either an unbelievable 
increase of the total debt of the country, or an 
unbelievable raise in productivity. Excess confidence does 
not seem to be the correct answer for the capital inflows 
problem in Mexico given the results of a very simple 
exercise of consistency.
Nonetheless, the fact that the Mexican economy has shown 
better performance on average, shows that lack of 
credibility could live together with some confidence in the 
programme. Appendix 5.2 shows an example based in the ideas 
of chapter three and those of this chapter. In the 
presented model there are asymmetric beliefs. National 
consumers do not believe in the permanence of low 
inflation. Foreign investors take advantage of the 
financial liberalisation and invest. The result is a cycle 
where growth increases but there is an initial increase in 
consumption. The economy is better at the end and the final
118Krugman (1995 page 30) refers specifically to the 
case of Mexico in the following way:
"And yet Mexico's crisis is neither a temporary setback nor 
a purely Mexican affair. Something like that crisis was an 
accident waiting to happen because the stunning initial 
success of the Washington consensus was based not on solid 
achievements, but on excessively optimistic expectations."
By the Washington consensus Krugman understands that 
structural change and market oriented reforms would have an 
important impact on output and growth (the term Washington 
consensus was coined by John Williamson) .
169
consumption is greater than the original but lower than the 
highest peak. An adjustment in consumption is needed at 
some point.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The results of this chapter have been sufficiently 
summarized in the introduction. However, several remarks 
seem important.
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS:
After reading the explanation we might conclude, 
erroneously, that short term governments are inconvenient 
for society because they may produce cycles and crises. A 
permanent dictatorship could be recommended. It cannot take 
advantage of the uncertainty of the policy of future 
governments.
The suggestion, which can be criticized on the grounds of 
arguments far away from economics, is not true in economic 
terms, either. If the dictator imposes inconsistent or 
wrong policies there is no mechanism for these policies to 
be corrected.
Nonetheless, the existence of short term governments 
without full democracy may be very harmful for societies. 
Curiously the problem is worse under a complete openness of 
the capital account. In the presented model, the incentives 
to generate the capital inflows problem occur because it 
is possible to produce current account deficits without 
losing international reserves. At the same time, 
consumption and money can jump without transition dynamics. 
Under low or zero capital mobility lack of credibility 
produces a loss of international reserves that jeopardizes 
the stabilization programme (see chapter four) . That is not
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good for governments in power.119
A way to avoid volatility of expectations is reinforcing 
institutions and rules and not imposing capital controls. 
If the central bank is independent and set for example a 
currency board, the credibility problem analysed in this 
chapter disappears. The bank has the commitment of setting 
low inflation always. Even if the political system is as 
the one described here, the government can not force the 
bank to finance higher transfers.120 In this respect it is 
important to emphasize the case of Argentina. The currency 
board is in the constitution and nobody except the congress 
can change the rule.
Another important topic is the role of international 
organisations. So far, they have favoured targets for 
international reserves, the public deficit and the domestic 
credit of the central bank, for example. These targets may 
induce short term governments to cheat and create 
uncertainty about the future. Little attention has been 
paid to the size of the current account deficit and its 
consistency with investment and long term growth.
Possibly, in the future international organisations will 
penalize inconsistent current account deficits, although 
the overall public balance is in equilibrium. That would 
imply a fiscal over adjustment in the present when people 
forecast future inconsistent fiscal policies.
119This analysis does not mean that open capital markets 
are undesirable, what it means is that the political system 
has to be reformed according to the structural change in 
the economy. When that does not happen, the actual or 
perceived discretion of governments generates beliefs that 
are reflected at once in capital markets.
120Again that does not mean that a currency board is the 
solution for Mexico. It stresses only the importance of 
institutions and long term rules in an environment of 
perfect capital markets.
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EMPIRICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A critical issue in the case of the 1994 Mexican balance of 
payments crisis is the responsibility of the government and 
international organisations. If the capital inflows 
problem and the ongoing crisis were produced by lack of 
credibility, then certainly CSG government has political 
responsibility for the consequences. Even if it did not 
promote that situation, it could take some measures before. 
The government was obliged to perform at least simple tests 
about the consistency of the current account, as those 
presented in this chapter (appendix 5.1). Curiously the 
same conclusion appears if the problem was produced by 
excess confidence. People are not obliged to know 
economics. Policy makers are. Very positive expectations 
can be also disastrous when they are not based in anything 
real (Krugman (1995)). The lack of consistency of the 
current account deficit was a problem never correctly 
addressed by the government.
But international organisations also have responsibility. 
Edwards et al (1995) report:
" The World Bank was aware of the vulnerability and 
difficulties of the Mexican economy, and it communicated 
repeatedly its assessment to the Mexican authorities." 
(Edwards et al p. 3)
They also say
" The Mexican authorities chose to disregard many of the 
Bank's suggestions" (Edwards et al p. 3)
But they also report:
" In spite of the divergence between policy actions and 
economic results, the Mexican reforms were consistently 
praised by the media, financial experts, academics and the 
multilaterals - including the World Bank - as major 
success." (Edwards et al p.4)
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In other part of their article the authors suggest that the 
World Bank spoke to the public with two voices: one trying 
to calm financial markets stressing Mexico's policy 
accomplishments; the other expressing some concerns 
regarding the path the Mexican economy was taking (Edwards 
et al p.3) . They also assert that even in 1994 some reports 
of the World Bank praised the monetary policy of the 
central bank in Mexico (Edwards et al (1995) p.17 footnote 
30) .
There is one possible interpretation to this analysis: 
there was disagreement among the officials of the Bank. It 
produced inconsistency on the behaviour of the institution 
towards Mdxico. The lack of a unified view gave an 
incentive to the Mexican government not to take seriously 
the warnings.
On the other hand, the targets of the IMF should be 
questioned. The presented model shows possibilities where 
the targets of increasing international reserves, balanced 
public finances and control of the domestic credit of the 
central bank hold. However, still there is an increasing 
vulnerability of the economy and a capital inflows problem. 
Are these targets myopic? They may be. They actually may 
give incentives for the capital inflows problem to appear 
in the case in which rising international reserves is 
awarded. Praising the behaviour of the public finances in 
Mexico was a mistake when the observed current account 
deficit was unsustainable.
173
UNIT THREE: CONCLUSIONS AND APPENDIXES
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CHAPTER 6: GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This chapter is divided in three sections. The first points 
out the main contributions and limitations of the thesis. 
The second analyses possible implications of the results 
for economic policy. Third section discusses the 
implications for the particular case of Mexico.
6.1.- CONTRIBUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
This section outlines the main conclusions of the thesis. 
The first part describes general conclusions/ the second 
part more particular results. Third subsection discusses 
the limitations of the analysis.
6.1.1.- General Results of the Thesis
The main result of the thesis is about the nature of the 
capital inflows problem. This phenomenon, characterized by 
increases in consumption and economic activity, current 
account deficits and real exchange rate appreciations 
accompanying ERBS, is not necessarily a problem. It is 
neither a matter always generated by capital inflows. It is 
a situation that may be produced by different factors: In 
the positive side by the effect that the structural change 
has in the perceived lower risk of the economy, in the 
negative side by absence of credibility or excess 
confidence in the stabilization programme.
To avoid the capital inflows problem when it is a problem, 
it is recommended to follow long run invariant fiscal and 
monetary policies. The use of a restrictive fiscal policy 
may be useless. Tight monetary policy may help under low 
capital mobility, but often it produces unsustainable 
fiscal costs. They may even generate perverse results in 
which higher real interest rates fuel the problem.
175
6.1.2.- Main Results of the Theoretical Chapters
The theoretical chapters provide more particular 
conclusions:
Chapter three concludes that under plausible assumptions, 
the stylized facts of successful stabilization programmes121 
occur for two reasons: the dynamics of inflation and the 
structural change going with ERBS in several countries. 
The gradual reduction of inflation raises growth at least 
in the short run and output in a permanent way. The 
structural change increases the production capacity of the 
country through capital inflows from abroad, generating a 
consumption boom from the onset.
Chapter four concludes that the capital inflows problem is 
not necessarily a situation produced by capital inflows. It 
can emerge when there is lack of credibility, alternative 
domestic assets to money and high degree of monetary 
accommodation. When expectations of future inflation are 
independent of the actual public balance, fiscal policy is 
useless to combat the problem. Instead, tight monetary 
policy can eliminate it but often to a very high fiscal 
cost. If expectations of future inflation are linked to the 
actual public deficit directly, tight monetary policy may 
generate a perverse effect fuelling the symptoms of the 
problem.
The main conclusion of chapter five is that some short term 
governments may be tempted to create lack of credibility in 
their own stabilization programme. If they are successful, 
the fiscal effort to combat inflation falls, there is an 
accumulation of international reserves and there may be
121 Higher long run output or growth and the emergence 
of the symptoms of the capital inflows problem in a first 
stage.
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even a temporal increase in economic activity. Yet the 
government in power follows an apparent consistent fiscal 
and monetary policy where the public deficit and the 
domestic credit of the central bank are under control. The 
problem is that the experiment is unsustainable and there 
must be an adjustment at some moment.
The argument is appealing for the Mexican economy in the 
1990-1994 period, especially because in this country the 
president in power has an enormous power to choose his 
successor. The chapter shows a repeated game in which 
governments setting low inflation choose future governments 
with preferences for higher inflation. These last 
governments tend to choose other governments also with high 
inflation priorities. Therefore, the economy ends up on 
high equilibrium inflation.
6.1.3. - Main Limitations of the Analysis
The main limitation of the analysis is the assumption of a 
cash in advance constraint for consumption goods. While 
there are advantages in this assumption, it eliminates the 
substitution effect between money and consumption due to 
changes in the nominal interest rate. Models incorporating 
money in the utility function or transaction's technology 
frameworks capture such effect.122
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this work the simple cash 
in advance constraint is very useful. It is equivalent to 
the case in which money is in the utility function and is
122 Models incorporating money in the utility
function or transaction's technology frameworks capture 
the substitution effect. For the first class of models 
see Sidrausky (1967), Calvo (1981), Obstfeld (1985) and 
many more. For models incorporating transactions 
technologies see Arrau et al (1995) or Reinhart and Vegh 
(1995) . For an example in which a cash in advance 
constraint is combined with precautionary motives to 
rescue the substitution effect see Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989 pp. 167 and 168).
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a perfect complement of consumption. It captures the 
positive association between the demand for money and 
consumption, which is the factor producing all the main 
results of this thesis123.
The use of the simplest cash in advance constraint is 
compatible with potential results of other more realistic 
assumptions. Complementarities between money and 
consumption may exist also in Sidrausky type models (see 
Obstfeld (1985)) or in the transactions technology model 
(see Reinhart and Vegh (1995)). The results under these 
approaches would be similar to those under the cash in 
advance constraint. However, the mathematical treatment 
would be more difficult.
Another limitation of the thesis is the assumption of fixed 
output in chapters four and five, while chapter three 
describes a growth model. However, all the chapters are 
motivated by episodes happening in Mexico.
There are some arguments overcoming this apparent 
limitation or potential contradiction:
First of all, the motivation of chapter three is based not 
only in the Mexican experience but also in other countries. 
Second, we show in appendix 5.2 that the results of chapter 
five are compatible with those of chapter three when there 
are asymmetric beliefs. People living in the country do not 
believe in the permanence of low inflation. Foreign 
investors believe in the advantages of the structural 
change and invest. The result is a cycle where output rises 
permanently but there is a consumption crisis at some 
point. All the essential results remain.
On the other hand, the results of chapter four are 
motivated by facts observed in Mexico in 1988, when output 
growth did not change significantly with respect to the
123 It is responsible that sluggish disinflation 
generate higher growth in chapter three; It is also 
responsible that lack of credibility and excess confidence 
produce the capital inflows problem in chapters four and 
five.
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previous year. The assumption of fixed output should be 
harmless.
Finally, as we already explained in the General 
Introduction, a theoretical work based in some empirical 
facts is worthwhile not because it reproduces accurately 
some particular episode, but because it elucidates channels 
and effects potentially important for many other cases. In 
this sense chapters three and four can explain other 
possible cases. More difficult is that chapter five can be 
extended to cases different to Mexico, since some of the
assumptions are very particular of that country.
6.2.- IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS FOR ECONOMIC POLICY
This section explores the main implications of the results 
of the thesis for economic policy.
The first subsection answers what the results tell us about 
the use of exchange rates to stabilize. A second subsection 
analyses how to cope with the capital inflows problem. The 
third implication is over the convenience of opening the 
economy to international capital markets under ERBS.
6.2.1.- Choosing the Exchange Rate Regime
The analysis of this thesis is on economies under crawling 
peg regimes and specifically in ERBS. Are they superior to 
flexible regimes?
ERBS in small open economies under high inflation are 
probably very recommended. They avoid some problems of
flexible regimes. Chapter three shows that greater foreign 
portfolio investment because of the disinflation is
unlikely to occur in MBS when prices are not flexible 
downwards.
ERBS may be very effective and fast to reduce inflation. 
Bolivia is a good example. Though it has not been 
considered an ERBS, the mechanism of disinflation was much
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nearer to a programme using the exchange rate than to other 
programmes (see Sachs (1986) and chapter three). Israel is 
also an example of a programme without the painful initial 
recession that often reduces the expected success.
Nonetheless, non credible ERBS can result in balance of 
payments crises and deep recessions. Flexible regimes avoid 
sudden outbursts of inflation and maintain international 
reserves.
The analysis suggests that for small open economies the 
best strategy to reduce inflation is a credible ERBS.
6.2.2.- Coping With The Capital Inflows Problem
As this chapter has already concluded, the so-called 
capital inflows problem is neither necessarily a problem 
nor necessarily a situation produced by capital inflows. 
Chapter three shows a model where such phenomenon occurs 
and its appearance is desirable. Chapters four and five set 
up models where the appearance of the symptoms of the 
problem anticipates future negative events.
Under the ambiguity of the conclusion, it is necessary to 
establish what policies are desirable to cope with the 
situation when it is a problem. It is also advisable to 
create mechanisms to discover when the symptoms of the 
phenomenon do not constitute future negative events.
A recommendation for economic policy is to perform simple 
tests once the symptoms of the problem appear. Chapter five 
recommends checking the consistency of the current account 
(see appendix 5.1) . Policy makers can suspect a credibility 
problem if the current account/GDP ratio is much higher 
than the growth of the economy.
More difficult than the diagnostic is the solution of the 
problem. If it is caused by a lack of credibility, the 
ideal solution would be to reestablish confidence. However, 
that has a huge associated cost. Once an unsustainable 
current account deficit is on, there will be a crisis. This
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one would occur at the moment in which people recover 
confidence. Governments, especially if they are in power 
for short periods, are certainly tempted to delay the 
correction of the problem (chapter five).
On the other hand, when excess confidence causes the 
problem, the solution is even more difficult. A government 
realizing that the optimistic views of the agents are false 
has not incentives to tell them the truth, since that would 
generate a crisis.
In any case, an implication of the results of this work is 
that it is better to act before. The more an unsustainable 
current account deficit lasts, the higher the long run 
costs for the economy.
Finally, it is important to discuss the use of fiscal and 
monetary policies to cope with the capital inflows problem.
Fiscal policy is very important as an indicator of long run 
consistency. If a small public deficit today indicates 
healthy public finances in the future, lack of credibility 
will not emerge. The government will overcome one of the 
negative factors producing the problem. However, not always 
discipline in public finances in the present guarantees 
control of fiscal accounts in the future. A fiscal over 
adjustment in the present may be useless when people 
believe that it will be compensated with higher transfers 
in the future.
On the other hand, under imperfect capital mobility, tight 
monetary policy may overcome the symptoms of the problem 
(see chapter four). Nonetheless, when expected inflation is 
very high, the costs of this policy may be unsustainable 
and it will need a very restrictive fiscal adjustment if 
the intention is to maintain expectations of future 
inflation at the same level.
For the explained reasons, the best way to cope with the 
capital inflows problem is to combat its fundamental
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causes: excess confidence or lack of credibility. There is 
not a single recommendation for succeeding in this task. 
Better institutions and independence of the central bank 
may help, but there are other factors depending upon 
particular situations. We will come again to this point in 
the section dedicated to Mexico.
6.2.3.- Opening the Economy to Capital Markets
Is it desirable to open the economy to capital markets? 
Chapter five shows that it can create incentives for short 
term governments to generate lack of credibility in the 
stabilization programme. Chapter three (appendix 3 .2) shows 
that under increasing returns, some degree of financial 
repression with respect to foreign capital may be optimal.
However, there are many advantages of opening the economy 
to capital markets. Small economies can grow very fast if 
investment comes from abroad. This is particularly true 
when there are decreasing returns (see Barro and Sala i 
Martin (1995)), but it is also true in small open economies 
under increasing returns if they constitute guarantees to 
foreign investment (see chapter three). Furthermore, 
capital mobility is not responsible of lack of credibility, 
which is an important negative factor generating the 
capital inflows problem (see chapter four).
The role of international organisations on capital mobility 
is crucial. Capital controls for speculative motives may be 
desirable as a short run policy (Edwards (1995b), McKinnon 
and Pill (1996)). International organisations should also 
set conditions on the size of the current account deficit 
relative to the growth or GDP. This is a way to avoid 
government incentives for future inconsistent policies 
(chapter five). Indirectly, it stops speculative capital 
movements.
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6.3.- IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS OF THE THESIS FOR MEXICO
Two of the main chapters of this thesis are motivated on 
empirical observations of Mexico. The motivation of chapter 
three lies in observations of several countries, among them 
also Mexico. For these reasons this section discusses the 
implications of the results for that country.
According to the results of this thesis, the capital 
inflows problem in Mexico appeared by two factors: lack of 
credibility of the consumers and better opportunities for 
foreigners due to structural policies.
Lack or credibility generated an increase in the demand for 
speculative capital. Better opportunities for foreigners 
increased the supply of foreign capital allocated to 
productive activities. The result was a peculiar cycle in 
which there was a consumption boom, followed by a crisis, 
but where the production capacity of the economy increased, 
breaking several years of stagnation.124
Two questions surging from this analysis are a) why lack of 
credibility and confidence in the programme could live 
together and b)How efficient the Mexican government was 
combatting the negative aspects of the capital inflows 
problem.
Chapter five explains that the nature of the political 
system in Mexico is a plausible potential factor to explain 
lack of credibility in the stabilization programme. 
However, and as other ERBS in the last years, the Mexican 
programme was accompanied by many structural policies. 
Though some of these policies depend upon low inflation to 
last, some others can work under very different rates of
124The very rapid recovery of the economic activity in 
1996, after the severe recession of the previous year, 
shows that the structural change improved the capacity of 
the economy to overcome its problems.
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inflation.125 Therefore, the fact that people believe in a 
short duration of low inflation, does not necessarily 
invalidate the belief in a more productive economy in the 
future.
Apart from the above argument, in the Mexican context it is 
not implausible to think that asymmetric beliefs between 
nationals and foreigners could last for some time. Since 
the populist administrations of the seventies, Mexican 
people have lost confidence in their governments. 
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari was very popular in 
United States and other first world countries. Foreign 
investors saw Mr Salinas as a truly reformer committed to 
long run low inflation. This perception was probably shared 
by many people in Mexico but not for many others. Middle 
and low classes were expecting a reversion of the 
stabilization programme since the beginning.
With respect to the second question, the central bank and 
the government faced the capital inflows problem with tight 
monetary and fiscal policies since the beginning of the 
stabilization programme. Given the credibility problem, 
these policies were very costly and unable to avoid the 
consumption boom (see chapter four). In 1993, the 
government granted independence to the central bank, a very 
important step to generate endogenous credibility. 
Nonetheless, it is still not clear how independent is the 
bank. In 1994, capital inflows fell dramatically compared 
with the size of the current account deficit. Consumption 
continued being very high and international reserves fell. 
The central bank increased the domestic credit to the 
government considerably (see Sachs, Tornell and Velasco 
(1995)). A truly independent central bank could set a 
ceiling to this credit.
125 For example, the effects of NAFTA, deregulation and 
even from the financial liberalisation are relatively 
independent of inflation.
184
With institutions that depend very much on a short run 
presidency, the combat of the credibility problem is very 
difficult. Actual and perceived discretional policies make 
almost impossible to set long run targets for inflation. 
Though the president in power may not have intentions of 
choosing a candidate with preferences for high inflation, 
uncertainty could generate the capital inflows problem (see 
chapter five).
Things may be changing in Mexico nowadays. At least there 
is an intention to enlarge democracy. In an environment of 
high capital mobility, the control of monetary policy 
should go to a truly autonomous central bank, which sets 
long run targets independent of who is the actual president 
is power.
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Appendix 3.1
On the Feasibility o£ Balanced Growth Paths:
This appendix analyses the feasibility of balanced growth 
paths under disinflation.
To do that, the explained model in the text assumes DD/D = 
DS/S. Because of the rule linking money and reserves, Db/b 
= DS/S. All the real variables grow at the same rate.
Proposition: In every circumstance, a balanced growth path 
is feasible when the real rate of interest is greater than 
the rate of growth of GNP.
Proof:
The transversality condition is
lim^ .. Xt Vt e x p  (—01) =0 (A.3.1.1)
Because of first order conditions, and given the isoelastic 
utility function:
1 / n  x C t 9 V t e X P  ( ” 0 t )  ,Xc Vt exp -0t = — CJ-  —  . .. (A. 3.1.2
c c (1 + (r + tc ) <J>)
C~1/p is the marginal utility of consumption Uc.
Using (3.16), (3.23) and the balanced growth assumption
Xt Vt e x p ( - 6 t )  = ---------- y c e x p (  0t)---------- (A.3.1.3)
— - i
C* (<J)7T (0) + 1 + r<(>) e x p  (-yt)
Vc is V/C a constant term because the balanced growth 
assumption.
But
Ct = C± e x p  {Gs t) (A.3.1.4)
Where Gs is the rate of growth of GNP DS/S. 
Hence:
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Vc exp ( (y-0-(~ -1) Gs) t)
Xt Vt exp (-01) = -- - --------- 2--------  (a . 3.1.5)
— - i
Ci ( 4>iu (0) + 1 + r<())
For the transversality condition to hold we need
Y - 0 - {—  - 1) G. < 0 (A.3.1.6)
P
Substituting Gs=p(r+y-0) and rearranging:
A > p (A + y - 6) (A.3.1.7)
or
r > Gg (A.3.1.8)
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Appendix 3.2:
The Effect of Financial Repression and Liberalisation over 
Welfare and Consumption.
This appendix shows that developing countries liberalising 
their economies to international capital markets 
completely, can increase welfare and consumption when there 
are externalities.
The result reinforces the example already shown in the 
text, where new capital inflows have real effects.
The model under consideration assumes either two countries 
or two types of countries. One group consists of developed 
countries that possess a huge amount of capital. They 
operate under decreasing returns on capital. The other 
group contains developing countries with small initial 
stock of capital but operating under constant returns to 
scale in that stock.
The assumption of different returns for different stages of 
development is not entirely unrealistic. In developing 
countries opportunities are higher and in general, without 
uncertainty or risk, the rate of return of capital is very 
high.126
The economies under consideration interact. In principle, 
if the productivity of capital of the small economy is 
relatively high and the developed country possess lots of 
capital, this one should flow from the developed world (DEW 
henceforth) to the developing world (DIW henceforth).
For the small emerging economy or economies
126Barro and Sala i Martin (1995 pp 50 ) set an example 
where an economy with low stock of capital has diminishing 
returns. An intermediate amount of capital is consistent 
with increasing returns and a large capital stock is 
consistent with diminishing returns again.
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r = aA1 or r = A  {A. 3.2.1)
The private perceived rate of return of capital will be 
equal to aA1 if there is a Romer externality or to A without 
externalities (see text). The marginal productivity of 
capital is independent of the size of the stock of capital.
For the developed world the production function is
ttd < 1 (A. 3.2.2)
Where
Yd: Output of the DEW 
A,j: Productivity parameter
Ka: Total capital of the DEW geographically in DEW
The rate of return of capital of the developed world is
MPkd = “d Ad Kd“ 1 (A. 3.2.3)
Where MPkd is the marginal productivity of capital in DEW. 
If DEW could interact with the developing world without 
barriers
MPkd = aA1 or MPkd = A
The rate of return of capital of the world would be 
determined by the perceived private marginal productivity 
of capital in the developing world.
This appendix will show now that if capital is going to 
flow from DEW to DIW it is profitable for the governments 
of DIW to avoid the total liberalisation of the capital 
markets. To do that, the government has to find an optimal 
rate of return payable to the capital that comes from DEW. 
The government has to control the market setting a custom 
for the capital that comes from abroad.
Mathematically the government of DIW maximises
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B = (r - Cl) Ke (A. 3.2.4)
Subject to
Q = ad Ad Ka“ ' 1 (A. 3.2.5)
Kd + = JCy (A. 3.2.6)
Where: B are benefits for the government.
r: the perceived productivity of capital in
DIW.
Q: the rate of return that the government
sets for the capital of DEW
geographically in DIW.
Ke: Capital, property of DEW but 
geographically in DIW.
Kj,: Total capital property of DEW.
The implicit assumption is that the government takes the
capitals coming from abroad pays Cl to them and then invest
them in the productive sector, earning r. The difference r- 
is the per unit earning of the government. An almost 
identical analysis could be carried on assuming that the 
government sets a tax to the capital from abroad.
Solving for Kd in (A. 3.2.5), considering (A.3.2.6),
substituting in (A.3.2.4) and rearranging:
B = xK~ - —  - Q K~ + (A. 3.2.7)
Q* T Q"’1
1
X = (ad Ad) 1'*a (A. 3. 2. 8)
H =     > 1 (A.3.2.9)1 - ad
Taking the derivative dB/dQ, equating it to zero and
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rearranging:
H IX - Q"+1 Kt - Q {H - 1) X = 0 (A. 3.2.10)
The second derivative is
- (H + 1) Q* iCj. - {H - 1)X < 0 (A. 3.2.11)
This expression is smaller than zero because H>1, X>0 and 
ft can not be negative. Therefore, the government is 
maximising benefits.
(A.3.2.10) solves for the critical point or points.
Since the government is maximising and Ke is necessarily 
greater than zero, r>£2. From the point of view of the
government it is optimal to restrict the flow of capital
from DEW. What about socially? Would it be convenient for 
society to have a complete financial liberalisation (namely 
0=r)?.
To answer these last questions the appendix proceeds in two 
steps:
First, assume that there are not externalities in DIW and
then r=A (the traditional AK model) .
In this case the optimal degree of financial repression 
implies
Ca = A (K± + Kea) - Q Kea = AK± + (A-Q) Kea (A. 3.2.12)
Where Ca: consumption in DIW under the optimal
degree of financial repression 
Ka: Stock of capital property of DIW and 
geographically also in DIW 
Kea: Stock of capital property of DEW 
and geographically in DIW under the 
optimal degree of financial 
repression.
Without financial repression r=Cl.
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Cb = A (K± + Keh) ~AKeb = A K± (A. 3. 2.13)
Where Cb: Consumption of DIW under complete
financial liberalisation.
Keb: Stock of capital property of DEW, 
geographically in DIW under complete 
financial liberalisation.
Clearly Ca>Cb. Without externalities and from the point of 
view of the developing world, there is an optimal degree of 
financial repression. Taking away such repression would 
reduce welfare and consumption.
The rationale for the last result is relatively simple. 
Without externalities a good government should maximise 
consumption. With a given stock of capital property of the 
developing world (K±), consumption is maximised when (A-ft)Ke 
is maximised (in equation (A.3.2.12)). That implies some 
degree of financial repression that produces Ke>0 and H<A. 
The optimal rate Cl is given by the solution of (A.3.2.10) 
when r=A.127
Now let us analyse the case where there is a Romer 
externality.
In that case again with the optimal degree of financial 
repression.
Ca = A1 {Kd + Kea) - Cl Kea (A. 3.2.14)
and with complete financial liberalisation:
Cb = Ax {K± + Keb) - a A1 Keb (A. 3. 2.15)
Since (XA1=r>f2, Keb>Kea.
The net effect is ambiguous. Complete financial 
liberalisation implies cxAi^. The rate of interest paid to 
foreigners rises and that is a cost for the society.
1270bserve that zero capital mobility (namely Q=0) would 
be equivalent in welfare terms to complete financial 
liberalisation (1^=0 when the payment is zero) , since C=AKi 
in both cases.
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However, the flows of capital increase and that raises 
welfare. In the case of externalities a complete financial 
liberalisation could be optimal.128
The reason for this last result is that to maximise 
monetary benefits, the government maximises (ccAj-ftJKe. 
Nonetheless, if it wants to maximise social benefits, the 
maximisation has to be done over the term (A^ ftJK,, because 
Ax is the true marginal productivity of capital. Maximising 
the first expression implies a very low ft. A partial or 
total liberalisation may improve welfare and consumption.
Some examples may clarify things. The following table shows 
two simulations. The first column assumes an externality a 
la Romer. The government maximises the term (aAj-ftjKe and 
obtain a limited quantity of capital from abroad (Kg) . The 
second column shows that a total liberalisation (otAx=ft) 
improves welfare because consumption rises.
Columns 3 and 4 show a situation where there are not 
externalities. The government maximises the term (A-ft)Ke in 
column three. A total liberalisation brings almost the 
total capital of the developed world (Kj) to the developing 
world. GDP rises but GNP falls dramatically, in such a way 
that consumption falls from 789.5 units to 100.0 units.129
128Actually there could be cases in which it is optimal 
not only to liberalise but to subsidize capital inflows. 
This is when ft is optimal in the programme (Ai-ftjKe and also 
(CCA1-ft)Ke<0.
129The simulation was performed in a Lotus 1-2-3 
programme with a simulation that iterate values for ft in 
(A.2.2.10) until it is equal to zero.
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Table A.3.2.1 Simulation 4.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a 0.1 0.1 1.0 1.0
A1 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
ad 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Ad 15.0 15.0 15.0 15.0
KT 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Ki 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0
r 1.0 1.0 10.0 10.0
n 0.86 1.0 2.157 10.0
B 3.35 0.0 689.5 0.0
Kd 75.7 56.3 12.1 0.562
Ke 24.3 43.8 87.9 99.4
C 321.8 493.8 789.5 100.0
This appendix is useful because it provides an alternative 
explanation for the capital inflows problem in some ERBS 
that is also consistent with the one provided in the text. 
The argument is that such problem (that in these cases is 
not a problem) may have been produced by the structural 
measures accompanying disinflation rather than by 
stabilization itself. The analysis also suggest that the 
existence of some financial repression is not necessarily 
harmful for the economy under consideration. In this 
context, economic policy has to balance the cost and 
benefits of the possible structural change.
The analysis can be extended in numerous ways. Here we have 
assumed that the developing world has monopsony power and
can set the rate of interest paid to the developed world. 
Competition in Bertrand between similar countries of DIW 
would break the monopsony power and all countries should 
liberalise or nobody would invest in them. However, the 
possibility of coalitions or other ways of financial 
repression - like competing in Cournot and not in Bertrand- 
would rescue the main message of this appendix: that there 
is an optimal degree of financial repression and that 
liberalisation may be desirable especially under some kind 
of externalities.
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Appendix 3.3.- The Capital Inflows Problem in Balanced
Growth Equilibrium
One of the most important questions of this chapter is
whether the capital inflows problem arises in a balanced
growth path. That would happen if the initial condition for 
consumption were greater than the original. This is because 
then money rises and under a predetermined exchange rate 
there is a capital inflow (Drazen and Helpman (1987) ,
Obstfeld (1985)).
To investigate this question, it is convenient to write 
(3.14) in the text in terms of the GDP (Y) and to assume 
that all assets of the economy, including physical capital, 
grow at the same rate. Government consumption g is supposed 
to be zero without loss of generality.
1 + Xfy - Gy (-i + fy) = Cy (A.3.3.1)
A1
f = b * R - D fy = |  Gy = ^  Cr = -£ Dfy -D{.£)
f represents total foreign financial assets.
The impact of higher growth in the ratio of consumption-GDP 
is:
| |  = - < A + fy) (A.3.3.2)
This expression inside the parentheses is positive because 
the GNP is positive. Therefore, and assuming that physical 
capital is predetermined, consumption always falls at the 
beginning when growth rises.
Nonetheless the total financial assets of the economy may 
be negative. That actually happens when the economy is 
highly indebted. If that is the case, increasing growth 
implies greater equilibrium current account deficit. The 
reason is the following:
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The current account as a percentage of GDP is, in a 
balanced growth path
= Gy fy (A. 3.3.3)
(-%) = (A.3.3.4)dGy Y y
If fy<0 a rise in Gy increases the equilibrium sustainable 
current account deficit (see Edwards (1995b) and Edwards et 
al (1995)). When fy>0 the economy increases its current 
account surplus.
Notice that initial reductions in consumption and capital 
outflows may be accompanied with higher current account 
deficits when fy<0 but fy+(l/A)>0.
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Appendix 4.1.- Devaluation and Zero Monetary Accommodation
This appendix shows that if the government devalues the 
currency and sets a policy where Dm=DR/ it reverts the 
symptoms of the capital inflows problem completely. Now, 
however the real interest rate will rise because of the 
devaluation itself and by the lack of credibility in the 
reduction of inflation. Again there may be a severe fiscal 
cost.
To prove what the previous paragraph says consider the 
current account identity:
DR= Y + r*R - C - g (A. 4 .1.1)
and the monetary policy R=m+K# where K is R0-m0.
Then
Dm = Y + z*m + r*K - C - g (A.4.1.2)
Given this monetary policy, (A.4.1.2) and the cash in 
advance constraint determine consumption and money 
independently of the other equations of the system.
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Figure A.4.1.1
(A.4.1.2)
Where the line with steeper slope represents the cash in 
advance constraint and the other line is equation 
(A.4.1.2).
The system is stable if 1 /(j) > r*, which is a plausible 
assumption. The stable path is the cash in advance 
constraint and the economy has to be always on it.
As already explained in the text, this system is
independent of expectations. If the government follows this 
policy, consumption does not change when expectations of
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inflation rise.
A devaluation in this context has two effects. First, with 
predetermined international reserves it reduces money at 
once. Then, since starting from this point the government 
follows a policy of printing money according to 
international reserves, K has to rise. That shifts the line 
representing equation (A.4.1.2) to the left.
Figure A.4.1.2
mO m 2ml
Originally the equilibrium has mg as solution. Just after 
the devaluation m pass to mx and the line representing the 
current account balance shifts to the left. The new 
equilibrium has m2 as solution. There is a current account
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surplus in between and an accumulation of money and 
international reserves. Devaluation is neither neutral in 
the short run nor in the long run. It produces higher 
consumption and money at the end.
The intuitive reason for this result can be explained 
because when money falls, consumption also falls. The 
economy generates savings and the interest payments earned 
by international reserves increase. When the economy 
reaches mx again, its net incomes have increased. 
Consumption can increase a bit more.130
Observe that changes in the rate of inflation do not affect 
the equilibrium of m and C. It is clear also that the 
utility function does not have any role in the 
configuration of the equilibrium. The variable that the 
utility function affects is the real interest rate. To 
prove it, it is necessary first to solve the differential 
equation (A .4.1.2).
Substituting the cash in advance constraint in (A.4.1.2) 
and rearranging we get
~  - r*)C = DC (A. 4 .1.3)
< P  < P  < P
This differential equation in consumption is stable, since 
1/<(> > r*.
The solution for the equation is:
C(t) = A exp(-(-i-r*) t) + H  (A.4.1.4)
<P
H = Y + r *K (a. 4.1.5) 
(1 - r*4>)
130Calvo (1981) presents an example of devaluation in 
a Sidrausky type model. However, since in his model there 
are not reserves, the final equilibrium is the same than 
the original. Auernheimer (1987) includes international 
reserves in his analysis.
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A = C0 - H {A. 4.1.6)
DC{ t) = -(i - r*) A exp (- (-i -r *) t) (A.4.1.7)
<P <P
Previously to the devaluation DC=0 and C0=H. At the moment 
of the devaluation K rises and H becomes greater than C0, 
which means A<0. Therefore
DC( t) > 0 (A.4.1.8)
The problem is subject to cases where C(t)>0.
To know what happen with the rate of interest, we rewrite 
equation (4.8) of the text using the isoelastic utility 
function.
—  = p(r - 6) -  ----— — —  (A.4.1.9)
C K (1 + (r + 7T) <J>)
Because of the already explained behaviour of consumption
^  = W{ t) > 0 (A.4.1.10)
Then (A.4.1.9) can be rewritten as
-J- fr P . .. = p (r - e) - W(t) (A.4.1 .1 1 )
(1 + (r + it)<t>)
If the present rate of inflation remains forever, the 
devaluation must produce an initial raise in the real 
interest rate. If it were not like that then Dr would be 
smaller than zero and r would be departing of 0 on time. If 
initial r is greater than 0 and W(t)>p(r-0), r is falling 
on time towards 0. In t=«>, W(t)=0 (see equations (A.4.1.4) 
and (A.4.1.7)) and r=0. A plausible behaviour of r is one 
in which at the initial stage it raises and then falls in 
time.
When there is lack of credibility, the effect of high real 
interest rates is reinforced at the beginning. People 
expect that in tx inflation will rise. Since consumption is 
predetermined and the lagrange multiplier is also 
predetermined, it must happen that
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r( tx ) = r( t*) + tt0 - n1 {A. 4.1.12)
r(tx ) > r (t^ ) (A. 4.1.13)
Where r(tx.) is the real rate of interest just before the 
government reverts the low rate of inflation and r (tx+) is 
the same variable just after the reversion.
(A.4.1.13) implies that initially the trajectory of 
interest rates must observe very high values. In tx there is 
a sudden reduction of this variable and then it tends 
steadily to 0.
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Appendix A.4.2: Different Effects of Parameters on Initial 
Consumption
This appendix shows first that for a logarithmic utility 
function a temporal increase in the real interest rate 
reduces always initial consumption. It shows also that 
higher inflation in the future increases initial 
consumption. Therefore, if higher real interest rates are 
associated to higher inflation in the future, the effect of 
increasing the real interest rate over consumption is 
ambiguous.131
Under the isoelastic utility function the equations to 
solve Cif C(tx) and CQ in subsection 4.3.2 in the text are:
C(tx) p (1 + (z1 + 7^ )4)) = Cq (1 + (0+7Co)<J>) (A.4.2.1)
(P,ri~P9~e) tJ ) ^ exp(-8tx) = *2^2 ♦ *(*.4.2.2) 0(l+p) - pzx 0 x 0 u
and
C(tx) = C± exp(p(r1-0) tx) (A. 4.2.3)
When p is different to 1 this system is non-linear and may 
not have analytical solution. An iterative numerical 
algorithm is useful to solve different exercises. It 
consists of giving an arbitrary Ci in (A.4.2.3), solve Cq in 
(A.4.2.1) and check that (A.4.2.2) fits. If it does not 
fit, the process must be repeated iteratively until the
131In the simulation exercises where p*l all the 
experiments showed that temporal increases in the real rate 
of interest reduce initial consumption.
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system converges.132
However, when p=l the utility function is logarithmic, the 
system is linear and has analytical solution. A simple way 
to solve it is substituting (A.4.2.3) in (A.4.2.1) and then 
solve simultaneously (A.4.2.1) and (A.4.2.2) for C* and Cq. 
Finally, solve recursively C(tx) in (A.4.2.3).
Once (A.4.2.3) is substituted in (A.4.2.1), the 
simultaneous system becomes
AC± - BCq =0 (A. 4. 2.4)
A,Ci + B'C = J (A. 4.2.5)
Where:
A = exp((r1 - 0) tx) (1 + (r1+7i1)<|)) 
B = (1 + (0 + nQ)$)
?i/ _ (1 - exp ((rx - 20) tx))
/I *“ — ^
20 - rx
Bi = exp(-0tx)
0
T  -  * 0  -  9o x  „
 0  +  R °
The solution for initial consumption Ci in this system is
J (1 + (0 + 7t0) <J))
C, = --    {A. 4.2.6)
1 DET
Being DET the determinant of the system, which is equal to
132This is the algorithm used for the simulations of sub 
section 4.4.1 in a lotus programme.
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When tx—> oo and rx=Q:
Ct = 0J = y0 + QR0 - 5T0 U.4.2.7)
The response of initial consumption to inflation in period 
(0,tx) is negative since 7^  in the denominator of (A.4.2.6) 
with positive sign.
The response of C* to higher future expected inflation 7t0 
is:
dCj =  1  <t>J + *,)<!>) e x p  ( ( r t-28) tx) > 0 ( A  2  4  8)
d7C0 DET2 0
To evaluate the impact of temporal changes in the real
interest rate rx over initial consumption, it is necessary 
to evaluate the impact that this factor has in the
determinant. rx only appears in the denominator of
(A.4.2 . 6) , then
Sgn = - Sgn (A<2.4.9)
dz1 oz1
Evaluated in the steady state
= tx exp (-0fcj [ +i|exp(-0fcx) +dDET
dri wwx# 1 0 J 0
( 1 + (0+7lo) <())
02 1
(1-exp (-01„) ) (A.2.4.10)
Apparently, this derivative has an ambiguous sign, since
1 > exp(-0tx) but
However, we will show that the sign is always positive.
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The value tx exp (-0tx) is maximum when
tx = {A. 4.2.11)
Using this value# substituting in (A.4.2.10) and 
rearranging
1 > 2/e > 1/e, therefore
dDET i
dr1 ' | > 0 (A.4.2.13)
But if this derivative is positive when tx=l/0, will be 
always positive. This is because it is in the case where 
tx=l/0 when the negative difference (k^ K q) <|>/0 is maximum in 
absolute value. Therefore
dfgr > 0 {A. 4.2.14) 
dll
and then
dCi-^ -1 < 0 (A.4.2.15)
dri
We can notice by (A.4.2.10) that the policy of raising 
interest rates to reduce consumption loose effectiveness 
when the difference is large, that is to say when the
stabilization is very ambitious and non credible.
Now it is clear that if increases in rx rise expectations of 
future inflation (in this case 7t0) , a policy trying to 
overcome the capital inflows problem through higher 
interest rates may actually exacerbate it.
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Appendix 4.3.- An Extension of the Model in the Presence of 
Non Tradeable Goods
The results of chapter four remain almost unchanged if the 
model considers the existence of non tradeable goods. A new 
important variable in this case is the real exchange rate.
Suppose that the maximisation of the private sector is now 
over the intertemporal utility function:
Max U(CT , CN) exp (-01) dt (A. 4 .3.1)J o
Where CT is the consumption of tradeable goods and CN the 
consumption of non tradeable goods. The utility function U 
is supposed to be additive and separable in its arguments 
and strictly concave.
The programme (A.4.3.1) is subject to the constraints 
Yt + prYN + r B - CT - pr CN - - DmT + DB (A.4.3.2)
mT = (|) (Cr + prCN) (A.4.3.3)
Where:
Yt: Production of tradeable goods (given)
Yn: Production of non tradeable goods (given) 
pr: Relative prices (non tradeable/tradeable) 
Tij.: Rate of growth of prices of tradeable 
goods.
B : government bonds
1^ : Money in term of tradeable goods.
(A.4.3.2) is the intertemporal private budget constraint 
and (A.4.3.3) is the cash in advance constraint in the 
presence of non tradeable goods.
Government bonds are indexed to the price of tradeable 
goods, or alternatively, as we will see, to the exchange 
rate.
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There is PPP in tradeable goods. Then
PT = E (A.4.3.4)
Where PT are nominal prices of tradeable goods and E is the 
nominal exchange rate, the level of tradeable goods abroad 
is supposed to be one.
Maximisation of (A.4.3.1) subject to (A.4.3.2) and 
(A. 4.3 .3) gives as a result:
- X{1 + (r + ur)<J>) = 0 (A.4.3.5)
Uaf - X (1 + (r + 7tr)<l>)pr = 0 (A.4.3.6)
- 0A, = ~rX (A.4.3.8)
dfc
lim^ Xt Vt exp(-0fc) =0 (A.4.3.9)
Vt = mT + B (A. 4.3.9)
Vt is financial wealth in terms of tradeable goods. 
Combining (A.4.3.5) and (A.4.3.6)
—  = pi (A.4.3.10)
U cr
Which is the usual marginal condition between goods.
By (A . 4 .3 .5) and (A . 4.3 .8) and remembering the separability 
assumption
DCt = (0 - r) + {Dz + P7ir)<|>J^- (A. 4.3.11)
UcTCT UcrCT
(A.4.3.11) shows the same configuration of equilibrium that 
in the case of only tradeable goods.
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The government budget constraint of this economy is
gT + prgN + iB - r*R - ii^ nT = DmT + DB - DR (A. 4.3.12)
Where gT is government consumption in tradeable goods and gN 
government consumption of non tradeable goods.
The general equilibrium of the economy is obtained 
combining the private budget constraint (A.4.3.2) and the 
government budget constraint (A.4.3.12).
YT + r* R - CT - gT = DR (A. 4. 3.13)
Since
9n +C n = yn U.4.3.14)
Using equations (A.4.3.11) and (A.4.3.13) it is possible to 
arrive to the same results of the text in chapter four. The 
additional result is given by (A.4.3.10) for the behaviour 
of relative prices. Since the utility function is separable 
and strictly concave, the marginal utility of consumption 
of any good depends negatively in its own consumption. 
Relative prices pr (PN/PT) depend positively in the ratio 
(CT/CN) . CN is a parameter given by YN-gN.
In the case of full monetary accommodation, CT rises for the 
period (0,tx) and relative prices also increase. There is a 
real appreciation of the exchange rate. However, in tx CT 
falls suddenly and so does pr. Therefore, there is a once 
and for all reduction in the nominal price of non tradeable 
goods. In this case, inflation is always equal to the 
growth of the nominal exchange rate.
On the other hand, when the government follows a policy of 
increasing rx to set CTi=CT0, the inflation of non tradeable 
goods is greater than the inflation of tradeables in the 
period (0,tx). This is because in that interval CT is 
increasing while CN remains unchanged (relative prices are 
increasing). Therefore, this policy is more inflationary
than the full monetary accommodation.
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Sudden reductions of CT produce nominal reductions in the 
price of non tradeable goods. That could not happen if this 
prices were inflexible downwards. If that is the case, some 
unemployment may appear and that is an additional cost for 
the government that tries to avoid the symptoms of the 
capital inflows problem.
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Appendix 5.1.- Lack of Credibility versus Excess Confidence 
in the Mexican Stabilization Programme.
One way of checking if the Mexican stabilization programme 
was credible is to analyse the consistency of the current 
account deficit.
This appendix performs a very simple test to check if the 
macroeconomic parameters of CSG government were consistent. 
The test analyses first the identity of the current account 
in actual pesos. Second, it assumes constant forecasted 
relative prices:
PY + zn E f - PC - Pg - P I - E Df (A. 5.1.1)
Where I is the total level of investment (public and 
private) , g is government consumption and rn is the foreign 
nominal interest rate. Dividing the equation by the nominal 
exchange rate E, assuming that people perceive the real 
exchange rate of that moment as an equilibrium rate, and 
dividing again the equation by YP/E
1 + t, - Cy - gy - ly = U.S.1.2)
P* is the foreign price level (in this case the US index). 
Xy is any variable X divided by GDP.
After some manipulation (A.5.1.2) becomes:
l + (r - fy - cr - gy - ly = Dfy U.5.1.3)
r is the real rate of interest of abroad and Dfy represents 
the change of the total foreign assets of the economy with 
respect to GDP. In Mexico, fy is negative because the size 
of foreign debt is huge.
There must be a link between the ratio of investment to GDP 
Iy and the rate of growth DY/Y. We performed the following 
regression from 1965 to 1993 in annual terms (see also
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Econometric Appendix at the end of the thesis)
CRIPC= -15.26 + 83.84 Iy (A.5.1.4) 
(-3.87) (4.34)
R2= 0.42 D.W= 1.4 F: 18.9
Serial Correlation F(l,25): 2.04 
Normality %2{2): 2.49 
Heteroscedasticity: F(l,26): 0.2722 
Stability: CUSUM, CUSUMSQ good 
Predictive Failure 1965-1987:
F (1,19)=1.3
Chow Test: F(2,24): 0.647 
D.F for residuals: -3.78
ADF for residuals: -3.53
Where CRIPC is the annual growth of the real per capita 
GDP. IY is the ratio of fixed capital formation to GDP.
The statistical analysis shows absence of serial 
correlation for residuals (F test. Durbin Watson is not 
conclusive), absence of heteroscedasticity, relative 
normality of the residuals and stability of the parameters 
(CUSUM, CUSUMSQ, predictive failure and Chow Tests)133. The 
Dicky-Fuller tests are in the limit of tolerance for 
cointegration. It is possible to conclude that the real per 
capita growth and the ratio of investment to GDP 
cointegrate.
The exercise is the following: suppose that at the end of 
every year of the CSG administration a hypothetical 
representative individual looks the macroeconomic 
parameters of (A.5.1.3). He/She assumes a balanced growth 
equilibrium from that moment onwards; supposes Cy and gy
remaining at the level they have that year; takes fy as the
133We made a break point in 1987 because of the 
stabilization programme. However, the parameters seem very 
stable.
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initial value at that time and set a forecasted rate of 
growth linking Iy through (A.5.1.4).
If r>DY/Y, fyO<0 and Dfy<0 the system explodes. The terminal 
condition for the debt-GDP ratio is infinity and Cy and gy 
are inconsistent. The argument that Cy increased because of 
growth considerations cannot be maintained and the lack of 
credibility hypothesis may be rescued.
If DY/Y>r mathematically (A. 5.1.3) is stable, and 
theoretically Cy and gy could take any value. However, there 
must be financial restrictions. It is implausible a 
terminal condition in which the debt-GDP ratio is very 
large. There is a limited quantity of resources that can be 
obtained from abroad.134
This appendix assumes two scenarios. In both of them r=3% 
(the average implicit foreign real rate of interest 1989- 
1993 was 3.7% for the Mexican debt). In the first scenario 
growth is equal to 2.5% (the average rate of growth of the 
period 1989-1997 was 2.97%). Then we check what the 
consistent Cy+gy is to maintain balanced growth equilibrium. 
In the second scenario growth is 5%. Considering that the 
real macroeconomic parameters (Cy+gy) remain forever, the 
system solves for fy when t tends to infinity. All exercises 
consider a rate of growth of the population of 2.0%. The 
results are:
134In a market economy, an originally small economy that 
start growing very fast can, at some moment, influence the 
foreign rate of interest. This one would become greater 
than growth.
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Table A.5.1.1. Simulation 5 .Stable Case DY/Y>r
(%) 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989
DY/Y 5 5 5 5 5
i/y 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9
r 3 3 3 3 3
Cy+gy 85.5 85.6 83.7 81.8 80.4
fy (0) -26 -27 -29 -38 -43
fy
terminal
-3.7 -3.7 -2.8 -1.8 -1.1
CA/Y
next
four
years
-9.7 -9.8 -8.0 -6.5 -5.4
-10.2 -10.3 -8.3 -6.7 -5.4
-10.6 -10.8 -8.7 -6.9 -5.5
-11.0 -11.2 -9.0 -7.1 -5.6
Table A.5.1.2. Simulation 5. Complete Balanced Growth 
Equilibrium r>DY/Y
(%) 1993 1992 1991 1990 1989
DY/Y 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
I/Y 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9 18.9
CA/Y -1.7 -1.7 -1.8 -2.5 -2.8
Cy+gy 80.9 80.9 80.9 80.8 80.8
In all the scenarios the sum Cy+gy considered the observed 
inventories.
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In the unstable case (r>DY/Y second table) the actual level 
Cy+gy in 1993 is almost five percentage points above to the 
compatible level with 2.5% balanced growth (85.5 versus 
80.9). The exercise shows that starting from 1990, growth 
below r is inconsistent with the observed macroeconomic 
parameters. Rational people could not believe in a balanced 
growth path.
In the stable case (DY/Y>r), the first table shows a huge 
increase (in absolute value) of the terminal ratio fy since 
1989. Actual macroeconomic parameters do not seem 
consistent with possible future financial restrictions. 
Mexico has never had negative foreign assets to GDP 
superior in absolute value to 80%. Even under NAFTA and 
economic reform the results of the first table are hard to 
believe. Projected current account deficits are growing. 
They show levels well above the historical trend.
Nonetheless, the previous analysis could be criticized. It 
is plausible to think that people were not expecting a 
balanced growth path but a huge increase of output in the 
future. NAFTA and economic reform opened opportunities for 
long run projects. In that case, the excess confidence 
argument would imply a sudden increase in current 
consumption. This would be in response to the expected 
increase in future output.
McKinnon and Pill (1996)135 defend this hypothesis for the 
case of Mexico. However, they argue that excess confidence 
was not totally based on real opportunities. Banks found 
profitable to cheat people exaggerating the profile of some 
projects to lend resources because of moral hazard 
arguments.
Some analysts have tried to assess the impact of NAFTA in
135See also Muellbauer and Murphy (1990) , King (1990) 
and Pagano (1990) for a similar argument in the economy of 
Great Britain or Ades, Kiguel and Liviatan (1993) for the 
case of the current account deficit in Denmark.
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the economy. Sobarzo (1994) (1995) shows that under
increasing returns the impact on GDP could be huge (13% in 
the most optimistic scenario). However the variance between 
the optimistic estimation and the most conservative is 
large (the minimum estimated impact is 5%) . The author does 
not say for how long this impact would take place. The 
result rests in the assumption of increasing returns. 
Conservative applied general equilibrium models (i.e under 
decreasing or constant returns) would show little impact 
of the agreement on GDP.136
We performed again the exercise of balanced growth. This 
time it tries to calculate the necessary windfall in output 
(due probably to productivity improvements) to generate a 
credible scenario. Here the ratio Cy+gy falls immediately 
because of the windfall and follows a balanced growth 
afterwards.
The chosen growth in the balanced growth path was 5%. The 
exercise is very similar to the previous. In every year of 
the CSG administration the representative consumer checks 
the likelihood of the results. The financial restriction 
sets the level of foreign assets (negative) with respect to 
GDP at most in 100%. The results are:
136Interesting opinions assert that there was nothing 
clear about the future performance of the Mexican economy 
(Krugman (1995)). Other authors (Oks and van Wijnbergen 
(1995)) stress some mistakes in economic agents. They were 
expecting a boom in the manufacturing sector.
Table A. 5.1.3. Simulation 6.
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1993 1992 1991 1990 1989
DY/Y 5 5 5 5 5
I/Y 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9 21.9
Cy+gy 80.1 80.1 80.1 80.1 80.1
fy (0) -0.26 -0.27 -0.29 -0.38 -0.43
fy
terminal
-1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
CA/Y on 
impact
-3.9 -4.0 -4.1 -4.7 -4.8
Windfall
on
impact
10.1 10.2 7.8 5.0 2.3
According to this table, a windfall of 10% in present value 
was needed in 1992 and 1993. Only in this way it would be 
possible to maintain a balanced growth path of 5% and fy 
growing to 100% (in absolute value) in the long run.
The exercise suggests the following:
If the windfall lasted only for 1 year, a balanced growth 
path of 5% would have required an increase in output higher 
than 15%, which surely was unbelievable. If it took for 
example 10 years, the economy should be growing at around 
8% every year in the next 10 years, which again is hard to 
believe. Therefore, it seems that from 1991 the 
macroeconomic parameters were inconsistent.
This appendix has identified lack of consistency with lack 
of credibility. The reason to do that, is the following:
If the macroeconomic parameters are inconsistent, 
consumption must jump downwards in the future. In an 
optimising framework this only happens when there is lack
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of credibility. Therefore, if people understand the 
inconsistency they cannot believe in the programme.137
Appendix 5.2: 
Can Lack o£ Credibility and Confidence in the Programme 
Live Together?
Chapter three stresses the role of confidence in the 
emergence of the capital inflow problem. Chapter five 
emphasizes the role of lack of credibility in the same 
problem. Can these two possibilities live together?
The stabilization programme in Mexico (1987-1994) is a good 
candidate for the hypothesis that both situations could 
live together. The lack of credibility problem produced the 
consumption crisis. Confidence increased investment in the 
country. The long run output is above the flat trend of the 
eighties but consumption is still well below the 1994 peak.
Let us set up a very simple model. It is based in the 
framework explained in chapter three and in the ideas of 
the lack of credibility hypothesis explained in chapter 
five.
The assumptions are the following: 
r=aA1=0 (see chapter three).
In t0=0, the government announces that in the interval 
(t0/tx) inflation will follow the trajectory:
 4L25— — - = -Y (A. 5.2.1)
(1 + ( r  + it) 4>) '
and in (tx,<») :
1370ks and van Wijnbergen (1995) also agree that 
macroeconomic parameters were inconsistent in Mexico since 
the beginning of the 1990's. They say that the future 
perceived reduction of consumption would bring about a 
recession.
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71 =  n (tx) (A. 5.2.2)
Foreign investors believe this premise. Therefore, the 
associated perceived country risk of the economy falls. 
Assume that foreign investors decide to increase the 
capital stock of the country at the same rate of 
consumption in period (t0,tx) (see chapter three for reasons 
why investment can be decided in this way) .138 The rate of 
growth of consumption in that period is, according to 
(A.5.2.1) and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution 
P/ PY-
Therefore, in period (t0,tx)
K = K(0) exp (pyt) (A.5.2.3)
In (tx,°o)
K = K{0) exp (pytx) (A.5.2.4)
On the other hand, consumers believe in the rule (A.5.2.1) . 
However, for the period (tx,<») they believe:
71 = 7C(0) (A.5.2.5)
They expect a sudden reversion of the policy in tx.
That possibility is not implausible. Inflation in Mexico 
was falling sluggishly during 1987-1994. In 1995 it rose in 
a sudden way to a relative high level.
In the original steady state:
r(0) + rf(0) = C(0) (A.5.2.6)
Between (t0,tx):
7i = ( tc (0) + (A + r)) exp (-y t) - (A + r ) (A.5.2.7)
<P <P
138If there is more foreign direct investment than 
financial investment, it is possible to target the 
trajectory of K instead than the trajectory of f.
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C = C i exp(pyt) {A. 5.2. 8)
Where CA is the initial condition for consumption in t0.
The production function is (see chapter three):
Y = Ax K {A. 5.2.9)
Substituting these assumptions in the national accounts 
identity
Y{ O)exp(pyt) +rft-Ci exp(pyt) =p y-K'(0) exp (py t) +Dft(A. 5.2.10) 
This is a differential equation for f whose solution is:
f (tx) -Hq exp (rtx) + exp(py tx) {A. 5.2.11)
*(0) -f(0) - .<y(0).-C^ P / Jr(0))(A.5.2.12)
(PY - -r)
Also, since 0=r DX,=0
 °LCA. , . -  ______  ^  U . S . 2.13)
(1 + (r + 7T (0)) 4>) (1 + (r + n(0))<t>)
Where Cx is the new steady state consumption once inflation 
rises in a sudden way, as consumers believe. Given that 
inflation is constant in the period (tx,<») , C is equal to 
Cx. K is also given by the assumptions.
From (A.5.1.13) is clear that Ci=Cx.
Therefore
Cx = C± = r(0)exp(pytx) + rf{ tx) (A. 5.2.14)
Equations (A.5.2.11), (A.5.2.12) and (A.5.2.14) solve for
Cit f(tx) and H (0). The system has analytical solution but 
the interpretation of the results is not easy.
A simulation exercise gives the following results:
Table A .5.2.1: Simulation 7. 
Assumptions
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Results
K (0) 10 Y (0) 10
a 0.1 r 0.1
1.0 C (0) 9.2
Y 0.07 n (tx) 0.168
♦ 0.04 Y (tx) 10.72
tx 1.0 f (tx) -9.37
7C(0) 2.0 c (tx) 10.49
f (0) -8.0 Ci 9.78
p 1.0 (f/y) (0) -0.8
(f/y) (tx) -0.87
The capital inflows problem appears. Consumption increases 
at the beginning. At the end the sharp reduction in 
consumption and money also occurs, which is consistent with 
the lack of credibility hypothesis. Nonetheless, output 
rises in a permanent way (the trend of growth is zero) . The
total rise in the foreign debt of the country is the result
of both phenomena: lack of credibility of consumers and
confidence in the foreign investors.
If at time tx the government policy holds, the solution is
exactly the same. This is because from that point of time 
there will be another steady state. If, on the contrary, 
consumers were right, a reduction of capital could take 
place. As long as investment is irreversible, the solution 
will be also the same in this case.
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Appendix 5.3: Proof that consumption under governments A 
(CA) is greater when the time of governments A in power is 
smaller.
An infinite sequence of A governments gives as a result 
CA=Ch* A sequence of some A governments followed by an 
infinite sequence of P governments will produce CA>Ch as we 
have seen in the text. CA will be greater the smaller the 
time governments type A are in power. In the context of the 
analysed political model it means that an initial 
government A has always incentives to choose a P 
government.
Proof:
The present value of consumption multiplied by the constant 
rate of interest is:
r f Ct exp(-rt) dt = Ch = y0 + rfQ - gQ (A.5.3.1)
J  o
If a sequence of governments A takes office in the interval 
(0,tx) and a following sequence of P governments take office 
in the interval (tx,<») , (A.5.2.1) becomes
CA (1 - exp (-r tx)) + Cp exp(-rfcx) = Ch {A. 5.3.2)
Now we will compare two sequences. In the first, 
governments A last the interval (0,^) and governments P 
last (txl,«>) . In the second governments A last (0,^) and 
governments P (t^,00) . Also t^t^.
Solving for CA in (A.5.3.2) and substituting tx for txl and 
tx2, it is possible to compare the two sequences.
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'A/t
CDexp (-rtx,)
(A. 5.3.3)
" (l-exp (-rtXJ) <l-exp(-rt„,))
CA/txl
C_exp (-rtx,)
(A, 5. 3.4)
(l-exp(-rtJc2)) (l-exp(-rt„J)
(1-exp (-rt ,)) (l-exp(~rtxJ )
(A.5.3.5)
exp (-rtxl) v exp (-rt^) u>5>3>6)
(l-exp(-rtxl)) (l-exp(-rtx2)
Equations (A. 4.3 .5) and (A . 5.3 . 6) happen because txl < .
Representing (A.5.3.3) and (A.5.3.4) in the plane CA and CP, 
it is easy to realize that the equation where A lasts for 
less has greater constant term and also greater slope in 
absolute value
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Figure A.5.3.1
(A.5.3.3) / (A 5 3 7)
C h
(A.5.3.4)
Equating (A.5.3.3) and (A.5.3.4) it is straightforward to 
see that the intersection point between these two equations 
corresponds to the value Ch.
Now it is necessary to use condition (5.8) or (5.25) in the 
text:
U°A = -----------   = A. = constant (A. 5. 3.7)
(1 + (r + nA)<|)) (1 + (r + :rp)<t))
Since np>KA , CA > Cp# which implies CA> Ch> Cp.
There is a line with positive slope crossing equations 
(A.5.3.3) and (A.5.3.4) at the northwest of Ch, which means:
CA/txl> CA/txi(A. 5.3. 8)
Consumption in the period of A is greater the smaller is 
the time A is in government. An initial government A has 
always incentives to choose a P successor.
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ECONOMETRIC APPENDIX:
EMPIRICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN INFLATION AND GROWTH
The main objectives in this appendix are the following:
a) Check if the stylized facts of the four chosen countries 
in chapter one can be supported by the empirical data.
b) Check if the model showed in section 3.1 of chapter 
three, which links growth with the acceleration of 
inflation, is empirically relevant for the analysed 
countries.
Visual inspection of the time series suggest a negative 
relation between inflation and long run growth (see chart
1.1 in chapter one) However, this observation does not 
imply necessarily that such relationship in fact occurs. 
Other variables, negatively correlated with inflation and 
positively correlated with growth, may be responsible of 
the observation. A good econometric analysis should confirm 
if the original suspicion is correct.
The second objective is to answer what is the relevant
measure of inflation affecting growth. Is it the rate
itself? Is it the acceleration as the presented model
suggests? To check this fact may theoretically help policy 
makers to design stabilization policies. If the
acceleration of inflation is the measure affecting the long 
run growth, then it is advisable to reduce the rate of 
inflation in steps.
Several theoretical and empirical works relate inflation to 
growth139. At an empirical level, most of the studies are 
based in the so-called Barro regressions (see Barro (1991), 
Barro (1995) and Barro and Sala i Martin (1995).). Using 
cross-section studies and average panel data, these 
specifications impose, in many cases, a similar response of
139In theoretical grounds see Stockman (1981) , Hung 
(1993), De Gregorio (1992a) (1993) and Orphanides and Solow 
(1990).
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every country to changes in some exogenous or control 
variables. The use of dummies may characterize some 
particular behaviour, but it is impossible to generate 
different coefficients for every different country.
The specification of the Barro regressions has been 
criticized for several reasons. In different articles140 per 
capita growth is related to an initial value of per capita 
output. If the coefficient for this value is negative, the 
conclusion is that there is conditional convergence (Barro 
and Sala i Martin (1995)). Hypothetically, countries with 
very different initial stock of capital, but with similar 
technology and tastes, would converge to the same output 
per capita.141
Nonetheless, statistically it is a mistake to conclude 
convergence based in the negative sign of the coefficient 
of output on growth in panel data. Galton fallacy may exist 
(Quah (1993)) and that coefficient is then naturally biased 
to negative values. The conclusion is that this kind of 
analysis cannot constitute a proof of convergence. The 
regressions are not specified correctly.
Another line of criticism is the lack of dynamics. Bruno 
and Easterly (1995) use non parametric techniques for the 
specific topic of our interest (inflation and growth) . They 
conclude that changes in the rate of inflation do not have 
a unique effect over growth.
According to Bruno and Easterly (1995), for high inflation 
countries stabilization policies tend to accelerate growth 
temporarily. Afterwards growth reaches normal levels again. 
Countries in which inflation accelerates sharply observe an 
important reduction of growth. Countries with relatively 
high inflation rates may grow fast (Brazil). Their study
140Barro (1991), Barro (1995), Barro and Sala i Martin 
(1995). De Gregorio (1992a) (1993), Kormendi and McGuire
(1985), Levine and Renelt (1992), Levine and Zervos (1994).
141 Poor countries grow more than rich countries.
This fact has been advocated as a proof of the Solow growth 
model (Solow (1956)). If growth depends negatively on the 
level of output, it is exogenous in the long run.
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seems to be compatible with the model presented in section
3.1 chapter three.
The empirical part of this chapter is based in traditional 
econometric techniques. Instead of pooling the four 
countries, there is a case by case study. Doing this, we 
hope to overcome the problem of assigning similar 
coefficients to different countries. The growth of some 
country responds to some variables and possibly the growth 
of other country responds to other variables.
Finally, the analysis of time series introduces dynamics in 
a natural way. Variables can affect the long run growth of 
the economy in different ways. Some of them may have 
permanent effects, some others only temporal. This is 
something possible to check opening the time span of the 
variables over the objective value.
The Relation of Inflation and Growth in Selected Countries
This section reports the results of ad-hoc regressions of 
per-capita growth against several control variables. First 
of all, we set dynamic relations with several lags for the 
endogenous and exogenous variables (see Cuthbertson, Hall 
and Taylor (1992) chapter 4). The best specifications in 
econometric terms are reported in this section.
Dynamics was important only in some specifications. Given 
the relatively long term of one year in annual data, most 
of the control variables affect growth in the 
contemporaneous year.
The rate of inflation was always a significant control 
variable. It is necessary to be aware that almost in every 
system inflation is an endogenous variable. There is a 
positive probability of having simultaneous equation bias 
and inconsistent estimators. This problem has been 
addressed by Barro (1995) and Fischer (1991). Barro used
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several instrumental variables and reports satisfactory 
results. Fischer could not find convincing specifications 
using instrumental variables and reports the results using 
the rate of inflation itself.
To avoid as much as possible inconsistencies, this appendix 
did not use directly the rate of inflation, but the rate of 
growth of the nominal exchange rate. The analysed economies 
have been subject to exchange rate management several 
times. Sometimes they have had fixed regimes (for example 
Mexico in the whole period 1965-1975) . The use of this 
variable, instead of inflation, avoids the simultaneous 
equation bias when the economy is subject to crawling peg 
regimes.
Unfortunately, in all the cases studied there have been 
long episodes of floating regimes. Then the exchange rate 
is also an endogenous variable with possibilities of 
correlation with the disturbance term. The problem is also 
subject to the Lucas critique (Lucas (1976)). Different 
regimes may change the value of the coefficients and 
sometimes the sign.
To check if changes in the regime have modified 
substantially the coefficients, we performed predictive 
failure tests and analysed the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests 
since the last ERBS started. In none of the cases we find 
evidence of significant changes in the coefficients.
The chapter also tried to use other instrumental variables 
for inflation, for example lagged inflation or lagged 
growth of the nominal exchange rate, but except for 
Bolivia, they did not work (see Fischer (1991) for a 
similar result).
+ Argentina
The case of Argentina is perhaps the most straightforward. 
The best specification was a relation of per capita growth 
against the rate of growth of the nominal exchange rate 
(rgner), rgner two years before and the nominal rate of
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interest of abroad (libor).
First regression
Sample: Annual data 1965-1993. Source of data International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Annual Book 1995
CYPAR= 5.37 - 0.0006109 rgner + 0.000509 rgnert_2 
(2.32) (-2.09) (1.74)
- 0.5127 LIBOR 
(-2 .21)
R2: 0.40 D.W: 2.54 F(3,22): 4.82
t statistic in parentheses
Serial Correlation: F(l,21): 2.05
Functional Form: F(l,21): 0.0714
Normality: %2(2): 0.356
Heteroscedasticity: F(l,24): 1.83
CUSUM, CUSUMSQ: O.K
Wald Statistic for sum of coefficients of
rgner and rgnert-2=0: 0.05830
Predictive failure (period 1965-1990) : F(3,19) : 1.13
Variables
CYPAR: Per capita growth rate in Argentina 
rgner: rate of growth on nominal exchange rate 
LIBOR: LIBOR rate of interest in nominal terms
There is a very important negative effect of inflation on 
the contemporaneous rate of growth of per capita output 
(CYPAR). Also, increases in the foreign rate of interest 
have significant and negative effect on growth. The reason, 
which we did not investigate in the model, may be that 
Argentina is a highly indebted country. When the foreign 
rate of interest rises, it reduces the available resources
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for investment.142 An interesting aspect is that the real 
rate of interest was not significant. The nominal rate was.
According to this analysis, the level of inflation is not 
important to determine growth in the long run. The sum of 
the coefficients of rgner and rgnert_2 is statistically zero 
(see Wald statistic), implying that the acceleration of 
inflation produces negative effects on growth. That is 
consistent with the model explained in chapter three.
The regression can be considered a good representation of 
the process of growth in the sense that the statistics are 
satisfactory. Serial correlation is low and the statistic 
for functional form is almost zero ( suggesting a correct 
specification) . Residuals are normal and heteroscedasticity 
is not significant. The predictive failure test indicates 
that changes in the regime (the last stabilization 
programme started in 1991) do not modify the coefficients 
in a significant way.
Nonetheless, the R2 is relatively low. Changes in the 
parameters can only account for 40% of changes in growth. 
Since most of the statistics are correct, we suspect growth 
is very volatile in Argentina.
+ Israel:
For the case of Israel it was not possible to find good 
specifications of per capita growth. Instead, we ran a 
regression where the logarithm of the output level depends 
on several control variables. Time is one of them, 
suggesting a process of endogenous growth due to structural 
factors.
142This effect is often studied in structuralist 
analyses, in which investment becomes a residual after all 
the other macroeconomic variables are determined (specially 
consumption as a percentage of GDP) . (see for example van 
Wijnbergen (1989) or Oks and van Wijnbergen (1995)).
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Annual terms: 1968-1993 (Source of data IFS. IMF annual
book 1995)
LYPISR= 5.3 + 0.01774 time - 0.0001289 rgner
(19.2) (4.2) (-2.56)
-0.00228 LIBOR -0.13317 LCOMEXT + 0.587 LGRISR + 0.116 D79 
(-0.88) (-2.94) (21.27) (4.50)
R2: 0.997 D.W. 2.53 F(6,18): 1050.7
t statistics in parentheses
Serial Correlation: F(l,17): 1.5555 
Functional Form: F(l,17): 0.7729 
Normality: %2 (2) : 3.74 
Heteroscedasticity: F(l,23): 0.1624 
CUSUM, CUSUMSQ tests: O.K.
Predictive failure (period 1968-1984): F (9,9): 1.6393 
Variables
LYPISR: Real GDP per capita in logarithmic terms 
LCOMEXT: Index of the volume of trade
((imports+exports)/GDP)in log terms.
LGRISR: Real government consumption in per capita terms
(logs).
D79: Dummy for 1979.
There is a significant and negative relation between the 
rate of inflation and the level of per capita output 
(LYPISR). That means a negative association between growth 
and the acceleration of inflation. Time has a significant 
and positive value over the level of output, supporting 
again the endogenous growth hypothesis. In an ideal steady 
state situation, output per capita would grow at a positive 
value of 1.77%, driven by structural factors (productivity,
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discount of the utility for consumers).
The coefficient of the nominal foreign rate of interest is 
negative. Other effects are surprising: LCOMEXT is an
indicator of the openness of the economy. The effect of 
this variable on the level of per capita output is 
negative.143 That may be related to the fact that Israel is 
a rich country, with probably a high ratio of per capita 
stock of capital. In exogenous growth models, economic 
integration means that countries with relatively high 
capital stocks export part of their capital to emerging 
markets, where productivity is higher. The process may 
produce a reduction in the GDP per capita but not 
necessarily in the GNP per capita (see for example Barro 
and Sala i Martin (1995)).
A process of endogenous growth in aggregate terms does not 
rule out the possibility of diminishing returns in some 
sectors. Those could be enough to produce a decline of GDP 
when the economy becomes more open. A clear explanation of 
this result is beyond this work and it is necessary more 
research about the topic.
The other surprising result is the coefficient of the per 
capita real government consumption (LGRISR) over output per 
capita. It is positive and very large and significant.144 
Theoretical foundations of this phenomenon can be found in 
growth models with finite horizons (see Alogoskoufis and 
van der Ploeg (1994)). In this approach economic policy 
through demand may be quite effective at least in the short 
run. As in the case of the openness, further research about 
this topic would be of particular importance.
Finally, we had to adjust the regression with a dummy in 
1979 (d79).
In statistical terms, the regression is also a good
143Cardoso and Fishlow (1989) show a positive 
association between trade and growth for a pool of latin 
american countries.
144 Other studies (Fischer (1991) ) find that economies 
with larger deficits grow by less.
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description of growth. There is not significant serial 
correlation and the functional form is correct. Residuals 
are a bit abnormal - but not too much- and 
heteroscedasticity is low. Stability tests imply no 
significant changes on the parameters due to changes in the 
exchange rate regime.
+ Bolivia
The best specification for the Bolivian growth included 
inflation with a lag.
Sample: Annual data 1965-1991 (Source of Data: IFS.IMF)
CYPBOL = 1.83 - 0.000491 rgner,..! + 20.2 COMEX - 0.6705 LIBOR 
(0.64) (-3.068) (2.95) (-4.75)
-5.72 D83 
(-2.53)
R2: 0.78 D.W.: 1.58 F(4,20): 17.8
t statistics in parentheses.
Serial Correlation: F (1,19):1.075 
Functional Form: F(l,19): 0.0078 
Normality: X2(2): 0.5072 
Heteroscedasticity: F(l,23): 0.4989
CUSUM, CUSUMSQ: Unstable in small parts of the sample 
Predictive Failure (period 1965-1984): F(9,14): 1.15
There is a negative association between the lag of the rate 
of inflation and the per capita growth. Differently from 
the cases of Argentina and Israel, we could not find a 
relation between the acceleration of inflation and growth. 
The index of openness implies that trade liberalisation has 
promoted growth in a very important way. Again, this is 
possibly related to the fact that Bolivia is a poor
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country* but perhaps with high levels of productivity. 
Opening the economy implies a huge increase in investment 
and GDP. The reason why openness affects growth and not the 
level of output remains a topic for future study. Spillover 
effects over sectors with increasing returns may be part of 
the answer.
As in the case of Argentina, we found again a negative 
association between growth and the foreign nominal rate of 
interest. Bolivia is also a huge indebted country.
In statistical terms the regression is not as good as in 
the other cases. There is a small instability in the visual 
inspection of the CUSUM test (non reported here) . However, 
the predictive failure test shows no significant changes 
because of the new regime starting in 1985.
The significant and negative coefficient of the dummy in 
1983 may well reflect terms of trade deterioration (see 
chapter one and Morales (1988)).
Inflation is a crucial factor to explain growth in Bolivia. 
Controlling for other factors associated with disinflation 
(for example the openness of the economy) means that the 
channel of inflation over growth is direct.
+ Mexico
A parsimonious specification of the per capita growth in 
Mexico is the following (sample annual 1965-1993):
CYPMEX = -2.98 - 0.0306 rgner + 10.93 TTRAD - 0.0049 CGR 
(-1.34) (-5.03) (3.79) (-2.32)
-7.08 D83 
(-4.2)
R2: 0.769 D.W. 1.91 F(4,23): 19.2
t statistics in parentheses
Serial correlation: F(l,22): 0.02647
Functional Form: F(l,22): 0.005845
Normality: %2 (2): 0.26061
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Heteroscedasticity: F(l,26): 0.76120 
CUSUM CUSUMSQ tests: O.K.
Predictive failure (period 1965-1987): F(6/17): 0.7803 
Variables
CYPMEX: growth of per capita GDP
rgner: rate of growth of nominal exchange rate
TTRAD: terms of trade (Index of price of exports/index of
price of imports).
CGR: real government consumption.
D83: Dummy for 1983
The coefficient of the rate of inflation is negative. We 
could not find any relation between the acceleration of 
inflation and growth.
Apart from inflation, other factors influencing growth 
considerably are terms of trade and government consumption. 
Both of them have the expected sign. These effects can be 
explained by a structuralist approach. An increase in the 
price of exports, CETERIS PARIBUS, increases the real 
resources of the economy, increasing investment. A rise in 
government consumption reduces the disposable resources to 
invest.
The regression shows satisfactory statistics. Serial 
correlation does not exist. Functional form is very good. 
Residuals are normal and heteroscedasticity is absent. 
Stability parameters are also satisfactory, with the 
predictive failure test showing no significant impact on 
the change of regime over the coefficients.
We tried other specifications including the foreign rate of 
interest. The coefficients were not significant. However, 
we performed an experiment suggested by De Gregorio (1993) : 
He asserts that in Latin America the rate of inflation 
impacts growth through productivity and not through 
investment. Bruno and Easterly (1995) report similar 
results in a study that includes other countries. The model
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presented in chapter three establishes a relation between 
the acceleration of inflation and investment, whilst 
productivity is constant. The Stockman's 1981 model and 
most of his derivations (especially Hung (1993)) also finds 
a relation between inflation and investment.
The quality of data for Mexico permits to know how much 
inflation affects investment and how much investment 
influences growth. We performed the exercise in two stages 
(two stage least squares). First, we run a regression of 
the ratio investment/GDP (Iy) against some control 
variables. Second, we regress the growth of per capita 
output against the forecasted value of the ratio Iy.
The results are the following (sample: annual 1965-1993)
Iy = 0.0704 - 0.000126 rgner + 0.2064 TTRAD 
(6.75) (-3.92) (13.57)
- 0.002659 RLIBOR - 0.036923 D8384
(-3.31) (-5.66)
R2: 0.911 D.W: 2.25 F(4,23): 59.4
t statistics in parentheses
Serial Correlation: F(l,22): 0.7395 
Functional Form: F(l,22): 1.0018 
Normality: X2(2): 0.9222 
Heteroscedasticity: F(l,26): 2.355 
CUSUM CUSUMSQ tests: O.K.
Predictive Failure (period 1965-1987): F(6,17): 0.258
RLIBOR: libor rate of interest in real terms.
The second regression is (sample annual 1965-1993):
CYPMEX = -15.26 + 83.8 Iye 
(-3.9) (4.3)
R2: 0.42 D.W. : 1.41 F (1,26) : 18.9
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Serial correlation: F(l,25): 2.04 
Functional Form: F(l,25): 2.09 
Normality: y? (2) z 2.49 
Heteroscedasticity: F(l,26): 0.2722 
CUSUM CUSUMSQ tests: O.K.
Predictive Failure (period 1965-1987): F(l,19): 1.30
Inflation has an important negative effect over the ratio 
investment/GDP. This one has a positive and significant 
influence over per capita growth. However, Iy can only 
explain around 40% of per capita growth. The set of 
variables of the first regression for Mexico can account 
for almost 80% of movements in CYPMEX. The channel of the 
relation between inflation and growth seems to go from 
inflation to investment as well as from inflation to 
produc t ivi ty.
+ Common Characteristics of the Estimations:
In the analysed economies, the process of disinflation and 
the management of exchange rate have exerted a positive and 
permanent effect over growth or/and the level of output. 
After controlling for other variables usually correlated 
with disinflation,145 it is possible to assert that there is 
a direct channel from the rate of inflation through growth.
Nonetheless, this fact does not necessarily mean that 
controlling the exchange rate is a desirable policy. 
Reductions in the rate of inflation under inconsistent 
fiscal policies often produce future higher inflation, and 
according to the presented view, future small rates of 
growth. Policies to combat inflation must be well designed 
to avoid future collapses of the exchange rate regime.
For the cases of Argentina and Israel, the results of the 
empirical part support the conclusions of the theoretical
1450penness of the economy or the reduction of the 
government expenditure.
238
part of chapter three. The acceleration of inflation is the 
variable related to growth. Instead, the data for Bolivia 
and Mexico support more the results already found in quite 
a lot of theoretical and empirical studies.
A final remark is to call for future research on other 
determinants of growth: specially trade liberalisation, the 
financial rate of interest and demand factors. Many of 
these variables seem to have a very important effect on the 
determination of the long run growth. However, their 
influence is not yet very clear.
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DATA APPENDIX
Data for Econometric Appendix is in the following units
CYPX: Growth of GDP in per capita terms (eg if it is 10% 
then CPYX=10) X= AR, BOL, MEX (Argentina Bolivia and 
Mexico)
rgner: Rate of growth of nominal exchange rate. The same 
kind of measure than per capita growth
LIBOR: Same measure. If it is 6% LIBOR= 6
COMEX: Index of trade for Bolivia. Percentage terms/100 (eg 
if 20% then COMEX=0.2)
TTRAD: Terms of trade in Mexico. Index (1980=1)
CGR: Government consumption/GDP in Mexico, (eg if 20% 
CGR=0.2)
RLIBOR: (LIBOR-INFUS)/(1+(INFUS/100))
INFUS: Rate of inflation in US (eg if 10% INFUS=10)
Iy: Investment/GDP (eg if 20% Iy=0.2)
LYPISR: Log of per capita output in Israel. GDP is in 
millions of new shequelims. Population is in 
millions.
LCOMEX: Log of index of volume of trade in Israel:
(exports+imports)/GDP both measures are in US 
dollars. The result is if for example the volume of 
trade is 20%, COMEX=0.2
LGRISR: Log of real consumption in per capita terms.
Government consumption is in millions of new 
shequelims of 1990. Population is in millions.
Sources: IMF, IFS annual book 1995.
Carpeta Historica de Banco de Mexico for 
TTRAD, CGR, Iy.
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